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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to U.C.A. § 78-2a-3(2)(j). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Whether the trial court erred in admitting evidence of plaintiff s adjustments to 
company book value, contrary to the shareholder agreement that book value would be 
established by the company's year-end audited financial statement. 
Standard of Review: Correction of error. Lee v. Barnes, 1999 UT App 126, ^  7, 
977 P.2d 550. 
Preservation of Issue: This issue was raised by objection of defense counsel at trial 
(Trial Transcript, hereafter "Tr.," 256-57, 264), as well as by pretrial motion in limine 
(Tr. 1-8), and pretrial motion to compel discovery (R. 141, 165-68). 
2. Whether the trial court erred in altering the special verdict question on company 
book value of stock, after reading the jury's verdict, to support the court's own view of the 
evidence. 
Standard of Review: Correction of error. Bennion v. LeGrand Johnson Constr., 
701 P.2d 1078, 1083 (Utah 1985). 
Preservation of Issue: This issue was preserved through contemporaneous 
objections by defense counsel (Tr. 990, 994), as well as through post-trial objections to 
the proposed judgment (R. 278, 340). 
3. Whether the trial court erred in awarding plaintiff all requested attorney fees, 
without apportionment for nonrecoverable fees and without supporting findings of fact. 
Standard of Review: Correction of error. Miller v. Martineau & Co., 1999 UT 
App 216, m 28, 46,983 P.2d 1107. 
Preservation of Issue: This issue was raised by post-trial motion. (R. 284, 331.) 
DETERMINATIVE LEGAL PROVISIONS 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 38(a), 47(r) and (q), 49(a), and 59(a), and U.C.A. §§ 
78-21-1 to -3, reproduced verbatim in the Addendum, are relevant to analysis of the 
issues presented. (Add. 96.) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case involves a dispute between the plaintiff, Roger Eggett ("Eggett"), and 
his former employer, Wasatch Energy Corporation ("Wasatch" or the "Company"), over 
the book value of stock for which Eggett claimed payment upon termination of his 
employment. (R. 1.) The issue was tried to a jury. Wasatch argued that Eggett agreed to 
be bound by the book value set forth in the company's audited financial statement. 
However, the trial court permitted Eggett to present evidence of alleged "adjustments" to 
vary the audited financial statement, all going to the total book value of company stock to 
which Eggett's ownership percentage would be applied to calculate the amount owed to 
Eggett. 
The jury returned a special verdict, finding a book \dX\xtfor the entire company of 
$135,672. (R. 267, Question 5, Add. 8.) After reading the verdict answer, however, the 
trial judge, the Honorable David S. Young, sua sponte altered the verdict question to refer 
only to the book value of Eggett1 s stock. (Tr. 988-95, Add. 11.) The court thereafter 
2 
entered judgment awarding Eggett the full $135,672, instead of only his 36.5% ownership 
interest in the total Company equity. (R. 367, Add. 2.) The court also awarded Eggett 
attorney fees, without reduction for nonrecoverable fees. (Supplemental Judgment, 
unnumbered, R. Vol. II, Add. 4.) Wasatch appeals from both judgments. (R. 392, 
Amended Notice of Appeal, unnumbered, R. Vol. II.) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A. Formation and Operation of Wasatch Energy. 
In 1993, Eggett formed Wasatch. Wasatch is a marketer and distributor of natural 
gas, purchasing, pooling, and reselling gas from small producers who cannot efficiently 
market the gas individually. Eggett began by working part-time out of his home. By 
1995, he was working full-time and had hired two employees, Todd Cusick and Curtis 
Chisholm. (Complaint, R. 1-2; Tr. 107-11, 130.) 
On April 13, 1995, Eggett, Cusick, and Chisholm entered into a Shareholders' 
Agreement ("Agreement"). (Trial Exhibit, "Exh.," 1, Add. 20.) Eggett also signed the 
Agreement as president of the corporation. This Agreement set forth the shares of 
Company stock allotted to each of the three employees, with Eggett as the majority 
shareholder. Paragraph 2 of the Agreement provided that, upon the termination of 
employment of any shareholder, the remaining shareholders or corporation would have 
the option to purchase the stock of the terminating shareholder. Paragraph 3 of the 
Agreement set the purchase price for the stock of the terminating shareholder as the 
"Book Value" of the stock. If the termination was "for cause," however, the purchase 
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price would be the price paid for the stock by the terminating shareholder, or "par value." 
Paragraph 18(d) of the Agreement defined "Book Value" as the net shareholders1 equity 
of the corporation as certified in the Company's year-end "audited financial statements." 
Such certified "Book Value," by the express terms of the Agreement, was to be "binding 
and conclusive upon the parties." (Add. 28; Tr. 112-17.) 
In late April 1995, to obtain additional capital to expand the business, Wasatch 
arranged for Magna Energy International ("MEI") to invest in the Company. Thereafter, 
the Wasatch Board of Directors consisted of Eggett, Cusick, Chisholm and two 
representatives from MEI, Keith Painter and Dennis Fox. To protect its investment, MEI 
insisted that decisions related to payroll, debt, and equity be approved by four-fifths of the 
Wasatch board, giving MEI supervisory control over financial matters. However, as 
Company president, Eggett retained personal control over operating expenditures, 
including actual payment of salaries, profit sharing, and reimbursement of personal 
expenses. From 1995 to 1997, Wasatch's sales volume increased significantly, and the 
number of employees increased to thirteen. (Tr. 121-25, 379-81, 529-30, 592, 756-57.) 
This business growth and MEFs control led to various management disputes 
between Eggett and Wasatch. These disputes pertained primarily to management 
structure and financial decisions, including Eggett's level of compensation. (Tr. 125-32; 
170-97, 208-50, 316-40, 388-430, 470-80, 529-33, 756-70.) 
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B. Termination of Employment 
Unable to resolve these disputes, Eggett submitted a letter of resignation, dated 
April 15, 1997. (Exh. 3, Add. 31.) By this letter, Eggett resigned immediately from his 
positions as Wasatch president, board member, and chairman of the board of directors. In 
addition, he terminated his employment with Wasatch effective July 14, 1997. Citing the 
Shareholders' Agreement, Eggett offered to sell his Wasatch stock "for the audited Book 
Value as of June 30, 1997," the date of the Company's fiscal-year-end audit. In a letter 
dated April 25, 1997, Wasatch formally accepted Eggett's resignation. (Exh. 4, Add. 32; 
Tr. 132-38,141-42,895-96.) 
In a letter dated May 1, 1997, Wasatch informed Eggett that it was changing his 
status from employee to consultant and conducting an audit of certain Company accounts. 
(Exh. 6.) The subsequent audit report, dated May 9, 1997 and prepared by MEI's outside 
accountant, revealed that Eggett had taken from the Company unauthorized compensation 
and reimbursements for personal expenses in the approximate amount of $185,000. (Exh. 
38, Add. 37.) Based on this excessive compensation and other grounds, Wasatch 
terminated Eggett's employment "for cause" by letter dated May 16, 1997. (Exh. 7, Add. 
33.) Because Eggett was terminated for cause, Wasatch subsequently tendered to Eggett 
a check for the par value of his Company stock, in the amount of $1,217. (Exh. 8, Add. 
36.) However, Eggett rejected the offer, and his shares of stock were subsequently 
canceled on the Company books. (Tr. 146-51, 347-52, 388, 435-54, 470-505, 509-10, 
597-618, 642, 712-14, 723-28, 744-48, 773-86, 845.) 
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C. Legal Action and Trial. 
Eggett subsequently commenced this action, claiming the right to additional 
compensation for 1997, as well as a right to the book value of his Company stock. 
(Complaint, ffl[ 14, 19, R. 3-4.) Eggett alleged that the book value of his stock, 
comprising 36.5 percent of the Company's outstanding shares, was $80,000. (Complaint, 
Tf 20, R. 4.) Wasatch counterclaimed for refund of Eggett's unauthorized compensation 
and benefits in the approximate amount of $175,000. (R. 17-25.) The parties presented -
their competing claims in a jury trial, with Judge Young presiding. (R. 255-66.) 
On the issue of compensation, Eggett asserted a right to 10 percent of Company 
profits for 1997, claiming unpaid profit sharing in the total amount of $66,688. (Exh. 26, 
p. 5, Add. 50; Tr. 252-55, 894.) Wasatch argued that Company net income for that year 
was only $57,224, and that Eggett was accordingly entitled to a maximum profit sharing 
payment of only $5700. (Exh. 42, p. 4, Add. 64; Tr. 573, 980.) The jury awarded Eggett 
additional compensation of only $11,888. (Special Verdict, Questions 1 and 2, R. 266, 
Add. 7.) Wasatch does not challenge that portion of the verdict and, indeed, believes that 
this jury resolution bears on the issues before this Court on appeal. 
On the separate issue of payment for Eggett's stock, the jury found that Eggett was 
entitled to the book value of the stock, implicitly finding that Eggett was not terminated 
for cause. The jury also found that the book value of Eggett's stock should be determined 
as of June 30, 1997, the date of the Company's year-end audited financial statement. 
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than his own self-serving testimony, in support of his adjustments to the Company's 
audited financial statement. In fact, Eggett conceded that the Company's audited 
statement for June 30, 1997 was prepared in accordance with generally accepted 
accounting principles, and that retroactive adjustments to estimates for reserves and 
contingencies would be contrary to those principles. (Tr. 890, 290-92.) Further, both the 
Company's chief financial officer and its independent auditor, representing Ernst & 
Young, testified that Eggett's retroactive adjustments to the audited statement were 
unjustified and violated generally accepted accounting principles. (Tr. 570-79, 653-70.) 
Eggett admitted that his book value calculation was substantially different from the 
audited statement and, therefore, was outside the terms of the Shareholders' Agreement, 
but nonetheless he asked the jury to award him "what is fair and just." (Tr. 313-15.) 
D. Jury Verdict As Rendered and Revised. 
At the conclusion of the evidence, the trial judge read the jury instructions and 
special verdict form to the jury. Minor corrections were made to the special verdict form 
to make it internally consistent; however, no objection or correction was made to 
Question 5. (Tr. 925-29.) That question, following the formula used by both parties 
during the trial, asked the jury to determine the total stockholder equity of the Company: 
"On the date for evaluation of the shares that you selected above [June 30, 1997], what 
was the 'book value' of Wasatch Energy as defined by the Shareholders Agreement?" (R. 
267, Add. 8.) The clear intent of the parties, consistent with the trial formula, was to 
multiply this total book value figure by Eggett's ownership interest of 36.5 percent to 
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obtain the book value of Eggett1 s stock, thus sparing the jury the math and avoiding any 
risk of computational error. 
The jury came back with the answer to Question 5, finding a total Company book 
value of $135,671.96. (Id.) The jury was not asked to make, and did not make, any 
determination as to what amount Eggett should be awarded as the book value for his 
stock. Thereafter, on his own initiative and without any objection from Eggettfs counsel, 
Judge Young suggested to the jury that its response to Question 5 was a "mistake," and 
that the question should be altered to fit their answer. Over the objections of defense 
counsel, the judge opined that the question was "confusing" and "ambiguous" because "I 
don't know how they would have come up with the book value of that company at 135." 
(Tr. 990, 993, 995, Add. 14, 17, 19.) The judge then polled the jury, asking through a 
thoroughly confusing compound question whether Eggett was entitled to 36.5 percent of 
$135,000 or to the full $135,000. Prompted by the trial court's expressed view of the 
question, each juror answered "yes" to the judge's alternative question, leaving the judge 
room to apply his own inference that they intended to award the full $135,000. (Tr. 991-
93.) 
The court subsequently rejected Wasatch's objections to the proposed order, which 
sought that the order conform to the actual verdict (R. 278, 340), and entered Judgment 
for Eggett in the amount of the full $135,671.61. (R. 367-68, Add. 2.) The court 
subsequently entered a Supplemental Judgment awarding Eggett costs and attorney fees 
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as the prevailing party, (R. Unnumbered item filed April 7,2000, Add. 4.) Wasatch 
appeals from both judgments. (R. 392, and unnumbered item filed April 13,2000.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The parties contractually agreed that the book value of Eggett's stock would be 
"conclusively established" by the Company's audited financial statement. Courts are 
bound to enforce contracts according to the parties5 intent. Extrinsic evidence is 
inadmissible to alter or circumvent the terms of a clear contract. That substantive rule 
applies as well to a stock buy out agreement, such as the Shareholders' Agreement here. 
Moreover, Eggett makes no claim that the audited financial statement was not prepared in 
accordance with accepted accounting practices. Accordingly, Eggett is bound by the 
audited statement setting Company book value at $75,452, and the trial court erred by 
admitting evidence of Eggett's adjustments to that figure. Eggett's 36.5 percent share of 
that book value is $27,540. 
Alternatively, the book value of Eggett's stock should be limited to $49,520, 
which is 36.5 percent of $135,672, the Company book value found by the jury in response 
to Special Verdict Question No. 5. Once the issue of Company book value went to the 
jury, Wasatch was legally entitled to have that issue determined exclusively by the jury, 
without intervention by Judge Young. Eggett's counsel never objected that Question No. 
5 was ambiguous; therefore, any such objection is waived. Moreover, the question is 
clear on its face, plainly asking for the book value of Wasatch Energy, following the 
formula used by both parties at trial in calculating the book value of Eggett's stock. 
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Judge Young had no authority to question the jury's answer or to offer his own opinion 
that the question was "confusing/' or that the answer was a "mistake" or not supported by 
the evidence. If the amount awarded Eggett was considered inadequate or unsupported 
by the evidence, the proper remedy was by motion for new trial, not by sua sponte 
intervention of Judge Young. The judge plainly erred by altering the verdict question and 
coercing the jury to accept the judge's own view of the evidence. 
Finally, the trial court erred by awarding Eggett attorney fees without 
apportionment for nonrecoverable fees and without adequate findings of fact. Attorney 
fees are authorized only by the Shareholders' Agreement for the limited purpose of 
enforcing that Agreement as to book value of Eggett's stock. Accordingly, Eggett is not 
entitled to fees incurred in enforcing the separate Employment Agreement relating to his 
compensation. The separate compensation and stock issues were treated separately 
during discovery and trial, and case law requires that fees be apportioned between the two 
claims. In the absence of apportionment and adequate supporting findings, the fee award 
must be vacated. In addition, if Wasatch prevails on either of its arguments on appeal 
relating to book value of Eggett's stock, Wasatch is entitled to fees and costs on appeal, 
as well as to reduction of Eggett's fees and costs at trial. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT 1: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY ADMITTING EGGETT'S 
ADJUSTMENTS TO COMPANY BOOK VALUE CONTRARY TO 
THE PARTIES' CLEAR AGREEMENT THAT THE AUDITED 
FINANCIAL STATEMENT CONCLUSIVELY ESTABLISHED 
BOOK VALUE. 
A. Governing Legal Principles. 
"In interpreting a contract, the intentions of the parties are controlling." Winegar 
v. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104, 108 (Utah 1991). Accordingly, courts are required to 
enforce contracts according to the intent of the parties as manifested by the clear language 
of the contract itself. E.g., Republic Group, Inc. v. Won-Door Corp., 883 P.2d 285, 294 
(Utah App. 1994) ("trial court must give effect to the intentions of the parties"); Verhoef 
v. Aston, 740 P.2d 1342, 1344 (Utah App. 1987) ("[contracts should be construed so as 
to give effect to the parties' intentions"). A court is not free to disregard or rewrite a 
contract simply because it may produce a result that appears unfair to one of the parties. 
E.g., Dalton v. Jerico Constr. Co., 642 P.2d 748, 750 (Utah 1982) ("it is not for a court to 
rewrite a contract improvidently entered into at arm's length or to change the bargain 
indirectly on the basis of supposed equitable principles"); Rio Algom Corp. v. Jimco Ltd., 
618 P.2d 497, 505 (Utah 1980) ("A court will no t . . . make a better contract for the 
parties than they have made for themselves."). 
Moreover, in construing a contract, a court is bound by the plain language of the 
contract. Extrinsic evidence is not admissible to alter, augment, or circumvent the terms 
of an unambiguous contract. E.g., Winegar, supra, at 108 (court may consider extrinsic 
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evidence only if the contract language is "ambiguous or uncertain"); Ron Case Roofing 
and Asphalt Paving, Inc. v. Blomquist, 773 P.2d 1382, 1385 (Utah 1989) ("use of 
extrinsic evidence is permitted only if the document appears to incompletely express the 
parties' agreement or if it is ambiguous in expressing that agreement"). For example, in 
Brown v. Richards, 840 P.2d 143 (Utah App. 1992), the defendant agreed to purchase 
stock in the plaintiffs business for $900,000, with an option to purchase another building. 
After the defendant stopped making payments, the plaintiff sued for the purchase price, 
plus an additional $500,000 he claimed defendant promised if he failed to exercise the 
option on the other building. 
In a special verdict, the Brown jury found that the defendant had agreed to the 
$500,000 increase, and the court entered judgment for that amount. However, the court 
of appeals reversed, holding that the parties' written agreement set the purchase price at 
$900,000, without mention of any additional amount for non-exercise of the option. 
Evidence intended to vary the written terms of the agreement on the stock price was not 
admissible. Accordingly, the defendant was entitled to a directed verdict on that issue, 
and the question should not have been submitted to the jury. This Court vacated the trial 
court's award for the purported increase in the stock price. Id. at 148. 
The same rule applies in the context of employment and stock buyout agreements. 
In Webb v. R.O.A. General Inc., 804 P.2d 547 (Utah App. 1991), the plaintiff entered 
into a written employment contract by which he would serve as vice president and board 
chairman and be paid $100,000 per year, plus one percent of annual net sales. In the 
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subsequent lawsuit over compensation, the company argued that the intent of the parties 
was to pay only $85,000 in cash, with $15,000 in stock trades, and to pay the percentage 
of sales only if funds were available. Id. at 551. The company's audited financial 
statements showed accrued amounts for unpaid compensation. Id. at 550. 
This Court held that evidence of the company's intent was inadmissible: "Courts 
are not obligated to rewrite contracts entered into by parties dealing at arms' length, to 
relieve one party from a bargain later regretted, simply on supposed equitable principles." 
Id. at 551. Because the company's claim was "contrary not only to the terms of the 
integrated employment contract, but also to its own business records . . . the trial court 
correctly held that extrinsic evidence was inadmissible to vary the terms of the contract." 
Id. at 552. See also Hall v. Process Instruments and Control Inc., 866 P.2d 604 (Utah 
App. 1993), aff'd, 890 P.2d 1024 (Utah 1995) (trial court properly applied parol evidence 
rule to exclude evidence outside the written employment agreement). 
Similarly, in Swecker v. Rau, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3301 (D. Pa. 1990), the 
parties organized a small business and entered into a stock purchase agreement by which 
the company could purchase the stock of a departing shareholder at book value. When 
the plaintiff, who had departed, learned the book value of his stock, he sued to have his 
stock valued by another method and sought to introduce other evidence of value on the 
grounds that the term "book value" was ambiguous. Id. at *7. The court granted 
summary judgment to defendants, holding that the plaintiff was bound by the agreed book 
value of his stock: 
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[T]he agreement adopts the book value contained in the corporation's 
financial statement, as prepared by an independent certified public 
accountant in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles. 
Thus, the clear intent of the parties is ascertainable from the unambiguous 
language of the document itself, and parol evidence is inadmissible. [Id. at 
•7-8.] 
Finally, other courts have specifically held that a stock buyout agreement setting 
the stock price at the book value established by the company's audited financial statement 
is binding on the parties, without adjustments. For example, in Crowder Constr. Co. v. 
Riser, 517 S.E.2d 178 (N.C. App. 1999), the defendant employee signed a shareholder 
agreement providing that, upon termination of employment, stock would be sold to the 
company at the adjusted book value established by the audited year-end financial 
statement. The employee rejected the payment offered, contending that book value of his 
shares was not properly calculated because company auditors had made adjustments for 
tax liability, uncompleted contracts, and other timing adjustments. The company sued to 
enforce the agreement, and the court granted summary judgment to the company. 
The court held that the accountants were authorized to "adjust the book value per 
share to account for several possible contingencies related to the Company's bookkeeping 
practices." Id. at 185. The plaintiff argued that the accounting adjustments made 
stockholder equity artificially low, and that the total should be increased for additional 
inventories and over-depreciation of equipment. Id. at 186-87. However, the court 
rejected those arguments as mere differences in accounting judgment. "There is no 
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contention that [the independent auditors] failed to follow generally accepted auditing 
standards in reviewing the Company's financial statement." The court concluded: 
Where the value of a closely held corporation is determined by the 
use of its balance sheet as directed by a "buy-out" agreement, and is 
calculated by the accounting firm normally servicing that corporation in 
accordance with the terms of the "buy-out" agreement, we hold that the 
value determined by that accounting firm is presumptively correct, in the 
absence of mathematical error, evidence of fraud (such as willful 
concealment of assets), or evidence of a failure to follow generally accepted 
accounting practices. [Id. at 189, emp. added.] 
Similarly, in Area, Inc. v. Stentenfeld, 541 P.2d 755 (Alas. 1975), the corporation 
entered into an agreement with a departing shareholder to purchase the shareholder's 
stock at the book value established by the most recent financial statement, which 
contained adjustments for deferred compensation. The corporation later audited the 
books and concluded that the stock had been overvalued because the deferred 
compensation had not been adjusted for tax liability. Id. at 757, 761. 
The court held that the corporation was bound by the book value of stock as 
adopted in the agreement. The court reasoned that "book value" has no fixed legal 
meaning, and that different results can be obtained by different methods of calculation. 
The method used in valuing the stock had been approved and consistently used by the 
corporation, was consistent with accepted accounting principles, and was contemplated 
by the parties to the agreement; therefore, the corporation was bound by the agreement 
and could not alter the book value retroactively. Id. at 763-64. See also Jones v. Harris, 
388 P.2d 539, 542 (Wash. 1964) (parties to stock buyout agreement are bound by "book 
17 
value" established by financial statements and courts should accept valuations reached 
through accepted accounting practices); Sperco v. M&SD Corp., 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
973, *8 (D. 111. 1989) (parties agreed to book value of stock established in accordance 
with accounting principles and court cannot "renegotiate a contract... to ensure a more 
favorable result"). 
B. Application to Present Case. 
The foregoing authorities compel the conclusion that Eggett is bound by the book 
value established in the audited financial statement for June 30, 1997, without the 
retroactive adjustments presented at trial. The Shareholders' Agreement signed by Eggett 
is clear and comprehensive. Paragraph 3 states that the "purchase price" for stock of a 
terminating employee "shall be the 'Book Value5 (as defined in Paragraph 18) of such 
stock." Paragraph 18(d) defines "Book Value" as follows: 
"Book Value" shall mean the consolidated net shareholders5 equity of the 
Corporation determined as of the end of each [fiscal year] as certified to by 
the firm of independent public accountants then regularly employed by the 
Corporation . . . . Such determination shall be made on an accrual basis in 
accordance with generally accepted accounting principles and shall be 
binding and conclusive upon the parties to this Agreement. . . . The "Book 
Value" . . . shall be based on audited financial statements. [Add. 28, emp. 
added.] 
The obvious purpose of relying on the valuation of independent auditors is to avoid 
potential conflict and litigation over the parties5 differing views and calculations of book 
value. 
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Trial Exhibit 42 is the Company's audited financial statement for June 30,1997, 
prepared by the independent accounting firm of Ernst & Young. (Add. 59.) Eggett 
initially retained these accountants, who had been regularly employed by the Company 
for several years. The independent audit includes careful review of the company's 
financial statements and source documents to verify that the statements accurately 
represent the Company's operations and financial condition. (Tr. 572, 653-55.) Under 
accepted accounting principles, the audited statement is prepared on an accrual basis, 
meaning that income and expenses are counted as incurred, not when actually received or 
paid. Based on the judgment of the auditors, contingent liabilities or losses may be 
attributed to the Company before they are actually incurred. (Tr. 656-59.) 
The audited statement includes an adjustment of $618,000 for anticipated liability 
in the United Utilities lawsuit (Tr. 660-64); $283,000 for anticipated loss on a "swap 
contract" that had fallen through (Tr. 664-65); $296,252 for "suspense items," uncertain 
earnings withheld from income for a prescribed period of time (Tr. 665-67); and $45,553 
for the Gryndberg contract, which presented a potential loss (Tr. 667-69). The 
independent auditor testified that the June 30, 1997 financial statement, including these 
adjustments, was prepared in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles, 
that the statement accurately presented the Company's stockholder equity at $75,452, and 
that Eggett's adding these adjustments back into retained earnings based on actual future 
outcomes was contrary to accounting principles. (Tr. 659, 669-70.) Accordingly, the 
book value of Eggett's stock, as defined by the Shareholders' Agreement, was $27,540. 
19 
Eggett has asserted no valid basis to disregard or revise the book value of stock 
contained in the audited financial statement. In his resignation letter, Eggett conceded, In 
accordance with the Shareholders' Agreement, "I am required to sell my shares in the 
corporation . . . for the audited Book Value as of June 30, 1997." (Add. 31, emp. added.) 
Eggett's Complaint also cited and sought to enforce the Shareholders' Agreement, 
alleging that the book value of his shares in December 1996 was $80,000, multiples less 
than the $255,000 sought at trial. (R. 4.) 
The Complaint contained no allegation of error or fraud in the audited financial 
statement of June 30, 1997. Moreover, under questioning by his own counsel, Eggett 
testified at trial: 
Q . . . You're not claiming that the audit is not prepared in accordance 
with generally accepted accounting principles? 
A I'm not. [Tr. 890.] 
Rather, Eggett claimed only that accounting principles allow for "a range of reasonable 
answers." (Tr. 891.) However, having agreed by contract to the "answer" provided by 
the Company's independent accountants, Eggett was precluded from substituting a book 
value of his own. See Crowder Constr. Co. v. Kiser, supra, 517 S.E.2d at 189. 
In summary, based on the parties' agreement that book value of Eggett's stock 
would be "conclusively" established by the audited financial statement, Eggett is bound 
by that value, and extrinsic evidence is inadmissible to alter that agreed value. See Brown 
v. Richards, supra, 840 P.2d at 148; Swecker v. Rau, supra. By admitting such evidence 
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to contradict the agreed book value, the trial court relieved Eggett from the terms of his 
bargain, rewriting the contract on supposed equitable principles, contrary to governing 
case law. See Webb v. R.O.A. General Inc., supra, 804 P.2d at 551; Dalton v. Jerico 
Constr. Co., supra, 642 P.2d at 750. In the absence of any allegation of mathematical 
error, fraud, or departure from generally accepted accounting principles, the value 
determined by the independent accountants "is presumptively correct" and binding on the 
parties. See Crowder Constr. Co. v. Riser, supra\ Area, Inc. v. Stentenfeld, supra, 541 
P.2d at 763-64. Therefore, the trial court erred by admitting extrinsic evidence to 
contradict the agreed book value of Eggett's stock at $27,540. 
POINT II: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY ALTERING THE SPECIAL 
VERDICT QUESTION TO INTERPOSE ITS OWN VIEW OF THE 
EVIDENCE AFTER THE JURY HAD RENDERED ITS VERDICT. 
If this Court does not limit Eggett's stock payment to the agreed amount of 
$27,540, as set forth above, it should nonetheless limit the payment to 36.5 percent of the 
jury's verdict of $135,672, for a total stock payment of $49,520. 
A. Inviolability of Jury Verdict. 
Defendant, Wasatch Energy, is legally entitled to have the factual issues in this 
case decided by the jury. Utah Const. Art. I, Sec. 10; U.C.A. § 78-21-1. "All questions 
of fact, where the trial is by jury , . . . are to be decided by the jury, and all evidence 
thereon is to be addressed to them " U.C.A. § 78-21-2. "The right of trial by jury as 
declared by the constitution or as given by statute shall be preserved to the parties." Rule 
38(a), Utah R. Civ. P. Wasatch properly demanded a jury trial of the factual issues. (R. 
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26.) Accordingly, the jury in this case bears the exclusive duty to determine the 
credibility of witnesses, weigh the evidence, and make findings of fact, while the role of 
the judge is limited to deciding questions of law and instructing the jury on the law. See 
Groen v. Tri-O-Inc, 667 P.2d 598, 601 (Utah 1983); U.C.A. § 78-21-3; Model Utah Jury 
Instructions 2.2, 2.6, 2.27 (1993 ed.). 
Rule 49(a), Utah R. Civ. P., authorizes the trial court to submit factual issues to the 
jury by way of a special verdict form containing written interrogatories. Special verdict 
forms may be proposed by the parties, as was done in this case. (R. 184, 270.) If either 
party claims that a special verdict interrogatory is confusing or ambiguous, that party is 
required to object to the form of the question before submission to the jury, otherwise, the 
objection is waived. See Baker v. Cook, 308 P.2d 264, 266-67 (Utah 1957) ("If the 
defendant felt that the questions were so drawn as to confuse the jury, request should have 
been made to clarify the questions . . . . " ) ; Goggins v. Harwood, 704 P.2d 1282, 1289 
(Wyo. 1985) (party waived alleged error in special verdict form by failing to object prior 
to submission to jury); State ex rel Sam's Texaco & Towing, Inc. v. Gallagher, 842 P.2d 
383, 389 (Or. 1992) (party must object to special verdict form before jury retires or 
objection is waived). In the present case, neither party nor the court raised any objection 
or question regarding the meaning or clarity of Special Verdict Question 5, which asked 
the jury to determine the book value of Wasatch stock. 
Once the jury renders its special verdict, the trial judge has no authority to alter or 
reject that determination simply because the judge disagrees with it or considers it 
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unsupported by the disputed evidence that the judge personally finds most persuasive. 
For example, in EFCO Distributing, Inc. v. P err in, All PJZd 615 (Utah 1966), a contract 
dispute, the jury found for the plaintiff but awarded no damages. The plaintiff moved for 
judgment NOV and new trial, arguing that the evidence justified some damages for the 
breach of contract. However, the Supreme Court upheld denial of the motions, enforcing 
the verdict as rendered. The Court acknowledged that a trial court has "supervisory 
authority to rectify mistakes" by a jury, such as when the jury "has refused to accept 
credible, uncontradicted evidence where there is no rational basis for rejecting it, or it is 
plain to be seen that the jury has acted under a misconception of proven facts, or has 
misapplied or disregarded the law, or where it appears that the verdict was the result of 
passion and prejudice." Id. at 617 (emp. added). In such a case, the court may properly 
grant judgment NOV or a new trial. Id. However, "unless some such error or 
impropriety as just stated is clearly shown, the verdict of the jury should stand." Id. (emp. 
added). 
Because of the vital importance of trial by jury, a trial court must not interfere 
unnecessarily with the jury's verdict: 
[W]hen the parties have had the opportunity of presenting their evidence 
and arguments concerning their dispute to the jury, the judgment of the jury 
should be allowed to swing through a wide arc within the limits of how 
reasonable minds might see the situation; and the court should not upset a 
verdict merely because it may disagree. If it did so, the right of trial by jury 
would be effectively abrogated and the trial may as well be to the court in 
the first place. [Id. at 618, emp. added.] 
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Given the "exclusive prerogative of the jury to judge the credibility of witnesses," and the 
right of the jury to discount or even disregard the plaintiffs self-interested testimony, the 
trial court must not be "arbitrary by nullifying the jury's judgment merely because it is 
not in accord with his own." Id. 
Similarly, in First Security Bank v. Ezra C. Lundahl, Inc., 454 P.2d 886 (Utah 
1969), an action to collect on a dishonored check, the jury found, by special verdict, that 
the bank was negligent, but that the parties had previously settled all accounts, thus 
precluding recovery by the plaintiff. However, the trial judge made an "additional 
finding" that the disputed check was excluded from the settlement and awarded the 
plaintiff recovery. Id. at 889. 
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that "[t]he effect of this 'further finding9 was 
actually to contravene the finding made by the jury." Id. While the trial court may 
correct "obvious errors or defects" in a special verdict, "it is not the trial court's 
prerogative to make findings inconsistent therewith and thereby defeat the effect of the 
jury's findings." Id. See also Brigham v. Moon Lake Electric Ass'n, 470 P.2d 393, 397-
98 (Utah 1970) (absent a motion for new trial, the trial judge cannot review the 
sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury's verdict); State ex rel Sam Js Texaco & 
Towing, Inc. v. Gallagher, 842 P.2d 383, 389 (Or. 1992) (trial judge erred in refusing to 
accept the jury's plain verdict). 
As further demonstrated below, Judge Young in the present case had no right or 
justification to question the jury verdict. By so doing, he substituted his judgment for that 
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of the jur>, invaded the exclusive province of the jury, and effectively abrojeated the right 
of Wasatch to a jury determination of the key fact issue in the case, 
B. Correction of Obvious Error Under Rule 47(r) Does Not Apply. 
A trial court's correction of a special verdict is authorized by Rule 47(r), Utah R. 
Civ. P., which states: "If the verdict rendered is informal or insufficient, it may be 
corrected by the jury under the advice of the court, or the jury may be sent out again." 
However, as applied by the courts, such correction is limited to errors that are obvious on 
the face of the verdict. 
For example, in Jorgensen v. Gonzales. 383 P.2d 934 (Utah 1963), a personal 
injury action, the jury returned a special verdict that included general damages down to 
the penny, indicating the possibility of a quotient verdict. The court questioned the jury 
and determined that the jury had improperly considered the plaintiffs personal expenses 
as an element of general damage. The court directed the jury to retire and reconsider its 
verdict, and the jury returned with a corrected verdict showing a round figure for general 
damages. 
The Supreme Court upheld this procedure under Rule 47(r), defining the term 
"insufficient" in the rule to mean "inadequate or lacking in some requirement, purpose or 
use." Id. at 935. The Court explained that "where it is apparent that there is some patent 
error in connection with the verdict, the court may of course call the matter to [the jury's] 
attention and direct them to redeliberate." Id. (emp. added). However, absent some 
patent error in the verdict, the court must not interfere with a damage award: "[T]here is 
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no set formula as to the amount of damages that mayl)e awarded. This is properly left to 
the sound judgment of a jury " Id. at 936. 
Other cases illustrate the proper application and limits of Rule 47(r). In Brown v. 
Johnson, All P.2d 942 (Utah 1970), the judge instructed the jury that special damages 
could not exceed $377.50. The jury returned a verdict of $10,000 in special damages and 
$1700 in general damages. The court advised the jury that there was "an obvious error" 
on the face of the verdict and instructed them to retire and redeliberate. The jury returned 
with a corrected verdict of $377.50 in special damages and the balance in general 
damages. This corrected verdict was upheld on appeal because "[t]he error was 
undoubtedly induced by failure on the part of the jury to understand the difference 
between the terms 'general damage' and 'special damage.'" Id. at 945. 
Similarly, in Ute-Cal Land Development Corp. v. Sather, 605 P.2d 1240 (Utah 
1980), the jury found that the plaintiff was injured by delivery of a warranty deed but 
awarded no damages for the injury. The court held that this "patent insufficiency" was 
within the scope of Rule 47(r), but that the plaintiff had waived any entitlement to relief 
by failing to object when the verdict was rendered. Id. at 1248. See also Langton v. 
International Transport, Inc., 491 P.2d 1211, 1214-15 (Utah 1971) (special verdict was 
"insufficient" and "defective in form in that it did not comprehend all the items of 
damage contained in the instructions"; however, relief was denied for failure to object); 
State ex rel Sam's Texaco & Towing, Inc. v. Gallagher, supra, 842 P.2d at 387 
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(construing same language as Rule 47(r); special verdict is "sufficient^ if it "finds on an 
issue which ultimately determines and necessarily supports the judgment rendered"). 
Based on the foregoing case law, the jury's response to Special Verdict Question 
5, providing the book value of Wasatch stock, contained no obvious or patent error to 
justify application of Rule 47(r). Neither the judge nor Eggett's counsel identified any 
facial error in the verdict similar to those presented in the governing case law, above. 
C Rule 47(r) Does Not Apply to Challenges Based on Sufficiency of Evidence. 
A challenge to a jury verdict based, not on obvious error, but on sufficiency of 
evidence to support the verdict must be maintained under Rule 59(a) rather than Rule 
47(r). The court in Langton v. International Transport, Inc., supra, discussed the two 
types of challenges: 
There is a basic distinction between an insufficient or informal verdict and a 
verdict regular on its face, which awards inadequate damages . . . . In the 
latter case, a new trial must be granted to correct the error. In the former 
case, counsel has an opportunity to assert an objection, and the court, under 
Rule 47(r), U.R.C.P., may return the jury for further deliberation and with 
further instruction to correct the irregularity. [491 P.2d at 1215.] 
For example, in Stevenett v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 1999 UT App 80, 977 P.2d 508, the 
trial court granted the defendant's post-trial motion to reduce past special damages from 
$93,000 to $84,184.51. On appeal, the plaintiff argued that such relief was based on Rule 
47(r) and was, therefore, inappropriate as untimely. However, the Court of Appeals held 
that relief was properly, and necessarily, based on Rule 59(a): 
While Rule 47 speaks of a court's authority to correct an informal or 
insufficient verdict (also known as an irregular verdict'), Stevenett's 
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reliance on this rule is misplaced In this case, the court authorized the 
remittitur under Rule 59(a)(6), for insufficient evidence to support the 
verdict, not Rule 47(r). An informal or insufficient verdict under Rule 47(r) 
relates to the form of the verdict, not the sufficiency of the evidence 
supporting it, and the issue here is insufficiency in that there was no 
evidence . . , to support the award greater than $85,184.51, not that the 
verdict was irregular in form. [Id. at 517, emp. added.] 
Likewise, in the present case, the trial court's concern with the jury's response to 
Special Verdict Question 5 was not the form of the verdict, but the insufficiency of the 
evidence to support it. The verdict was "regular on its face"; the court simply regarded 
the amount of damages inadequate under his view of the evidence. Therefore, Rule 47(r) 
has no application to the present case. Rather, the proper procedure for Eggett to 
challenge the jury's finding in Question 5 was by motion for new trial under Rule 59(a). 
Langton and Stevenett, supra. Absent such a motion, the trial judge had no authority to 
assess the sufficiency of evidence to support the verdict. Brigham v. Moon Lake Electric 
Ass 'n, supra, 470 P.2d at 397 ("trial court has had no opportunity to pass upon the legal 
sufficiency of the evidence during the trial, and cannot do so unless a motion for a new 
trial upon the ground of the insufficiency of the evidence is presented to it"). See also 
Goddardv. Hickman, 685 P.2d 530, 532 (Utah 1984) (a trial judge's "mere disagreement 
[with a verdict] is not sufficient reason to order a new trial"). 
D. Error in the Trial Court's Intervention and Procedure. 
After reading the jury's response to Special Verdict Question 5, finding "the book 
value of Wasatch Energy" to be $135,671.61, Judge Young embarked, sua sponte, on a 
course to revise the question to suit his own view of the evidence. The judge first asked 
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the jury foreman, "[I]s this the value that the jury believes should be paid for the shares?" 
(Tr. 989, L. 23.) That initial question was unjustified, as there is no ambiguity in the 
verdict form or the jury's answer that required clarification. Moreover, the judge's 
question deviated from the question asked in the verdict form, thus tending to mislead, 
confuse, and coerce the jury toward the judge's point of view. If the judge believed the 
jury's verdict contained "obvious error," thus within the scope of Rule 47(r), "[t]he 
proper procedure [was] for the trial court to require the jury to return for further 
deliberation." Ute-Cal Land Development Corp. v. Sather, supra, 605 P.2d at 1247 
(citation omitted). See also Jorgensen v. Gonzales, supra, 383 P.2d at 935 ("the court 
directed the jury to go out and reconsider its verdict"); Brown v. Johnson, supra, All P.2d 
at 945 (u[t]he trial judge elected to send the jury out to correct the verdict"). 
To the judge's question, the jury foreman responded, "We believe that to be the 
book value." (Tr. 990, L. 1.) Thus, the foreman's answer is consistent with the verdict 
answer; the $135,672 is the Wasatch "book value," not the amount to be paid to Eggett. 
Based on the foreman's answer, Judge Young should have dropped the inquiry, 
but he pressed on, offering his own opinion: "I think the question was confusing and 
that's why I wanted to ask that question." (Id., L. 5-6.) Defense counsel then objected: 
"It seems rather inappropriate to be coming up with questions for the jury at this time. 
The question is as it's stated and it's answered as it's answered." (Id., L. 9-12.) The 
judge overruled the objection, explaining, "Well, I'm not going to allow that to stand if it 
is a mistake." (Id., L. 13.) 
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Having suggested to the jury that the question was "confusing" and that their 
verdict was a "mistake," the judge again asked the foreman: "Is this the value that you 
think the corporation owes to Mr. Eggett to purchase his shares?" Following the judge's 
leading question, this time the foreman answered, "Yes." (Id.,L. 17-20.) The judge then 
proposed to poll the jury. (Id., L. 24.) 
Wasatch counsel again objected, explaining that the form of the verdict question 
tracked the way both parties presented the evidence at trial, and that it was the intent of 
both parties to multiply that Company book value by Eggett's ownership percentage to 
derive the amount owed to him. (Tr. 991, L. 5-10.) Eggett himself testified at trial that 
the amount owed to him is derived by first determining the book value of the Company, 
and then multiplying that figure by his ownership interest of 36.5 percent. (Tr. 256.) 
Eggett's own exhibit followed the same formula. (Add. 51.) Nonetheless, the judge 
again overruled the objection, stating his belief that the jury did not intend that result. 
(Id., LAI.) 
Judge Young then proceeded to poll the jury with the following question: 
We know from the facts of this case that Mr. Eggett owns 36.5 
percent. If I interpret your answer to this question to be $135,000.00 for 
book value. That would mean that he would be entitled to 36.5 percent of 
$135,000.00. If I understand it the way I have now asked you the question, 
he is entitled to $135,671.96 which is a number that you have come to by 
some calculation method for the purchase of his shares of stock. So, in 
other words, this figure, 135,000, is a representative smaller figure due to 
him which represents 36 percent of X which is a larger number. All right? 
Now, I want to be sure that I understand that correctly and if any of 
you disagree with that, I want to know that. 
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,... [I]s that your verdict as I've just explained it. [Tr. 991-92, Add. 15-16.] 
Each juror answered "yes." (Tr. 992-93.) 
Notwithstanding these affirmative answers, the question as posed by Judge Young 
was clearly compound, leading, thoroughly confusing, and misrepresented the actual 
verdict question. The jurors' answer "yes" was only as good as the question posed. Were 
they assenting to an award of "36.5 percent of $135,000," as stated in the first part of the 
question, or to an award of the entire $135,671.96, as stated in the second part of the 
question? Moreover, the $135,671.96 is not a number that the jury came to "by some 
calculation method for the purchase of his shares ofstocl? (emp. added), as misstated by 
the judge. That figure, as requested by the clear verdict question, is "the 'book value' of 
Wasatch Energy." (R. 267.) 
This procedure was not a "polling" of the jury, in the accepted sense of asking the 
jurors if the written verdict is their verdict, see Rule 47(q); rather, this was a blatant 
attempt by the trial court to control the verdict by altering the clear verdict question. 
Through his misleading compound question, Judge Young coerced the jury to accept and 
follow his view of the evidence, or at least created enough uncertainty to allow his own 
inference of jury intent to supplant the true verdict. Thus, the judge plainly failed to act 
"properly and discreetly in handling the situation." See Jorgensen v. Gonzales, supra, 
383 P.2d at 936. See also 9 Moore's Federal Practice § 49.1 l[3][b] (3d ed. 2000) 
(acknowledging the preeminent position of the trial judge and how easily the judge's 
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comments and demeanor can improperly influence or coerce the jury to reconsider its 
verdict). 
The judge then attempted to justify the result he had coerced from the jury by 
explaining his own "understanding" of the question: "This question, I find, is ambiguous 
in its right [sic] and the way it was written " (Tr. 993, L. 6.) However, as 
demonstrated above, any claim of ambiguity in the form of the Special Verdict question 
was waived by Eggett's failure to object prior to its submission to the jury. See, e.g., 
Baker v. Cook, supra, 308 P.2d at 266-67. Eggett's counsel never did object to the 
verdict question. The judge thanked the jury for its service, concluding, "I accept our 
verdict" acknowledging his own, albeit improper, role in the process. (Id., L. 19, emp. 
added.) 
After dismissal of the jury, Wasatch counsel again objected that "it was 
inappropriate . . . for a new question to be posed to the jury without any review by either 
side or attorneys and created . . . an error." (Tr. 994, L. 23.) The judge responded that, in 
his view, the evidence was insufficient to support the Company book value of $135,672: 
It seems to me that the number in and of itself causes me to conclude that it 
would be irrationally selected if it were other than that number. For 
instance, we could go through and, I don't know how they would have 
come up with the book value of that company at 135 , . . . it's entirely 
inconsistent with the June 30th, 1997 date. [Tr. 995, L. 2-9.] 
Counsel responded that the same uncertainty exists with respect to the 
compensation awarded Eggett in Question 2, and the judge agreed: "I agree with [sic] in 
that respect and I don't know how they came up with number two either." (Tr. 995, L. 
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10-15.) Accordingl}. the judge's action was based on his own assessment of the 
sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict, contrary to the case law discussed 
above. See, e.g., EFCO Distributing, Inc. v. Perrin, supra, All P.2d at 618 ("the court 
should not upset a verdict merely because it may disagree"); First Security Bank v. Ezra 
C Lundahl, Inc., supra, 454 P.2d at 889 (the court may not make findings inconsistent 
with the jury's findings); Langton v. International Transport, Inc., supra, 491 P.2d at 
1215 (verdict awarding inadequate damages can be challenged only by motion for new 
trial); Brigham v. Moon Lake Electric Ass 'n, supra, 470 P.2d at 397 (court has no right to 
assess sufficiency of evidence in the absence of a motion raising the issue). 
Even if the sufficiency of evidence to support the verdict had been properly raised, 
the trial court would have had no basis to set aside the jury verdict on the book value of 
Wasatch stock. Utah law accords broad latitude to a jury in the calculation and 
assessment of damages. A jury's damage verdict will not be set aside unless it finds no 
support in the evidence and clearly resulted from passion or prejudice. See, e.g., Bennion 
v. LeGrand Johnson Construction Co., 701 P.2d 1078, 1083-84 (Utah 1985); Fillmore 
Products, Inc. v. Western States Paving, Inc., 592 P.2d 581, 582 (Utah 1979) (court will 
not substitute its judgment for that of the jury "unless there is no competent evidence to 
support the verdict"); Jorgensen v. Gonzales, supra, 383 P.2d at 936 ("there is no set 
formula as to the amount of damages that may be awarded"); EFCO Distributing, Inc. v. 
Perrin, supra, All P.2d at 618 ("the judgment of the jury should be allowed to swing 
through a wide arc within the limits of how reasonable minds might see the situation"). 
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In this case, the record contains an abundance of evidence supporting the jury^s 
verdict placing the book value of Company stock at $135,672 or lower. As demonstrated 
in Point I, above, the undisputed shareholders' equity of the Company, based on the 
audited statement of June 30, 1997, is $75,452. (Add. 63.) At trial, Eggett attempted to 
"adjust" that audited figure up to nearly $700,000 (Add. 53), but the jury was obviously 
entitled to disregard any portion or combination of those adjustments. See, e.g., EFCO 
Distributing, Inc. v. Perrin, supra, All P.2d at 618. Accordingly, the jury's figure of 
$135,000 is well within the range of $75,000 and $700,000, offered by Wasatch and 
Eggett respectively. Moreover, the ratio of the amount awarded to the amount demanded 
($135,000/$700,000), equal to 19 percent, is comparable to the ratio of the verdict to 
amount demanded for compensation ($11,888/$66,688), equal to 18 percent. In addition, 
the undisputed book value of the Company for the previous year was only $18,172. (Tr. 
344-45.) Accordingly, the jury's verdict on Question 5 is consistent with the evidence 
and in line with the compensation verdict, which the court did not question. Plainly, the 
book value verdict is not "irrational," as the trial judge erroneously postulated. 
In summary, the jury's verdict on Question 5 is not confusing or erroneous, and 
the trial judge had no authority or justification to revise the question to suit his own faulty 
view of the evidence. Accordingly, if the agreed book value of Eggett's stock is not 
enforced, at least the jury verdict should be enforced as rendered. 
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POINT III: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING EGGETT 
ATTORNEY FEES WITHOUT APPORTIONMENT BETWEEN 
RECOVERABLE AND NONRECOVERABLE FEES. 
A. Fees At Trial. 
Attorney fees may be awarded only if authorized by contract or statute. If based 
on contract, fees can be awarded only in accordance with the terms of the contract. Dixie 
State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 988 (Utah 1988). A party requesting attorney fees 
must "distinguish between work done that was subject to a fee award and work that was 
not." Cottonwood Mall Co. v. Sine, 830 P.2d 266, 269 (Utah 1992). Accordingly, the 
claimant's supporting affidavit must apportion fees between successful claims for which 
fees may be recovered and claims for which fees cannot be recovered. Id. at 269-70. See 
also Foote v. Clark, 962 P.2d 52, 55 (Utah 1998). Moreover, the trial court must 
document its award of fees with sufficiently detailed findings to support the allocation 
and award. Id.; see also Miller v. Martineau & Co., 1999 UT App 216, ^145-48, 983 
P.2d 1107; Schafir v. Harrigan, 879 P.2d 1384, 1393-94 (Utah App. 1994) (denying fees 
because most related to claims for which fees were not recoverable). 
In this case, Eggett claims entitlement to attorney fees pursuant to paragraph 19(c) 
of the Shareholders' Agreement: "In the event any legal action is required by a party to 
this Agreement to enforce the provisions of same, the prevailing party shall be entitled to 
recover its costs of suit, including reasonable attorneys' fees." (Add. 29.) However, 
Eggett's Complaint contains two major, separable claims: one for breach of the 
Employment Agreement by failing to pay due compensation, and one for breach of the 
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Shareholders Agreement by failing to pay book value for Eggett's stock. (R. 1-5.) 
Accordingly, only the fees pertaining to the stock claim are recoverable by contract; fees 
related to the compensation claim are not recoverable. 
The plaintiffs supporting affidavit makes no attempt to apportion fees between the 
stock claim and the compensation claim. (R. 287, Add. 80.) The affidavit merely makes 
the conclusory assertion that the stock and compensation claims are "inextricably 
intertwined" and that Eggett should be awarded fees for both claims. (Para. 10.) 
However, that assertion is unsupported by the record. The stock claim is based on the 
Shareholders' Agreement and turns on whether Eggett was terminated for cause and, if 
not, the proper determination of book value. (Tr. 152-69, 255-89.) The compensation 
claim turns on the existence and terms of a separate, written compensation agreement. 
(Tr. 170-255.) Accordingly, the claims are easily separable and were handled separately 
throughout discovery and trial, with clear demarcation in the questioning of witnesses on 
the two subjects at trial. (Eggett, Tr. 255; Keith Painter, Tr. 435; Curtis Chisholm, Tr. 
542; Brian Watts, Tr. 607-08.) The two claims involved separate evidence and separate 
calculations of damages. (Tr. 254-55, 281-82, 893-94.) Because Eggett failed to 
apportion the fees for these separable claims, the attorney fee award must be set aside. 
See, e.g., Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 318 (Utah 1998) ("trial court . . . may not 
award wholesale all attorney fees requested if they have not been allocated as to separate 
claims"). 
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The Supplemental Judgment, awarding Eggett over $60,000 in attorney fees, 
contains entirely inadequate, and even misleading, findings to support the award. For 
example, the Supplemental Judgment recites that Eggett "has made a proper and 
reasonable segregation between those claims to which he is entitled to an award of costs, 
expenses, and fees, and those claims to which he is not entitled to such an award." (Page 
2.) However, as noted above, the supporting affidavit makes no apportionment at all for 
recoverable and nonrecoverable fees. After stating that a proper segregation has been 
made, the judgment recites that all claims asserted are "so intertwined . . . that it is not 
possible to segregate or to distinguish them." {Id., emp. added.) Because the fee 
judgment is purely conclusory, without adequate findings, it must be set aside. See, e.g., 
Miller v. Martineau, supra, at 1116-17. 
B. Fees On Appeal. 
To the extent Wasatch prevails on this appeal, it is entitled to recovery of its 
attorney fees and costs incurred on appeal, as well as to reduction of fees and costs 
awarded Eggett at trial. See, e.g., Brown v. DavidK. Richards & Co., 1999 UT App 109, 
978 P.2d 470, 479. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, this Court should vacate the judgment pertaining to the 
book value of Eggett's stock and enter judgment for the agreed value of $27,540. 
Alternatively, the Court should enter judgment based on the actual jury verdict, reducing 
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Eggett's share to $49,520. In addition, the Court should vacate the award of attorney fees 
and costs at trial and award Wasatch attorney fees and costs on appeal. 
Respectfully submitted this ^ ^ day of June, 2000. 
KIRTON & McCONKIE 
#?~?^m£<U*^n 
Eric C. Olson 
Merrill F. Nelson 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY STATE OF UTAH 




WASATCH ENERGY CORPORATION, 
a Utah Corporation, 
Defendants. 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 97-0906444 
Judge David S. Young 
This action came on for trial beginning November 3, 1999, before the Court and jury, the 
Honorable Judge David S. Young, District Court Judge, presiding. Plaintiff was represented by 
Perrin R. Love of Clyde, Snow, Sessions & Swenson. Defendant was represented by Robert L. 
Stevens of Richards, Brandt, Miller & Nelson. 
The parties concluded the presentation of evidence and rested their cases on November 10, 
1999. Following instruction as to the law to be applied and closing arguments by counsel, the jury 
Judgment @ 
JD -^Wl 
retired to deliberate, make findings of fact, and answer special interrogatories in a Special Verdict 
Form, which is incorporated herein by reference. 
On November 10,1999, after due deliberation, the jury returned in open court the following 
verdict: 
The total amount of additional compensation to be 
awarded to Roger Eggett for the period from 
January 1, 1997, through May 1,1997: S 11,888.35 
The total amount to be awarded to Roger Eggett 
as book value for his shares of stock in 
Wasatch Energy Co.: S 135,671.61 
Total amount to be awarded to Roger Eggett: $ 147,559.96 
As the Court read the Special Verdict Foim, the Court polled the jury to determine whether 
the figure of $135,671.61 represented the book value of Roger Eggett's shares of stock (which the 
evidence showed was 36.5 per cent of the total number of outstanding shares), or the book value of 
Wasatch Energy in total Each of the eight jurors stated affirmatively that $ 135,671.61 was the book 
value of Roger Eggett's shares, and was the amount to be awarded to Roger Eggett. 
Based upon the jury verdict, the Court found Roger Eggett to be the prevailing party in this 
action. 
NOW THEREFORE, based upon the verdict of the jury and good cause otherwise appearing, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that judgment is hereby entered in 
favor of plaintiff Roger Eggett and against defendant Wasatch Energy Co., in the amount of 
$ 147,559.96, together with prejudgment interest accruing at a rate provided by law from November 
11, 1999, the date following the jury award, until the date this Judgment is entered, and post-
judgment interest from the date that this Judgment is entered until paid. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, that plaintiff Roger Eggett 
may submit to this Court a Memorandum of Costs pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 54(d), and an affidavit 
of attorneys' fees and expenses. After defendant has an opportunity to respond, the Court will 
consider any submissions by plaintiff, and enter a supplemental judgment, if appropriate. 
IMAGED 
Perrm R Love (5505) 
CLYDE SNOW SESSIONS & SWENSON 
One Utah Center, Thirteenth Floor 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801)322-2516 
(801)521-6280 (telecopy) 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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WASATCH ENERGY CORPORATION, 





Judge David S Young 
Judgment \\ as entered in this matter on January 11,2000, and is incorporated by reference Plaintiff 
Roger Eggett moves for entry of a Supplemental Judgment against defendant Wasatch Energy Corp In 
consideration of the motion, the Court has reviewed the following 
a Affidavit of Pernn R Love in Support of Award of Costs, Expenses and Attorney's Fees, 
dated December 6, 1999, 
b Wasatch Energy Corp 's Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Award of 
Attorneys Fees, dated December 16,1999, I III 11 |l;| 
970906444.- .i0.1^1?8-..—,-. *, JD 
c. Reply Affidavit of Perrin R. Love in Support of Award of costs and Attorney's Fees, dated 
December 23, 1999; 
d. Supplemental Affidavit of Perrin R. Love in Support of Award of Costs, Expenses and 
Attorney's Fees, dated January 13, 2000; 
e. Plaintiffs Verified Memorandum of Taxable Costs dated December 23, 1999; and 
f. Defendant's Motion to Tax Costs, dated January 3, 2000. 
g. Second Supplemental Affidavit of Perrin R. Love in Support of Award of Costs, 
Expenses and Attorney's Fees, dated March 24, 2000. 
The Court heard argument on the matters raised by these pleadings on March 24, 2000. Plaintiff 
Roger Eggett was represented by Perrin R. Love of Clyde, Snow, Sessions & S wenson. Defendant Wasatch 
Energy Corp. was represented by Robert L. Stevens of Richards, Brandt, Miller & Nelson. 
Based upon the submissions of the parties, the arguments of counsel, and good cause appearing, the 
Court finds that plaintiff Roger Eggett is entitled to an award of costs, expenses, and attorneys' fees in the 
amount of 560,374.43. The Court finds that these costs, expenses, and fees are reasonable. The Court also 
finds that plaintiff Roger Eggett has made a proper and reasonable segregation between those claims to 
which he is entitled to an award of costs, expenses, and fees, and those claims to which he is not entitled to 
such an award. Specifically, the Court finds that (1) the claims brought by Mr. Eggett to recover book value 
for his shares pursuant to his Shareholder Agreement were the predominant claims at trial; (2) the facts to 
be discovered and tried on Mr. Eggett's claims pursuant to the Shareholder Agreement are so intertwined 
with the facts to be discovered and tried on the other claims and counterclaims that it is not possible to 
segregate or to distinguish them. Accordingly, the Court finds that it is proper and reasonable to segregate 
those costs, expenses, and fees incurred by Mr. Eggett before May 16, 1997, from those costs, expenses, 
and fees incurred by Mr. Eggett after May 16, 1997, when Mr. Eggett's claims under the Shareholder 
Agreement arose. 
NOW THEREFORE, based upon the submissions of the parties, the arguments of counsel, and good 
cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Supplemental Judgment 
is entered in favor of plaintiff Roger Eggett and against defendant Wasatch Energy Corp., as follows: 
Costs, Expenses, and Attorney's Fees S60,374.43 
Prejudgment interest from November 11, 
1999 through January 10, 2000, on the 
Judgment amount of 5147,559.96 S 2,466.07 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, that plaintiff Roger Eggett is awarded 
postjudgment interest at an annual rate of 7.67 per cent on the Judgment amount of 5147,559.96 from 
January 11, 2000, until paid. Plaintiff Roger Eggett is awarded postjudgment interest at an annual rate of 
7.67 percent on the Supplemental Judgment amount of 560,374.43 jfrom the date that this Supplemental 
Judgment is entered until paid. 
Pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P.54(d), the Court taxes costs in the amount of S 2,157.08. These costs are 
included in the award of 560,374.43, and are not a separate award. 
DATED this 7 ^£Tof April, 2000. 
A' 
BY THE COURT: AV 
David S. Young 
Third District CoVrt 
Approval as to form: 
Richards, Brandt, Miller & Nelson 
Counsel for defendant Wasatch Energy Corp. 
NOV 10 1999 
SALT UKE COUNTY 
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WASATCH ENERGY CORPORATION, 
a Utah Corporation, 
Defendants. 
SPECIAL VERDICT FORM 
Civil No. 97-0906444 
Judge David S. Young 
WE THE JURORS empaneled in the above-captioned case find the issues of fact and answer 
the special Interrogatories to us as follows: 
I. EGGETT'S CLAIMS 
1. Do you find that Wasatch Energy breached its agreements or obligations to Roger 
Eggett by not paying Mr. Eggett the full amount of compensation to which he was entitled for all 
or any part of the period from January 1, 1997 through May 1, 1997. 
ANSWER: Yes V No 
2. If the answer to Question No. 1 is "yes"> what is the total amount of additional 
compensation that Wasatch Energy owes to Roger Eggett for all or part of the period from January 
1,1997 through J u ^ i 4 f t ^ 7 ? ^ ^ 
d<3. 
3. Do you find that Wasatch Energy breached its agreements or obligations to Roger 
Eggett, by terminating Roger Eggett for cause and not paying him book value for his shares of stock? 
ANSWER: Yes X No 
If you answered question no. I "yes," answer question no.s 4 and 5. If you answered 
question no. 3 "no," skip to question no. 6. 
4. Under the SHAREHOLDERS AGREEMENT between the parties, on what date was 
the book value of Eggett's shares to be determined after he resigned? (Check one). 
June 30, 1996 
December 31, 1996 
X June 30, 1997 
5. On the date for evaluation of the shares that you selected above, what was the "book 
value" of Wasatch Energy as defined by the Shareholders Agreement? 
s /35.C7/.1C 
I Answer this question only if you answered either question no. 1 as "YES" or question no. 
3 a s J > 0 ^ ^ ^ 
6. Do you find by clear and convincing evidence that the acts o^omissions of Wasatch 
Energy, as alleged by Eggett, were the result of willful and malicious or intentional fraudulent 
conduct, or conduct that manifests a knowing and reckless indifference toward and disregard of the 
rights of others? 
~&r\ 
ANSWER: Yes No 
II. WASATCH ENERGY CLAIMS 
7. Do you find that Roger Eggett breached his fiduciary duties and/or breached his 
compensation and reimbursement agreements with Wasatch by receiving unauthorized compensation 
or abusing his expense account? 
ANSWER: Yes No Y 
8. If your answer to question no. 7 is "YES," what is the amount of excessive 






If you answered question no. 7 as "YES" answer the following question. 
9. Do you find by clear and convincing evidence that the acts or omissions of Roger 
Eggett as claimed by Wasatch Energy were willful and malicious or intentionally fraudulent or 
manifested a knowing and reckless indifference toward and disregard the rights of others such that 
punitive damages should be awarded? 
ANSWER: Yes No 
3 
"2*,? 
DATED this (6 day oinav&ry^- 19 f?. 
Foreperson of the Jury 
4 
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1 resignation- And I believe that that is something that 
2 they have the burden to prove the validity of. 
3 Okay. The discussions were all held timely, the 
4 reservation in relation to that jury instruction was timely 
5 and considered before it was given during the course of the 
6 trial. 
7 We'll be in recess awaiting the deliberation of 
8 the Jury. 
9 (Whereupon a recess was taken.) 
10 THE BAILIFF: Third District Court will resume 
11 session. Please be seated. 
12 THE COURT: All right, the record may show we 
13 convened in the presence of the Jury. 
14 Mr. Robertson/ were you selected as the 
15 foreperson of the jury? 
16 MR. ROBERTSON: Yes, Your Honor. 
17 THE COURT: Have you reached a verdict? 
18 MR. ROBERTSON: Yes, we have, Your Honor. 
19 THE COURT: Would you give it to the bailiff for 
20 delivery to the Court, please. 
21 Thank you. I will read the verdict. 
22 Do you find that Wasatch Energy breached its 
23 agreement or obligations to Roger Eggett by not paying Mr. 
24 Eggett the full amount of compensation to which he was 
25 entitled for all or part of January 1, 1997 through May 1, 
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1 13917 The answer is yes*. 
2 Two, if the answer to question number one is yes, 
3 what is the total amount of additional compensation which 
4 Wasatch Energy owes to Roger Eggett for all or part of the 
5 period of January 1 through May 1. $11,888.00. 
6 Number 3. Do you find that Wasatch Energy 
7 breached its agreement or obligations to Roger Eggett by 
8 terminating Roger Eggett for cause and nor paying him book 
9 value for his shares of stock. Answer: Yes. 
10 Then, skipping to question four. The 
11 shareholders agreement between the parties, on what date 
12 was the book value of Eggett's share to be determined after 
13 he resigned? June 30, 1997. 
14 Question 5. On the date for evaluation of the 
15 shares you selected above, what was the book value of 
16 Wasatch Energy as defined by the shareholders agreement? 
17 That, the answer is $135,671.61. 
18 And then on to the second series of questions in 
19 part 2, Wasatch Energy's claims as question number seven. 
20 The answer to that is no, thus prohibiting any further 
21 responses from the jury. 
22 Do I understand, Mr. Robertson, that the jury's 
23 decision, as I've read this question number five, is this 
24 the value that the jury believes should be paid for the 
25 shares? 
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1 MR. ROBERTSON; We believe that to be the book 
2 value. 
3 THE COURT: And so— 
4 MR. ROBERTSON: Paid for the shares. 
5 THE COURT: So from the, I think the question was 
6 confusing and that's why I wanted to ask that question. 
7 The book value would be the value from which — yes, did 
8 you have a question? 
9 MR. STEVENS: It seems rather inappropriate to be 
10 coming up with questions for the jury at this time. The 
11 question is as it's stated and it's answered as it's 
12 answered. 
13 THE COURT: Well, I'm not going to allow that to 
14 stand if it is a mistake. So, if I can find that out now, 
15 I will find that out now. 
16 What you're saying by that, let me just be sure 
17 that I understand what we're talking about. Is this the 
18 value that you think the corporation owes to Mr. Eggett to 
19 purchase his shares? 
20 MR. ROBERTSON: Yes. 
21 THE COURT: All right. Now I'm going to ask that 
22 question of all of you as jurors if you concur in that 
23 determination. Let me go through. 
24 Do either of you desire that I poll the jury on 
25 any other questions? 
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1 MR. STEVENS: Your Honor, may we approach the 
2 bench? 
3 THE COURT; You may„ 
4 (Whereupon the following sidebar was held: 
5 MR. STEVENS: Your Honor, the way this question is 
6 worded and the way this has been argued has been entirely 
7 talked about, at least from our point of view, (inaudible) 
8 book value of the company is. We know that Mr. Eggett has 
9 36.5%. That's the number that should be applied here. To 
10 have them now— 
11 THE COURT: Okay, I'm not going to allow that and 
12 you can make a record of it but I'm not going to allow it. 
13 I don't believe it's consistent with their desire. 
14 MR. STEVENS: And it's certainly not consistent 
15 with what they've just said. 
16 THE COURT: That's exactly right and so— we'll 
17 make a record of it and that's just fine.) 
18 
19 THE COURT: Okay. I'm going to poll the jury on 
20 particularly question number 5. The question, here's the 
21 problem and I want to just explain it to the jury so that I 
22 get a clear understanding of what your decision is. 
23 We know from the facts of this case that Mr. 
24 Eggett owns 36.5 percent. If I interpret your answer to 
25 this question to be $135,000.00 for book value. That would 
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1 mean that he would be entitled to 36.5 percent of 
2 $135,000.00. If I understand it the way I have now asked 
3 you the question, he is entitled to $135,671.96 which is a 
4 number that you have come to by some calculation method for 
5 the purchase of his shares of stock. So, in other words, 
6 this figure, 135,000, is a representative smaller figure 
7 due to him which represents 36 percent of X which is a 
8 larger number. All right? 
9 Now, I want to be sure that I understand that 
10 correctly and if any of you disagree with that, I want to 
11 know that. 
12 First, Mrs. Hamilton, is that your verdict as 
13 I've just explained it. 
14 MRS. HAMILTON: Yes. 
15 THE COURT: Ms. Olson? 
16 MRS. OLSON: Yes, your Honor. 
17 THE COURT: Ms. Bennion? 
18 MISS BENNION: Yes. 
19 THE COURT: Mr. Hank? 
20 MR. HANK: Yes. 
21 THE COURT: Mr. Robertson? 
22 MR. ROBERTSON: Yes. 
23 THE COURT: Mrs. Smith? 
24 MRS. SMITH: Yes. 
25 THE COURT: Mr. Corpron? 
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1 MR. CDRPRON: Yes. 
2 THE COURT: Mr. Sindt? 
3 MR. SINDT: Yes, Your Honor. 
4 THE COURT: All right. Okay, I'm going to enter, 
5 well, we have the record and we have indicated on the 
6 record what my understanding is. This question, I find, is 
7 ambiguous in its right and the way it was written and that 
8 the jury was spoken that the value is due to Mr. Eggett is 
9 for the lost compensation, $11,888.00 and for his shares of 
10 stock, $135,671.96. That means that from this decision of 
11 the jury that those two numbers combined would equal 11, I 
12 messed up, excuse me. All right, those numbers combined 
13 would be $147,559.96. M l right. 
14 I want to thank you for your service. You can 
15 see the decisions to be made at the court and challenges of 
16 cases like this are difficult and I hope that you've 
17 learned some lessons also from the combined wisdom of 
18 sharing your views among each other and deliberating. Some 
19 of that may have been frustrating at times, but I accept 
20 our verdict. I think you've rendered a faithful service 
21 and an appropriate service. Unfortunately I have to tell 
22 you that the legislature in its wisdom has asked you to do 
23 one other thing and that is to briefly respond to some 
24 questionnaires. I will now excuse you into the jury room. 
25 This should take just a few moments. 
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1 Since you're excused from your service* There 
2 will be no further prohibition to your discussing this case 
3 and if you wish to discuss the matter with the attorneys or 
4 anyone else, you are free to do so. If you wish not to, 
5 that also will be respected. You're now excused. Thank 
6 you. 
7 All right, do either of you have any questions or 
8 matters that you want to deal on the record before we 
9 conclude. 
10 MR. STEVENS: I dof your Honor. 
11 THE COURT: Yes, Mr. Stevens. 
12 MR. STEVENS: Your Honor, this would simply 
13 (inaudible) took care but the sidebar — 
14 THE COURT: Yes, indeed. I will indicate to you 
15 that with this system the sidebar will have been picked up 
16 on part of the record. I know we're all old practioners 
17 that don't remember sidebar conferences being recorded. 
18 But, this has been. 
19 MR. STEVENS: Okay. I just want to make clear 
20 our objection to the questions from the bench with regard 
21 to question number five. Question number five as written, 
22 I think, was agreed to by both parties. It was answered as 
23 it was answered and it was inappropriate, I believe, for a 
24 new question to be posed to the jury without any review by 
25 either side or attorneys and created, I think, an error. 
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1 THE COURT: Okay- Well, you're entitled to have 
2 that preserved for the record and I've told you that- It 
3 seems to me that the number in and of itself causes me to 
4 conclude that it would be irrationally selected if it were 
5 other than that number. For instance, we could go through 
6 and, I don't know how they would have come up with the book 
7 value of that company at 135, if you could help me to 
8 figure that out, that would be fine, but it's entirely 
9 inconsistent with the June 30th, 1997 date. 
10 MR. STEVENS: Well, it's also, their number on 
11 number two, was also, I don't know how they came up with 
12 that one either. I don't know they ever come up with 
13 numbers. 
14 THE COURT: I agree with in that respect and I 
15 don't know how they came up with number two either. But, 
16 it struck me that number five could be a mathematical error 
17 by the way it was written and indeed that's what the jury 
18 confirmed it was. 
19 So, any other questions? 
20 Do you have any questions, Mr. Love? 
21 MR. LOVE: No, I think, obviously, I think what 
22 you did was entirely appropriate because the jury did 
23 express some confusion and clarified its intention. 
24 We will make a claim for attorney's fees. I just 
25 want to know how you would like us to proceed on that. 
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SHAREHOLDERS' AGREEMENT 
This Agreement (the "Agreement") is made and entered as of the 13th day of April, 
1995, by and among (a) WASATCH OIL & GAS CORPORATION, a Utah corporabon (the 
"Corporabon"), and (b) Roger K. Eggett, Jr., Todd D. Cusick, Curbs R. Chisholm (collecbvely, the 
"Shareholders," and individually, a "Shareholder"). 
RECITALS 
WHEREAS, the Shareholders own all of the Corporabon's issued and outstanding 
common stock (the "Shares"); 
WHEREAS, the Corporabon and the Shareholders realize that, m the event of the death 
or disability of one of the Shareholders or the sale of a Shareholder's Shares during his lifetime, the 
Corporabon's Shares might pass into the ownership or control of persons other than the remaining 
Shareholders, which could disrupt the harmonious and successful management and operabon of the 
Corporabon; 
WHEREAS, the Corporabon and the Shareholders further realize that, in the event one 
of the Shareholders should terminate employment with the Corporabon by retirement or otherwise, 
such tenrunabon could disrupt the harmonious and successful management and operabon of the 
Corporabon; 
WHEREAS, the Shareholders feel that their mutual interests and the interests of the 
Corporabon mandate the imposibon of certain restrictions on themselves and on the Corporabon with 
respect to the transfer of the Shares; and 
WHEREAS, the Corporabon and the Shareholders have independently concluded that 
the method of valuing the Shares provided in this Agreement is fair and equitable 
NOW, THEREFORE, in considerabon of the foregoing, and the mutual promises, 
obligabons, covenants, and agreements contained herein, as well as the mutual benefits to be denved 




EXHIBIT •II I 
TERMS 
1. Shareholders' Ownership in Corporation. The Corporation has FORTY THREE 
THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED AND THIRTY FOUR (43,334) shares of common stock issued and 
outstanding. The Shares are owned as follows: 
Name of Shareholder Number of Shares 
Roger K.Eggett, Jr. 24,335 
Todd D. Cusick 10,833 
Curtis R. Chisholm 8,166 
2. Purchase of Shares on Death, Disability, Retirement or Withdrawal of an 
Employee. Upon the death, "disability" (as defined in Paragraph 18) or "withdrawal" (as defined in 
Paragraph 18) (collectively, an "Event of Termination"), of an employee/shareholder of the Corporation 
(an "Employee") (a) the remaining Shareholders shall have the right and option, but not the obligation, 
exercisable at any time within ninety (90) days of any Event of Termination, to purchase, and the 
employee/shareholder or, in the event of such employee/shareholder's death or disability, the personal 
representative, executor, or legal administrator of the deceased or disabled employee/shareholder's 
estate (a "Legal Representative") shall, upon the exercise of such right and option by the remaining 
Shareholders, sell to the remaining Shareholder all or part of the stock owned by the terminated, 
deceased or disabled employee/shareholder (including any stock owned by such 
emplovee/shareholder's spouse, children, issue, or a trust for the exclusive benefit of such 
employee/shareholder, such employee/shareholder's spouse, children, or issue) at the time of any such 
Event of Termination, for the price and upon the terms and conditions hereinafter stipulated; provided 
that if any remaining Shareholder does not purchase his full proportionate allotment of the Shares, the 
unaccepted Shares may be purchased, proportionately, by the other remaining Shareholders within 
thirty (30) days thereafter. 
In the event that all or part of the stock owned by an Employee (including any stock 
owned by the Employee's spouse, children, issue, or a trust for the exclusive benefit of the Employee, 
the Employee's spouse, children, or issue) is not purchased in accordance with the preceding paragraphs 
(a) the Corporation shall have the right and option, but not the obligation, exercisable at any time within 
120 days of any Event of Termination, to purchase and redeem, and (b) the Employee (in the event of 
withdrawal) or the Legal Representative, as the case may be, shall, upon the exercise of such right and 
opbon by the Corporation, sell to the Corporation, all or a part of the stock owned by the Employee 
(including any stock owned by the Employee's spouse, children, issue or a trust for the exclusive benefit 
of the Employee, the Employee's spouse, children, or issue) at the time of any such Event of 
Termination, for the price and upon the terms and conditions hereinafter stipulated. 
3. Purchase Price. If the Corporation chooses to exercise the right and option to 
purchase Shares following an Event of Termination, or in the event of a purchase of Shares as otherwise 
specified in this Agreement, the purchase price to be paid for a Shareholder's Shares shall be the value of 
the Shares at the time of the Event of Termination or other purchase, determined as set forth in this 
Paragraph. Except in the case of an Employee's "termination for cause" (as defined in Paragraph 18), the 
purchase price shall be the "Book Value" (as defined in Paragraph 18) of such stock In the case of an 
Employee's "termination for cause" (as defined in Paragraph 18), the purchase price shall be the lesser of 
the price paid by any such Employee for such Employee's stock or the "Book Value" (as defined in 
Paragraph 18) of such stock Notwithstanding the preceding two sentences, a lesser or greater purchase 
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price for the common stock of the Corporation may be agreed to and specified in writing, so long as the 
Corporation and each of the Shareholders consents thereto in writing. 
4. Method of Payment The purchase price to be paid for any Shares purchased in 
accordance with the terms and conditions of this Agreement shall be paid as follows: 
(a) Upon the exercise of the right to purchase Shares in accordance with 
this Agreement by the Corporation, then, within 180 days following the Event of Termination, and upon 
the qualification of a Legal Representative of the deceased or disabled Employee's estate, the Employee 
or the Legal Representative, as the case may be, shall be paid the greater of (i) the proceeds of any 
insurance policy owned by the Corporation covering the deceased Employee's life, as provided in 
Paragraph 11, below (limited, however, to the amount of the purchase price determined under the 
provisions of subparagraph 3(a), above), or (ii) twenty percent (20%), or more, of the purchase price of 
the Shares at the price determined as provided in Paragraph 3, above. 
(b) Should the amount paid under the provisions of paragraph 4(a), above, 
be less than the full purchase price to be paid for the Shares, then concurrently with the payment of such 
amount, the Corporation or Shareholder(s), as the case may be, shall execute and deliver to the 
Shareholder or the Legal Representative, as the case may be, a Promissory Note which shall aggregate 
the total unpaid balance of the purchase price owing for the Shares, which Promissory Note shall be 
payable over three (3) years in equal monthly installments commencing immediately following the 
execution of the Promissory Note. The Promissory Note shall bear interest at the rate equal to the prime 
rate of interest charged by ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK, Salt Lake City, Utah, to its most credit-
worthy customer, as of the date of the Event of Termination, and each payment made shall be applied 
first to the payment of interest and then to the reduction of principal of the Promissory Note. The 
Promissory Note shall provide that in the event of default in payment of interest or of principal all 
future installments shall become due and payable immediately. Further, in the event of default under 
the Promissory Note, interest shall be assessed at a default rate of eighteen percent (18%) per annum 
and, if collection is necessary, the costs of collection, including reasonable attorneys' fees, shall be 
assessable. The Promissory Note shall be subject to prepayment, in whole or in part, at any time, and 
shall be assignable by the holder thereof. Notwithstanding the foregoing, in no event shall the aggregate 
amount of the semi-annual payments on the Promissory Note during any fiscal year of the Corporation, 
including principal and interest, exceed twenty percent (20%) of the Corporation's net pre-tax profits for 
the preceding fiscal year. If payments must be reduced as a result of the preceding sentence, then the 
amounts that are not paid when originally due shall be paid in the next succeeding fiscal year in equal 
monthly installments, again subject to the twenty percent (20%) of net profits limitation. 
(c) Upon receipt of the purchase price to be paid pursuant to 
subparagraphs 4(a) and 4(b), above, in cash, or in cash and by the Promissory Note, as provided above, 
in payment of the Shares, the Employee or the Legal Representative, as the case may be, shall execute 
and deliver to the Corporation such instruments as are necessary7 and proper to transfer full and 
complete title to the Shares to the Corporation; provided that the Corporation shall irnmediately assign 
to the Employee or the Legal Representative, as the case may be, as collateral security for the payment of 
the unpaid balance of any Promissory Note so issued, such number of Shares as shall equal in value, as 
determined by this Agreement, the amount of the unpaid Promissory Note. The Share security shall 
then be released proportionately as the Promissory Note is paid. 
(d) Upon the exercise of the right to purchase Shares in accordance with 
this Agreement by a Shareholder, then, within 180 days following an Event of Termination, the purchase 
price shall be determined under Paragraph 3, above, and the Shareholder(s) in their discretion, shall pay 
the entire purchase price of the Shares in full or pay ten percent (10%), or more, of the purchase price of 
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the Shares and, concurrently therewith, execute and deliver to the Shareholder or the Legal 
Representabve, as the case may be, a Promissory Note, which shall aggregate the total unpaid balance of 
the purchase price owing for the Shares, on substantially the terms and condibons set forth in 
subparagraph 4(b), above and subject to the terms and condibons set forth in subparagraph 4(c), above, 
as revised and interpreted to benefit the purchasing Shareholder(s). 
5. Sales of Shares During Lifetime; Right of Co-Sale Each of the Shareholders 
agrees that, during his lifetime, he will not transfer, encumber or dispose of any porbon or all of his 
Shares, except in accordance with and strictly condiboned upon fulfillment of the terms and condibons 
of this Agreement In the event a Shareholder receives a bona fide offer for the sale of his Shares, and 
desires to sell the same, he shall first give nobce in writing to the other Shareholders and the 
Corporabon setting forth the price offered and the terms and condibons of payment The other 
Shareholders shall then have a period of thirty (30) days within which to purchase all or part of said 
Shares at the same price and on the same terms and condibons. Any Shares not purchased within the 
above period by the other Shareholders shall be offered to the Corporabon, at the same price and terms, 
and the Corporabon shall have the right within thirty (30) days thereafter to purchase and redeem all or 
part of the Shares Any Shares not purchased within the above period by the Corporabon shall be 
offered to the other Shareholders, at the same price and terms, and the other Shareholders shall have the 
right within thirty (30) days thereafter to purchase all or part of the Shares. If there is more than one 
other Shareholder, then each Shareholder shall have the right to purchase such porbon of the Shares 
offered for sale as the number of Shares owned by him at such time shall bear to the total number of 
Shares owned by all other Shareholders; provided that if any Shareholder does not purchase his full 
proportionate allotment of the Shares, the unpurchased Shares may be purchased by, if there is more 
than one other Shareholder, the other Shareholders proportionately. 
If all of the offered Shares are not purchased before the expirabon of the periods 
specified in the preceding Paragraph, the offering Shareholder may dispose of any remaining offered 
Shares in any lawful manner, except that he shall not sell any such Shares to any other person for any 
price or upon any terms other than previously offered without first giving die Corporabon and the other 
Shareholders the right to purchase the Shares at the price and on the terms offered by such other person, 
and an\ person acquiring such Shares must agree to enter into a Stock Redempbon/Buy-Sell Agreement 
containing provisions similar to those set forth herein with the Corporabon and the persons who then 
own the remainder of the Corporabon's outstanding Shares 
A sale by a Shareholder under this Paragraph shall not prejudice his right to continue to 
participate in the operabons of the Corporabon Further, a Shareholder shall not have any vested right 
to continue to participate in the operabons of the Corporabon, such matter being exclusively within ihe 
control of the Board of Directors of the Corporabon. 
Notwithstanding any term or condibon of this Paragraph 5, whenever any Shareholder 
proposes to sell any shares of stock of the Corporabon, such Shareholder (the "Proposed Transferor'') 
shall provide written nobce specifying the terms and condibons of the proposed sale to the other 
Shareholders in the manner specified in this Paragraph 5. If the Corporabon or the other Shareholders, 
as the case may be, decline to purchase the Shares from the Proposed Transferor pursuant to this 
Paragraph 5, then, in lieu of such right and opbon, any or all of the Shareholders shall have the opbon to 
participate in such sale with the Proposed Transferor in the manner hereinafter set forth. To exercise the 
opbon, the Shareholders shall give written nobce of elecbon to the Proposed Transferor within twenty 
(20) days after the expirabon of the thirty (30) day nobce period provided Thereupon, each of the 
Shareholders shall have the right, but not the obligabon, to sell his Shares in the Corporabon to the 
proposed purchaser upon the same terms and condibons specified in the Proposed Transferor's nobce, 
pro rata with the Proposed Transferor, on the basis of their respecbve holdings of stock of the 
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Corporation. The n u m b e r of Shares to be sold by the Proposed Transferor shall be reduced by the 
number of Shares the Shareholders elect to so sell calculated in accordance with tine formula set forth in 
the preceding sentence unless the proposed purchaser is willing to purchase all of the Shares proposed 
to be sold by the Shareholders. If the Shareholders exercise such option, the Shareholders shall bear a 
pro rata portion of the expenses incident to such sale. Failure by a Shareholder to exercise the option 
within the twenty (20) day period shall be deemed a declination of any right to participate in such sale 
provided that such sale is completed within ninety (90) days of the expiration of such twenty (20) day 
period at a price and on terms and conditions set forth in the Proposed Transferor's notice. Failure to 
meet the foregoing conditions shall require a new notice and right of co-sale with respect to such sale. 
6. Shareholder Bankruptcy, etc. If (a) any Shareholder shall make an assignment 
for the benefit of creditors, (b) a trustee or receiver shall be appointed for any of the assets or properties 
of any Shareholder, (c) any Shareholder shall file a voluntary petition in bankruptcy or shall consent to 
the filing of an involuntary petition in bankruptcy against him, or shall fail to obtain dismissal of 
bankruptcy proceedings against him within sixty (60) days following the commencement thereof, or 
shall be the subject of an order for relief, or (d) an attachment or execution shall be levied upon, or a tax 
or other statutory or judicial Hen shall be placed upon, any of the Shares now or at any time hereafter 
held by any Shareholder and shall not be released within ten (10) days thereafter, (collectively, an "Event 
of Bankruptcy"), then such Shareholder (the "Bankrupt Shareholder") shall give writ ten notice to the 
Corporation and all other Shareholders on or within three (3) days of the day of the happening of the 
Event of Bankruptcy, which notice shall describe the Event of Bankruptcy. 
Upon receipt of the notice referred to in the preceding Paragraph, the Corporation shall 
have the option for a period of thirty (30) days to purchase any or all of the Shares owned by the 
Bankrupt Shareholder; provided that, if the other Shareholders do not purchase all of the Bankrupt 
Shareholder's Shares, the Corporation shall have the right, within an additional ten (10) day period, to 
purchase any part or all of the Bankrupt Shareholder's Shares unpurchased; provided further that, if the 
Corporation does not purchase any part or all of the Bankrupt Shareholder's Shares, the non-bankrupt 
Shareholder shall have the right, within an additional ten (10) day period, to purchase the unpurchased 
Shares; and provided further that, if there is more than one other Shareholder, each Shareholder shall 
have the right to purchase that portion of the unpurchased Shares as the number of Shares owned by 
him at the date of the Event of Bankruptcy shall bear to the total number of Shares owned by all non-
bankrupt Shareholders at that date. If any non-bankrupt Shareholder does not purchase his full 
proportionate share of the Shares, such unpurchased Shares may be purchased by the non-bankrupt 
Shareholders proportionately within an additional ten (10) day period. If any of the unpurchased Shares 
remain unpurchased by the non-bankrupt Shareholders, any non-bankrupt Shareholder shall have an 
additional ten (10) day period within which to purchase such Shares. The price and terms of the 
purchase and sale shall be as set forth in Paragraph 3, above. 
Any Shares, which become subject to the provisions of this Paragraph and as to which a 
purchase option is not exercised, may be transferred pursuant to such assignment for the benefit of 
creditors or such trusteeship, receivership, or bankruptcy7 proceedings, or upon sale or foreclosure 
under such attachment or levy of execution or hen, upon the expiration of the purchase option; provided 
that the transferee and such transferee's spouse, if applicable, execute and become parties to this 
Agreement, and thereby agree to receive and hold said Shares subject to all of the terms and conditions 
of this Agreement 
7. Transfers Between Shareholder and Permitted Transferee. Notwithstanding any 
of the terms or conditions of this Agreement, each Shareholder shall have the right during his or her 
lifetime to transfer all or any part of the Shareholder's Shares, with or wi thout consideration, to a 
"Permitted Transferee" (as defined in Paragraph 18, below), and the shares may be transferred from any 
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sudiPermittBdTTansferee bade to the Shareholder, provided mat any Shares transferred to the 
Shareholder's Permitted Transferee shall remain subject to all of the terms and conditions of this 
Agreement, just as though said transfer had not taken place; and provided further that, at the discretion 
and direction of the Corporation, any Permitted Transferee executes a copy of this Agreement In this 
connection, the Shareholder shall have his spouse, determined as of the date of this Agreement or any 
subsequent date, execute the "Consent of Spouses" attached hereto as Exhibit "A" and incorporated 
herein by this reference. 
8. Endorsement of Certificates. The Shareholders agree that all 5hare certificates 
which they now hold or which they may acquire in the future evidencing stock of the Corporation shall 
be endorsed substantially as follows: 
THIS STOCK CERTIFICATE IS SUBJECT TO A 
SHAREHOLDERS' AGREEMENT, DATED AS OF THE _ D A Y 
OF , _ EXECUTED BY THE CORPORATION AND 
ALL OF ITS SHAREHOLDERS AND IS TRANSFERABLE 
ONLY IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE TERMS AND 
CONDITIONS OF SAID AGREEMENT 
9. Alteration or Amendments. This Agreement may be altered or amended, in 
whole or in part, at any time by filing with this Agreement a written instrument setting forth such 
changes, dated and signed by the Corporation and all of the Shareholders. 
10. Termination. This Agreement shall terminate upon the earliest to occur of any 
one of the following events: 
(a) The written agreement of the Corporation and all of the 
Shareholders to mat effect 
(b) The bankruptcy, receivership or dissolution of the 
Corporation. 
(c) The cessation of business of the Corporation. 
(d) A public offering of the capital stock of the Corporation. 
(e) Whenever there is only one surviving party to this 
Agreement bound by the terms of this Agreement 
(f) If not sooner terminated, four (4) years after the 
execution of this Agreement 
11. Insurance Proceeds. The Corporation shall have the right, but no obligation, to 
take out insurance (whole life or term or any combination thereof) on the life of any Shareholder and a 
disability insurance policy covering any Shareholder. In the event the Corporation takes out any such 
insurance, the Corporation shall have the right to increase, terminate, or reduce such insurance 
whenever, at the sole discretion of the Corporafaon, such insurance or additional or less insurance is 
required to assist the Corporation in meeting its options or obhgations under this Agreement; provided 
that, before the Corporation shall surrender any insurance policy to the insurance company which 
issued the same, the Corporation shall hrst offer such policy to the insured for the same amounts) 
which the Corporation would be enfatled to receive from the insurance company for the surrender of the 
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insurance policy. This right to purchase insurance shall lapse if not exercised within sixty (60) days 
following the sale of a Shareholder's Shares during his lifetime, the receipt of a statement of Shareholder 
disability, the termination of an Employee's employment by the Corporation, or the termination of this 
Agreement 
The Corporation shall be the beneficiary of the policies issued to the Corporation and 
may apply to the payment of premiums any dividends declared and paid on the policies. If the 
Corporation shall receive proceeds from any insurance policy covering the life of a deceased 
Shareholder or a disabled Shareholder, such proceeds shall be paid by the Corporation to the Legal 
Representative of the decedent's estate to the extent of the purchase price of the decedent's or disabled 
Shareholder's Shares. Such payment shall be deemed to have been made as payment or partial payment 
of the purchase price as provided hereinabove. Any amount in excess of said purchase price shall be 
retained by the CorporatiorL Payment of the insurance proceeds may be deferred until the expiration of 
ninety (90) days following the deceased Shareholder's death or the disability of a Shareholder. In the 
event the proceeds from such insurance policy or policies are insufficient to pay the purchase price for 
the Shares, as set forth above, then the deficiency shall be paid in accordance with subparagraph 4(b), 
above. 
12. Notices, Any and all notices, designations, offers, acceptances, or any other 
communications provided for in this Agreement shall be given, in writing, by registered or certified 
mail, which shall be addressed, in the case of the Corporation, to its principal office, and in the case of 
the Shareholders, to their addresses appearing on the stock books of the Corporation. 
13. Invalid Provision; Severability. The invalidity or unenforceability of any 
particular provision of this Agreement shall not affect the other provisions hereof and the Agreement 
shall be construed in all respects as if such invalid provision were omitted. 
14. Legal Effect; Future Share Issuances. The provisions of this Agreement shall be 
deemed covenants running with the ownership of the Shares of the Corporation presently owned by the 
Shareholders and all future issuances of stock by the Corporation, and shall be binding upon and inure 
to the benefit of the parties hereto, and also upon their heirs, executors, legal administrators, successors 
or assigns; and the parties hereby agree for themselves and their heirs, executors, administrators, 
successors or assigns, to execute any instruments and to perform any act which may be necessary or 
proper to carry out the purposes of this Agreement 
15. Involuntary Transfers; Void Transfers. In the event that any portion of the 
Shares of any Shareholder of the Corporation, or any interest therein, shall be acquired by any third 
person, firm or corporation as a result of execution, attachment or judicial sale, by operation of law or in 
any manner other than a voluntary transfer by said Shareholder, the Shares so acquired by said third 
person, firm or corporation shall remain subject to the terms and conditions of this Agreement and to 
the rights of the Corporation and the other Shareholders of the Corporation hereunder, and the person, 
firm or corporation so acquiring said Shares shall be required, as a condition precedent to transfer of 
said Shares to enter in an Agreement containing provisions similar to those set forth herein with the 
Corporation and the persons who then own the remainder of the Corporation's outstanding Shares. 
Otherwise, any transfer or attempt to transfer any Shares in violation of the terms of this Agreement 
shall not be valid. The transferee shall not be deemed to be the shareholder of such Shares, or entitled to 
any rights thereon, and the Corporation shall refuse to transfer any Shares on its books to the alleged 
transferee thereof. 
16. Injunctive Relief. The parties hereby declare that it is impossible to measure in 
money the damages which will accrue to a party or person bound hereby or to the Legal Representative 
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of a deceased or disabled party or person by reason of a failure to perform any of the obligations under 
this Agreement Therefore, if any party hereto or the Legal Representative of a deceased or disabled 
Shareholder or a Permitted Transferee shall institute any action or proceeding to enforce the provisions 
hereof, any person (including the party against whom such an action or proceeding is brought) hereby 
agrees that the court in such an action is brought may grant injunctive relief and hereby waives the 
claim or defense therein that such party, Legal Representative, or Permitted Transferee has an adequate 
remedy at law, and such person shall not urge in any such action or proceeding the claim or defense that 
such a remedy at law exists Any sale, transfer, or other disposition made in violation of this Agreement 
shall be null and void and of no force or effect 
17. Provision in Will This Agreement shall be binding upon the parties to this 
Agreement, their heirs, legatees, executors, administrators and assigns. To this end, each party to this 
Agreement shall maintain in effect at all times a will directing his or her representative to carry out the 
terms and conditions of this Agreement and to execute any and all documents necessary to accomplish 
that result, provided that the failure to maintain in effect such a will shall not affect the rights or 
obligations of the parties to this Agreement 
18. Definitions. As used in this Agreement, the following terms shall have the 
meanings set forth below: 
(a) Disability. For purposes of this Agreement, if at any time in the opinion 
of the Corporation a question arises as to the disability of any Shareholder, then the Corporation shall 
prompt!} employ three (3) physicians who are members of the American Medical Association to 
examine the Shareholder and determine if his physical and mental condition is such as to render him 
incapable of participating in die operations of the Corporation. In the event the Shareholder under 
consideration appears to have mental capacity to act in his own behalf, then one (1) of the three (3) 
physicians employed by the Corporation for this purpose shall be a physician selected by the 
Shareholder The decision of said group of three (3) physicians shall be certified in writing to the Board 
of Directors of the Corporation and the Board of Directors may make such certification available to the 
Shareholder or his Legal Representative The Board of Directors of the Corporation, m its sole 
discretion, shall make any final determination of permanent disability and said determination of 
permanent disability shall be binding and conclusive upon the Corporation and the involved 
Shareholder and shall have the effect of terminating the participation of the Shareholder in the 
operations of the Corporation for purposes of this Agreement 
(b) Permitted Transferee. For purposes of this Agreement, (l) a transfer by 
a Shareholder of any of his Shares in the Corporation (A) to his spouse or issue of either of them or his 
parents, or (B) in trust for the benefit of himself, his spouse, or issue of either spouse; provided that the 
Shareholder has and at all times maintains legal and practical control of any such trust, (C) to a family 
partnership in which the Shareholder has and at all times maintains legal and practical control of die 
affairs of the family partnership and in which the only partners are the Shareholder, his spouse, or the 
issue of either of them or (D) to Shareholders other shall be deemed a transfer of Shares to a "Permitted 
Transferee", and such spouse, or the issue of either spouse, shall be deemed to be a Permitted Transferee 
with respect to such Shares, (u) a person shall be deemed a Permitted Transferee of a Shareholder only 
with respect to the Shares received from such Shareholder or from other Permitted Transferees of such 
Shareholder, and (in) a Permitted Transferee shall be deemed a Permitted Transferee of the Shareholder 
from whom he received such Shares, or if the Shares were received from another Permitted Transferee, 
the Shareholder from whom such Permitted Transferee received the Shares. 
(c) Withdrawal, Termination for Cause. Any withdrawal by an Employee 
from participation in the operabons of the Corporation as a result of the mutual or unilateral decision of 
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the Employee and Hie Corporation or the Employee, respectively, other than by reason of disability or 
"termination for cause" (as defined below). For purposes of this Agreement, "termination for cause" 
shall mean termination of an Employee's employment by and with the Corporation, upon fifteen (15) 
days written notice from the Corporation, for "cause" as follows: 
(i) if the Employee has been convicted of, or pleads guilt}' or nolo 
contendere to, a felony or a crime involving moral turpitude, in which case the 
Corporation may terminate such Employee's employment immediately upon the 
occurrence of such conviction or plea; or 
(ii) if the Employee has (A) engaged in fraudulent misconduct with 
respect to the Corporation, or (B) engaged in theft of Corporation assets; or 
(iii) if the Employee has committed any material breach of his 
obligations, covenants, agreements, or warranties to the Corporation; or 
(iv) in the event of the repeated neglect, malfeasance, nonfeasance, 
or other conduct of the Employee in the performance of the services of the 
Employee to the Corporation, any of which (in the reasonable judgment of the 
Board of Directors of the Corporation) is detrimental to the best interests of the 
Corporation; or 
(v) if the Employee has a substance abuse problem. 
(d) Book Value. For purposes of this Agreement, "Book Value" shall mean 
the consolidated net shareholders' equity of the Corporation determined as of the end of each of the 
Corporation's calendar years (commencing December 31,1994) as certified to by the firm of independent 
public accountants then regularly employed by the Corporation, divided by the number of the Shares 
issued and outstanding. Such determination shall be made on an accrual basis in accordance with 
generally accepted accounting principles and shall be binding and conclusive upon the parties to this 
Agreement and their Permitted Transferees. Proceeds of any insurance owned by the Corporation on 
the life of a deceased Shareholder shall not be included in any calculation of "Book Value" (as defined 
below) for purposes of arriving at the value of the Shares owned by the deceased Shareholder, his estate, 
heirs, or Permitted Transferee(s). The "Book Value" (as defined belowr) as of December 31 of each year 
(commencing December 31, 1993) shall be based on audited financial statements. However, because of 
the fame required to prepare audited financial statements as of December 31 of each year, any valuation 
of Shares that is to be made after December 31 of a year bu t before completion of audited financial 
statements (and the price to be paid) shall be based upon an estimate of "Book Value" (as defined below) 
as of the appropriate December 31. Such estimate of "Book Value" (as defined below) and purchase 
price shall be adjusted following receipt of the audited financial statements so as to conform wTith the 
audited financial statements. 
(e) Shareholders' Equity7. For purposes of this Agreement, "Shareholders' 
Equity" shall mean the shareholders' equity of ihe Corporation as certified to by the firm of certified 
public accountants then regularly employed by the Corporation in the Corporation's most recent 
consolidated financial statements. Such determination shall be binding and conclusive upon the parties 
to the Agreement and their Permitted Transferees. 
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19 General Provisions. The parties hereto hereby agree to the following general 
provisions: 
(a) The administrator, personal representative or Legal Representative of a 
deceased 01 disabled Shareholder shall execute and deliver any and all documents or legal instruments 
necessarv or desirable to carry out the provisions of this Agreement 
(b) This Agreement shall be governed by the laws of the State of Utah, 
notwithstanding the fact that one of the parries to this Agreement may hereafter become a resident of a 
different State. 
' ' In the event any legal, action is required by a party to this Agreement to 
enforce the provisions ^i >*. the prevailing part)' shall be entitled to recover its costs of suit, including 
reasonable attorneys' fees. 
(d) The rights and obligations of any Shareholder1, Permitted ' I i ansferee, or 
the heirs or estate of either of them under this Agreement may not be assigned without the prior writ ten 
consent of the Corporation-
Future Shareholders of the Corporation may become parties to this 
Agreement b) exec utuig a counterpart hereof and, if and when applicable, by having their spouse 
execute a counterpart of the Consent of Spouses attached hereto, whereupon each such signing person 
shall be bound by the terms and conditions of this Agreement and shall be entitled to the rights under 
this Agreement the re a fter as though such person had originally executed this Agreement 
(£) It is e . understood that this Agreement constitutes the entire 
agreement between the parties hereto ana tnat mere are no representations, warranties, or agreements, 
whether express or implied or oral or written, except as set forth herein. The terms and conditions of 
thus Agreement may be modified only by a written agreement signed by all the parties hereto. 
(g) No waiver of any of the provisions of this Agreement shall be deemed, 
or shall constitute, a waiver of any other provision, whether or not similar, nor shall any waiver 
constitute a continuing waiver. No waiver shall be binding unless executed in writing by the party 
malang the waiver. 
fill Unless 'the context otherwise requires, the singular includes the plural, 
flic pluml iih lutit'i I he siTiguli", and any 'masculine or feminine references include the other. 
20. Termination by Establishment of Public Market for Shares; Termination by 
Shareholder Agreement This Agreement shall automatically terminate and all restrictions upon the 
sale, disposition or transfer of the Shares established by this Agreement shall be removed at such time as 
the Corporation shall, with approval of the Shareholders who own or whose Permitted Transferees own 
two-thirds (2/3) of all of the Shares, through voluntary registration or other voluntary action establish a 
public market for the Shares, This Agreement may be teirninated by the affirmative vote of 
Shareholders who own or whose Permitted Transferees own two-thirds (2/3) of all of the Shares. 
(a) In the event that this Agreement is so terminated, any Shareholder who 
voted against termination and his Permitted Transferee(s), may, within ninety (90) days from such 
termination, offer all, but not some, of their aggregate Shares to the Corporation for purchase upon the 
terms and conditions set forth in Paragraphs 3 and 4, above, and the Corporation shall purchase such. 
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Shares as therein provided. If the Corporation has insufficient "Shareholders' Equity" (as defined below) 
to purchase all of the Shares which are offered to the Corporation by such Shareholders and Permitted 
Transferees, then the Corporation shall purchase such Shares to the extent that it shall have qualified 
"Shareholders' Equity" (as defined below), such "Shareholders' Equity" (as defined below) to be used 
(proportionately, if inadequate to purchase all such Shares) among all of such Shareholders and 
Permitted Transferees who offer Shares pursuant to this subparagraph 
(b) Should the Corporation fail to purchase the Shares of any such 
Shareholder or Permitted Transferee or any part thereof, as in Paragraph 20(a), above, then such 
Shareholder or Permitted Transferee may sell those Shares not purchased by the Corporation in 
accordance with the procedure contained in Paragraph 5, above except that no offer need be made to the 
Corporation as called for in subparagraph 20(a), above, and the only parties having a right to purchase 
such Shares shall be the other eligible Shareholders. 
(c) A sale by a Shareholder under this Paragraph shall not prejudice his 
right to continue to be an employee of the Corporation. Neither shall such a Shareholder have any 
vested right to continue to be an employee of the Corporation, such matter being exclusively the 
responsibility of management of the Corporation. 
(d) It is understood that the rights conferred by this Paragraph are optional 
to said Shareholders and Permitted Transferees and that they may retain their Shares in die Corporation 
following termination of this Agreement by agreement of the Shareholders. 
21. Previous Shareholders' and Shareholder's Agreements. This Agreement 
supersedes, amends and replaces all previous Shareholders' and Shareholder's Agreements. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Corporation has caused this Agreement to be executed by 
its dulv authorized officers and the Shareholders have executed this Agreement, all as of the poky of _ 
SHAREHOLDERS: 
<&{2,M2-
WASATCH OIL & GAS CORPORATION, a Utah 
corporation 
By. 
Its ; ^ & & ^ ' 
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April 15, 1997 
Boai d ol Directors 
Wasatch Energy Corporation 
240 South 200 West 
P.O. Box 699 
Farmington, " 1 R '1,T, f 
Please accept this notice of my resig ,J, ~\ ai* n t < uuai.r.ion.: 
Board of Directors of Wasatch Energ> Corporation emu wasatch Oil & Gao 
Corporation (collectively, the "Company"). 
In accordance with the Employment Agreement (the "Agreement") entered into 
between the Company and myself dated March 31, 1995, I make the following 
assertions: 
1. My employment terminates 90 days after the dcVi nil HIM, iiesignafi 'i 'I i I •• 
July 14, 1997. July 14, 1997 will be my date ot .-. iation. 
2. I am under no obligation to continue to guarantee the line of credit and will 
immediately notify Barnes Banking Co,,, of my resignation and of my 
withdrawal of the personal guarantee. 
.:. i am under no obligation to continue as a Directoi or as Chairman of the 
Board of Directors and therefore immediately resign from these positions 
; estricted from performing certain activities as outlined in paragraph 6 of 
the Agreement for a period of 1,2 months following the termination of rr my 
employment. 
In accordance with the Shareholders' Agreement entered into between myself 
and Todd D. Cusick and Curtis R. Chisholm on or about the first week of April 
iOGC;
, I am required to sell my shares in the corporation on a pro rata basis to 
; D Cusick and Curtis R. Chisholm for the audited Book Value as of June 
• , ?v " i i the event these two individuals do not purchase the stock the « 
Corporation has the right to purchase any remaining shares for the same price, 
Please inform me of the activities 1 should perform prior to July 14, 1997 
Sincerp,w 
•• „£ " K Eggetf Jr. 
Egg0023 
S PLAINTIFFS 
| EXHIBIT • 
°- EXH# .A )L 
CASE 
A H r . 2 H 7 ..FBI -8:18 AK WASAT.C! I E & J 'FAX HD. .'6.01 451 92D4 
AvWasatch 
L. \ Energy 
Friday, April 25, 1997 
Roger Eggett 
1026 South Mary Circle 
Bountiful, UT 84010 
Dear Roger: 
The purpose of this letter is to inform you that on April 16,1997, the Board of 
Directors for Wasatch Energy Corporation accepted your resignation as 
President and Chairman of tne Board of Directors. Information regarding your 
status of employment with Wasatch will be forthcoming. 
Yesterday you asked me to confirm in writing my request that you do not come 
to the Wasatch offices. This letter confirms that request. Please direct all 
inquiries of Wasatch in writing to either Brian Watts or myself. 
Sincerely, 





H EXH# / 
(I CASE 
EXHI 
> 7 , 
PO Box 699 • Farmington, UT 84025 • 0699 • Tel (801) 451-9200 • Fax (801) 451-9204 
F.BS0024 
S > r K I O U R D S 
18 ira 
-4 L- R N E L S O N 





BRETT F. PAULSEN'" 
LYNNS.DAVIES 
ROBERT G. GILCHRIST 
RUSSELL C.FERICKS 
MICHAEL R MOHRMAN 
MICHAEL N. EMERY 
MICHAEL n ZACCHEO 
CARYL. JOHNSON 
CURTIS J. DRAKE 
GEORGE TNAEGLE 
CRAIG CCOBURN 
BRAD C BETEBENNER 
ROBERT G. WRIGHT" 
CHRISTIAN W. NELSON tt 




KENT W HANSEN 
MARK L. MCCARTY 
CARRIE T TAYLOR 
S. BROOK MILLARD 
JAMES L. BARNETT 
Of COUNSEL 
ROBERT W BRANDT 
WILLIAM S RICHARDS 
WALLACE R LAUCHNOR 
ROBERT W MILLER (1<*4(W1Q83) 
ALSO ADMITTED IN 
— ARIZONA - MICHIGAN 
t CALIFORNIA TE>.AS 
- COLORADO • WYOMING 
t t IDAHO 
KEY BANK JQWER 
5U SOUTH MAIN ?th FLOOR 
POST OFFICE BOX 2465 
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 84110-2465 
(801)531-2000 FAX (801)532-5506 
INTERNET ADDRESS rbmn.cum 
n 
Via Facsimile No. 801-537-5199 
CAMP! >,\\: K& SESSIONS 
201 South Main, Suite 1300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Re: Termination of Roger Eggett *s Employment with Wasatch Energy Corp. 
Ot JX File No. 13771 001 
Deai 1 'en: in: 
I h is letter is to advise Mr. Eggett that the Board of Directors of Wasatch Energy Corp. met 
May 16, 1997, to review Mr. Eggett's continued employment status with the company At that meeting it 
was the determination of the Board of Directors that Mr. Eggett has violated his Employment Agreement in 
the following: 
- - . Jtors is acxisec tna: M: 
•:•;)., . . ... ~ . ..Jywhite to lesvMht* £ ^r 
L'L-etf s emplovnenl contract 
i the Corporation and the Chairman of the 
*v. . LA. ;... . . . ^ . ; i took excessive sums and compensation 
'h. at the approval of the Board of Directors nor the company's 
Compensation Committee. Mr. Eggett repeatedly refused to disclose to 
the Board or Compensation Committee the amounts he was taking in 
compensation as well as misrepresented to Board members the amoiint. he 
was taking. 
Mr. Eggett abused his expense account. For examr 
reimbursement such personal expenses as a person^ . 
to the Rocky Mountain Elk Foundation. Further, Mr Eggett, 
Brian. Watts, the Secretary of the company; to make the payments for 
Mi Eggett's personal vehicle. Mr. Eggett misrepresented that *•-




May 16, 1997 
Page 2 
However, this expense was not even requested by Mr. Eggett from 
K. Painter (1 member of the Compensation Committee) until 
approximately three months after the company began making these 
payments, and has never been approved. 
• At a company meeting held on April 15, 1997, while Mr. Eggett was still 
the President of the company, Mr. Eggett stated to the employees of the 
company that the company was a sinking ship and recommended that all 
employees leave the company as soon as possible because, in Mr. Eggett's 
absence, there was no capable management within the company. These 
statements were clearly disruptive and detrimental to the company's 
interests. 
• After Mr. Eggett resigned and was removed as the President of the 
corporation he made repeated calls and visits to company employees 
during normal business hours, disrupting the company's business. Todd 
Cusick, the President of the company as of that time, requested that 
Mr. Eggett not enter the premises and that future communications from 
Mr. Eggett be made in writing. However, Mr. Eggett disregarded this 
request and continued to disrupt the company's business by entering the 
premises and making repeated calls to company employees during business 
hours. 
All but the last of the foregoing acts were taken at a time when Mr. Eggett was acting as the 
President of the company as well as the Chairman of the Board of Directors, and owed the company a duty 
of fidelity and loyalty commensurate with that position. In the judgment of the Board of Directors, these 
acts constitute grounds for termination for cause under paragraphs 2(e)(ii), 2(e)(iii) and 2(e)(iv) of 
Mr. Eggett's Employment Agreement. 
Each of these acts, in the determination of the Board of Directors, constitute independent grounds 
for termination for cause under Mr. Eggett's Agreement. Accordingly, we hereby notify you that inasmuch 
as Mr. Eggett has been paid in advance through May 31, 1997, his employment with the company is 
terminated for cause effective that date. If Mr. Eggett believes the Board is mistaken in its determination 
with regard to any of the foregoing acts, the Board of Directors is willing to consider any explanation or 
appeal which Mr. Eggett submits in writing. 
Perrin R. Love 
May 16, 1997 
Page 3 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, Wasatch will horioi Mr. Eggett's request for a shareholder meeting,,, 
In light of Wasatch's termination of Mr. Eggett for cause, the shareholder meeting will be held on. May 30, 
1997 at 10:00 p.m at our offices,,, Appropriate notices will be sent to all shareholders. 
As we have previously advised you, the company reserves all rights to seek reimbursement .and 
damages from. Mi .,„ Eggett for any excess compensation oi distribution taken, by Mr. Eggett. 
I received a copy of youi lettei dated May 14, 1997 this i i IOI ning and ha\ e forwarded it to Wasatch 
for its consideration. We will respond to this once Wasatch has an, opportunity to consider your proposal. 
However, it appears that Mr. Eggett's offer demands a greater amount than his previous offer1",, 
Finally, I am advised that 'Mr. Eggett has demanded access to "W asatch records, ; - n 
writing the records to which Mr. Eggett seeks access together with the purpose for acces„ ~. ^
 w.i 
which V Eggett claims he is enisled thereto ird Wasatch w?'s considei h\<* ?eoues: 
< . . . . . . 
Sincerely, 
K W H / p m 152547 
cc: 
. PROFESSIONAL LAW CORPORATION 
T INELfC-
ROBERT L. STEVEN-
"DAVID L. BARCLAY -
BRETT F. PAULSFV 
LYNNS.DAVIP 
ROBERT G. GILCHRIS: 
RUSSELL C.FERICK' 
MICHAEL K. MOHRMA? 
M1CHAE; N. EMEF' 
MICHAELF ZACCHtC 
GARY L. IOHNSON 
CURTIS i.DRAKl 
GEORGE T. NAEGLi 
CRAiGC.COBURN 
ERADC.BETEBENNER 
ROBERT G.WRIGHT • 




MATTHEW C. BARNECK 
KENT W: HANSEN 
MARK L. McCART; 




ROBERT W BRAND: 
WILLIAM S. RICHARDS 
WALLACE R. LAL'CHNOF-
ROBERT W. MILLER (1^0-19?.' 
ALSO ADMITTED IN 
"AR1ZON-. ~ MICHIGAN 
+ CALIFORNIA • TEXAS 
- COLORADO ' WYOMING 
ft IDAHO 
KEY BANK TOWER 
50 SOUTH MAIN 7th FLOOK 
POST OFFICE BOX 24fcr 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 8J]10-24fcr 
(801)531-2000 FAX (S01)532-550r 
INTERNET ADDRESS rbmn.coir 
August28? 1997 
Via Hand-delivery 
Perrin R. Love 
CAMPBELL, MAACK & SESSIONS 
201 South Main, Suite 1300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Re: Wasatch Energy Corp. v. Eggett 
Our File No. 13771-001 
Dear Perrin: 
Enclosed is a check in the amount of $1,216.70 made payable to Mr. Eggett for the purchase of his 
shares in Wasatch Energy Corporation. This sum represents the amount Mr. Eggett paid for his shares 
(24,334 shares X .05 per share). By this letter we are notifying you of Wasatch's decision to terminate the 
Standstill Agreement, and hereby demand that Mr. Eggett return his shares in Wasatch no later than close of 
business Friday, August 29, 1997. The shares may be returned by deliver)' to me. In the event Mr. Eggett 
refuses to return his shares as provided herein, the shares will be canceled on Wasatch's books. 
Should you wish to discuss the matter or have questions please call. 
Very trulv vours. 
RICHA T, MILLER & NELSON 
KWH/pm: mn: 
-12-37 HON 16:36 WASATCH ENERGY FAX NO, 801 451 9204 P. .15 
Arthur-J3L GccafeUcH: 
i 11 -' uid sgazf 
T7Jt juiiw Street 
San cry. t/r S4C93 
May 9, 1997 
Magna Energy International 
620 So Main Street 
Bountiful [77 84 010 
Gentlemen: 
i ou instructed me to perform ± limited examinatic: : c: : the books 
and records and corporate minutes of Wasatch Energy Corporation 
= i ) :i" to pay particular attention to salary payments to principa 2 
officers; bonus and or profit sharing payments to all employees 
travel expense reimbursements' of principal officers, corporate 
c on t ri b u t i on s a n d a ny othe r paym ents ma de o n o r b e h a 1 f o f a n} 
corporate employee* 
To accomplish this, I reviewed all corporate minutes (from the 
date of incorporation (7/8/93) to and including 4/30/9"* r ) Z 
reviewed all corporate bank statements for 1994, 1995, 1996 a nd 
1997, The corporation, at various times, had checking accounts 
with First Security Bank of Utah, Zions First National Bank and 
Ba rnes Banking Co. I reviewed all available payroll records and 
data pertaining to bonus and profit sharing payments. I rev iewed 
all available vouchers submitted for travel reimbursements. 
1 ' i . l f r e c J U p C I ' i l ! I | e - ' X d / l i J H a l , ,1 ! 11 | I1 hi1 I'II < I ft'l", C I ' J ' U lit I if ("ii" I I,I I 1 C'W I j'iiji 
FACTS 
COMPENSATION; 
1, The corporation had employment contracts with its three 
principal officer/employees. However, these contracts were 
silent as to the amount of compensation or method of computing 
such compensation. The contracts were entered into on March 31 , 
1995, the term of the contract was from April 17, 1995 through 
Apri Z 16, 2 9 9 9 fo r Roger Eggett Tr a nd £ ro m Sp r i 1 2 7 1995 
P DEFENDANT'S 
•• EXHIBIT 
11 A^\ a- &</i/L < 
BffiM2-S7 HON 16:37 WASAF« .ENERGY FAX NO. 801 451 3204 JUB 
through April 16, 1996 for Todd Cusick and Curtis Chisholm. 
Section 3 of the employment contracts sets the terms for 
compensation. It states as follows: 
Compensation. The Employee shall be entitled to 
compensation for any and all services performed under this 
Agreement as may be agreed tof in writing^ by the parties to this 
Agreement. 
The Salary,, in the event that this Agreement shall not be 
terminated/ shall be reviewed at least annually and may be 
increased or decreased, consistent with general salary increases 
or decreases/ as the case my bef for the Corporation's executive 
employees or as appropriate in light of the performance of the 
Corporation and the Employee. 
I could not find any written agreements between the Corporation 
and the employee as to compensation, bonus or profit sharing 
payments. 
Absent any additional information, I have concluded that all 
officer salaries, bonus and or profit sharing payments would have 
to be determined and approved by the Board of Directors. 
The minutes of the Board of Directors meetings did not address 
the problem. That is, the Board did not set salary or any other 
compensation package for the officer/employees. However, in the 
directors meeting of May 31, 1995 the issue of company payroll 
was discussed. Roger stated that the following minimum payroll 
had been agreed to: (There was no board action on this.) 
Roger $ 4 000 per mo 
Todd 1 500 per mo 
Curtis 1 500 per mo 
Roger, also indicated that circumstances, allowing, payroll would 
be increased to the following levels: 
Roger $ 7 000 per mo 
Todd 4 583 per mo 
Curtis 3 150 per mo 
Roger Eggett Jr., assumed the sole responsibility, for 
determining the pay, bonus and profit sharing for all employees. 
The amount of compensation was never openly discussed in 
director's meetings, staff meetings or committee meetings. The 
director of Finance had no idea as to the salary of any employee 
HAY-12-B7 HON 16:37 WASfiT" ENERGY I "AX 1 10 801 & 1 92:04 
until he recovered the payroll records from Paychex in April 
1997. 
During the year 1995, the exact date is unknown, Roger Eggett 
decided that all employees should receive their salaries in 
advance. At that time he had the finance officer issue each 
employee an additional paycheck, making' 13 pay periods in 1995 
and placing all current and future employee's on the program ~f 
receiving j a} r r <::::> 2 1 fo r pe c iods of time not yet worked. 
The total payment of wages, bonus and profit sharing paid. t< 2 1 
employees of the company for the period ended I7/~- /$6 (ca 1 • M i :  i1" = : r 
year) and 3/31/97 l f. i rst qua. rter) are as follows~ 
3 1 96 (12 employees) $55o jr -
: " I S >7 (13 employees) 240 196 
CONTRIBUTIONS : 
The corporationf at the request of its employees, initiated a 
program in mid 1936 whereby any employee could ' designate a 
portion of his salary to be paid directly to the Bishop of his 
IDS Ward. The amounts so designated would not be considered 
wages to the employee, but, would be considered as a contribution 
from Wasatch to the LDS Wa rd. 
Only two employee9sf Roger K. Eggett Jr and Todd Cusick, took 
-advantage of this program foi the fiscal year ended 6/30/96* 
However, for the calendar year ended. 12/31/96, two additional 
employees, Curtis R Chisholm and Richard K Eggett a 2 so 
participated in the program. 
Th e idea was appa ren lly concei ved a t: 3 1 unch mee ti ng <:: f th e 
empl oyees i n Dec emh er 1995, Th e c omp a ny h ad. onl y fo 1 11: ( 4 I 
employees at the time and they all agi eed to di.scuss the idea 
with their bishop to see if it had merit* Roger stated he would 
1 un it by his attorney to determine if it was legal. 
2 'he principa 1 benefit to be derived by the employee was to have 
his tithing paid, by the company, not include the income 0.2 1 his 
W-2 and to avoid the payment of FICA AND MC taxes on the amounts 
so a llocated. 
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The principal benefits to be derived by the company were to have 
a contribution deduction in lieu of wages paid and to avoid the 
payment of the employers share of the FICA AND MC taxes. 
It appears that the employees attempted to create a plan similar 
to a "Cafeteria Plan" whereby they could allocate wages as 
contributions and not have to include them in taxable income. 
However, in a cafeteria plan, even though the amounts are not 
subject to income tax they are subject to FICA AND MC tax. 
In reality the checks were made payable to the Ward of the 
employee and were then given to the employee to hand deliver to 
his bishop. 
I would assume the person who delivered the donation was given 
credit in his tithing record and there would be nothing to 
prevent that person from claiming the contribution when preparing 
his federal income tax return. 
Possible tax consequence: In the event of an IRS audit the 
contributions would probably be disallowed to the company with 
the amounts being allocated to the employee as additional wages 
or as consent dividends. If the amounts were determined to be 
additional wages to the employee the tax impact to the company 
would be additional FICA AND MC (both employee and employer) and 
possibly federal withholding taxes on the amounts so allocated. 
However, if determined to be consent dividends the company would 
lose the deduction for the amounts so paid and would be required 
to pay the additional federal taxes and interest. The impact to 
the employee would be minor. They would probably have to include 
in income the amounts so allocated, but, the offset would be a 
contribution deduction for the amounts so included in income. 
TRAVEL REIMBURSEMENT: 
Apparently it is the policy of the company to reimburse all 
authorized travel. Receipt documentation is required. All 
company travel was either by the company president, Roger K. 
Eggett Jr., or was authorized by him. On most occasions Roger 
Eggett was accompanied by another employee. All travel costs 
would be charged to the credit card of Mr. Eggett. At the end of 
the month he would submit a voucher requesting reimbursement of 
all funds spent. 
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Mr. Eggett would, prepare his own. travel i ' ouchers and submit them 
along with the documents for payment. In most instances there 
wa s not an appi oving signature on the travel voucher. 
The travel voucher was used for reimbursement of items other than 
company trave I 
Mr. Eg g • • ' t: t: Ir took flyi ng lessons and submi tted them for 
reimbursement. Mr. Eggett would also purchase, for t he office, 
i terns of office furni ture, cell phones, offi ce e< 3 uipment , 
computers, office supplies, etc* and charge them to his American 
Exp re ss ca rd. a n d t h em s 1 i bin:! 1:11 n g do cumenta 11 © n a s ki n g fo r 
reimburse- * * 
1 reviewed all travel vouchers submitted by Mr. Eggett for the 
time period 1/1/96 through 4/1/07, with the exception of those 
submitted 1/5/97 and 4/2/97. The latter two vouchers could not 
be located. 
1 discussed the travel reimbursement policy with Mr. Brian Watts, 
he indicated that Mr, Eggett controlled all travel 1 eimbvrsement 
authority. That any travel by person other than Mr. Eggett would 
be approved by Mr. Eggett. Since/ Mr. Eggett, was the President 
of the Company and controlled all travel author!ty 21 1 ra » 1 :i ot 
necessary for anyone to approve his travel reimbursement. Hi 
Watts further stated that his function was to verify that all 
submitted vouchers had adequate documentation of all claimed 
charges. 
He did stater however, that the reason all of the travel was 
charged, to Mi Eg g e11 '* s American Ca.rd was so tha t Mx , Egge11 
would get credit for SKY MILES ? ,3 » benefits from the SKY MILES 
were Mr. Eggetts to keep. 
Mr. Watts did state that Mr, Eggett. had told, him that he had 
enough SKY MILES I• :> t a ke he and hIs fami Iy on a n exten,ded trip 
to Europe 
When questioned about the flying lessons Mr. Watts stated that 
Mr. Eggett stated in a staff meeting that he was going to take 
flying lessons in o rdei to save the company money. That is, 2 f 
h e had a private license he would be able to rent small 
airplanes, when necessaryf in order to save time in performing 
company business. ( V. i s i t i n g remote locations, e t :::: ) 
The total cost of pi ivate lessons reimbursed was $ ; 069.50 
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Mr. Eggett's "Pilots log" would reveal any and all trips made on 
behalf of Wasatch Energy, including any and all passengers who 
accompanied him, place of origin, - destination, date of departure 
and date of return. 
The available records revealed that Roger Eggett Jr only rented a 
private plane once and that was to fly to Vail, Colorado. Many 
commercial flights fly into and out of Vail each day. Indeed, I 
heard that the whether was so bad that the plane was abandoned in 
Vail and a commercial flight was used to return to Salt Lake 
City. 
Automobile Payment: 
Roger Eggett Jr. approved the lease payment for an automobile 
operated by Todd Cusick. The automobile is a 1997 Toyota. Lease 
payment is $477.56 per month starting May 1, 1997. This payment 
along with all operating cost of the vehicle were approved for 
corporate expenditures because the vehicle is used in excess of 
90% on company business. 
Roger Eggett Jr. also approved the corporation making automobile 
payments for his own personal automobile starting November 1, 
1996. The payments are made to Utah First Cr Un in the amount of 
$653.16 per month. The company was also to pay all operating 
expenses of this automobile. 
It appears that Rogers automobile was driven mostly (85% or more) 
for personal use and therefore the payments should be considered 
additional compensation. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the records and documents examined and the interviews 
conducted I have concluded that Roger K. Eggett, Jr. withdrew 
funds from the corporation in excess of the amounts authorized by 
e i t h e r the Board of Directors or his employment contract as 
follows: 
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Roger K, Eggett Jr., President 
Base Salary (Board Meeting 
5/31/95) $7 000 p/m ' $ 84 000 $ 28 000 
Bonus -N -mfif Sharing 88 754 62 350 
Balance 172 754 90 250 
I JLUicoL Paymen l ' I" 
Hill LDS Ward . _ „ 12 500 
Designated amount not 
yet pa id to Moss Mil I I D 5 4 600 
MAY-12-97 HON B 3 9 UBSfW ENERGY B X NO. BD:l *51 B2D4 P. 
Contribution to Ouelessebougou 1 250 
Contribution to Rocky Mt 
Elk Foundation 
1 000 
Automobile Payments made 
Utah First Cr Union 1 306 2 613 
Reimbursed Flying 
Lessons 7 060 
Total Compensation 189 020 111 313 
Less: Base Salary (above) 84 000 28 000 
Excess Compensation Paid
 | 105 020 83 313 
It appears that Wasatch would have a very strong case to demand 
repayment of all excess bonus and profit sharing, contributions 
and reimbursements for personal expenses taken by Roger and for 
that matter any and all employees who received such payments. 
Again, it must be noted that there was never any authority for 
the corporation to pay any employee or officer a bonus or profit 
sharing distribution, reimbursement for personal expenses. Any 
such payments would, at best be an illegal distribution, subject 
to recapture, or at worst, a theft of corporate funds. 
It should be noted at this time that no employee or officer of 
the corporation, other than Roger K. Eggett, Jr., had any 
knowledge of how the bonus or profit sharing payments were 
computed or paid. They, therefore, would be only innocent 
participants of the payment plans. No recommendation is made in 
reference to these amounts. 
RECCMMENLATIONS 
Recommended that the company abandon it policy of paying salary 
in advance and return to the old conventional method of work now 
receive pay later. 
Recommended that the company immediately review all wage and 
salary payments and adjust them in accordance with ordinary, 
necessary and reasonable amounts. Further, if a bonus or profit 
sharing plan is to be put in place, it be done by legal document 
and approved by the Board of Directors. That any and all bonus 
or profit sharing payments be made once each year not later than 
60 days following the close of the taxable year. 
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1996 Actual Payroll 













1997 Compensation Agreement 
$7,000 Per Month 
10% of Net Income 
Before Taxes 
Compensation Paid to Roger Eggett 
Between January and May 1997 
Month 
• January '97 
• February '97 
•March ''97 
•" April ;.97 














Nov. *96 profit sharing 
Dec. *96 profit sharing 
Jan. 497. profit sharing 
Feb. *97 profit sharing 
Consulting Fee 
1997 Profit Sharing 
1 -i..:i.*,3T73»!,:>: ~.• .;£..-;•«: - \ \- = • . . . ' . • , • ' . 
1 • January 





























Book Value is determined by multiplying 
Stockholders* Equity by Ownership interest. 
Stockholders* Equity * Ownership Interest 
REVISED 
RETAINED EARNINGS | 
AS OF JUNE 30, 
• Per Audit Report 
• Add Swap Contract Adj. 
J ..-• Add Suspense Items 
1 V AddGrynberg Adj. 





$45,553 ^ J 
$682,029 Jj 
CALCULATED BOOK VALUE | 
at JUNE 30, 
• Adjusted Retained Earnings 
1 • Contribued Capital 
• Total Stockholders'Equity 
• Ownership Interest 
1 "Book Value 
1 ••:--:'-:y'-':i^'r:--:-'::;-^:':''J-:-'- '"^".'VS •;',;-'-: " \ ' : / W ' 0 ^ - ' ' - : -v ; v : '.' 
1997 







Retained Earnings as of 
December '31,1996 
Per Management Report 
Add Suspense Items 
Add Grynberg Adjustment 
Retained Earnings 




Total Stockholders' Equity 
Ownership Interest 
Book Value 
Summary with Book Value at 
December 31,1996 
In accordance with the Employment Agreement. 
Shareholders* Agreement, and Compensation 
Agreement, Mr. Esgett should receive the 
following: 
Book Value at December 31,1996 $ 126,429 
Profit Sharing through April 1997 $66,688 
Total $193,117 
Summary with Book Value at 
June 30,1997 
In accordance with the Employment Agreement. 
Shareholders' Agreement, and Compensation 
Agreement, Mr. Eggett should receive the 
following: 
Book Value at June 30,1997 $255,419 
Profit Sharing through April 1997 $66,688 
Total $322,107 











Note: Cusick and Chishom each received an 
additional 2,833 shafes"ofWasatch Energyas 
compensation. 
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Report of Independent Auditors 
The Board of Directors and Stockholders 
Wasatch Energy Corporation 
We have audited the accompanying consolidated balance sheets of Wasatch Energy 
Corporation as of June 30, 1997 and 1996, and the related consolidated statements of 
income, stockholders' equity and cash flows for the years then ended. These financial 
statements are the responsibility of the Company's management. Our responsibility is to 
express an opinion on these financial statements based on our audits. 
We conducted our audits in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards. 
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain reasonable assurance 
about whether the financial statements are free of material misstatement. An audit 
includes examining, on a test basis, evidence supporting the amounts and disclosures in 
the financial statements. An audit also includes assessing the accounting principles used 
and significant estimates made by management, as well as evaluating the overall financial 
statement presentation. WTe believe that our audits provide a reasonable basis for our 
opinion. 
In our opinion, the consolidated financial statements referred to above present fairly, in 
all material respects, the consolidated financial position of Wasatch Energy Corporation 
at June 30, 1997 and 1996, and the consolidated results of its operations and its cash 
flows for the years then ended in conformity with generally accepted accounting 
principles. 
August 19, 1997 
+(fr 
i 
Ernst & Young LLP is a member of Ernst & Young International, Ltd. 
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Deferred income tax assets and prepaid expenses 
Accounts receivable from related parties 
Total current assets 
Property, plant and equipment: 
Furniture and equipment 
Natural gas producing properties 
























Liabilities and stockholders' 
Current liabilities: 
equity 
Outstanding checks in excess of bank balance 
Accounts payable 
Accrued liabilities 
Accrued income taxes 
Accrued taxes, other 
Total current liabilities 














Common stock, par value S.05 per share: authorized 
100.000 shares. 66.667 shares in 1997 and 1996 
issued and outstanding 
Additional paid-in capital 
Retained earnings i c ^ 
Treasury stock, at cost: 700 shares in 1997 and 1.800 
shares in 1996 
Total stockholders* equity 
Total liabilities and stockholders* equity 

















Wasatch Energy Corporation 
Consolidated Statements of Income 
Sales 
Interest income 
Cost of sales 
General and administrative 
Income before interest expense and income taxes 
Interest expense 
Income before income taxes 
Income taxes 
Net income 
























See accompanying notes. 
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Wasatch Energy Corporation 
Consolidated Statements of Stockholders' Equity 
Balance at July 1. 1995 
Issuance of treasury stock 
Net income 
Balance at June 30. 1996 
Issuance of treasury stock 
Net income 
Balance at June 30, 1997 
Additional Retained 
Common Paid-in Earnings Treasury 
Stock Capital (Deficit) Stock Total 





















See accompanying notes. 
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"Wasatch Energy Corporation 
Consolidated Statements of Cash Flows 
Year ended June 30 
1997 1996 
Operating activities 
Net income $ 57,224 $ 119,839 
Adjustments to reconcile net income to net cash 
provided by (used in) operating activities: 
Depreciation and amortization 70,218 53.164 
Changes in operating assets and liabilities: 
Accounts receivable (465,858) (1,736,229) 
Prepaids and other assets (102,901) (229.092) 
Accounts payable (1,152,289) 2,482.746 
Accrued liabilities 559,460 284.551 
Accrued income and other taxes 196,815 135.693 
Net cash provided b\ (used in) operating activities (837,331) 1.110.672 
Investing activities 
Purchases of property, plant and equipment (203,903) (69.044) 
Financing activities 
Additional paid in capital 
Note payable 
Issuance of treasury stock 
Net cash used in financing activities 
Net increase (decrease) in cash 
Cash at beginning of year 
Cash (checks outstanding in excess of bank balance) 














See accompanying notes. 
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Wasatch Energy Corporation 
Notes to Consolidated Financial Statements 
June 30,1997 
1. Significant Accounting Policies 
Wasatch Energy Corporation (the Company) was incorporated July 7, 1993, under the 
laws of the state of Utah as Wasatch Oil & Gas Corporation. On April 10, 1996, the 
Company changed its name to W7asatch Energy Corporation and formed Wasatch Oil & 
Gas Corporation as a wholly-owned subsidiary. The Company principally buys and 
resells natural gas to retail markets. 
Principles of Consolidation 
The consolidated financial statements include the accounts of Wasatch Energy 
Corporation and its wholly-owned subsidiary Wasatch Oil & Gas Corporation. All 
significant intercompany accounts and transactions have been eliminated. 
Property, Plant and Equipment 
Property, plant and equipment, including natural gas producing properties, are recorded at 
cost. Depreciation is computed using the straight-line method based on estimated useful 
lives of 36 months. 
Gas Imbalances 
Quantities of gas over-delivered or under-delivered under imbalance agreements with 
pipelines, are recorded monthly as prepaids or accrued liabilities using the lower of cost 
or market price for prepaid balances and higher of cost or market price for accrued 
liability balances. Generally, these balances are settled with deliveries of gas. 
Revenue Recognition 
The Company recognizes gas sales when the purchaser takes possession of gas at the 
contracted point of deliver)'. 
7 
000 
Wasatch Energy Corporation 
Notes to Consolidated Financial Statements (continued) 
1. Significant Accounting Policies (continued) 
Credit Risk 
The Company's primary market areas are the Rocky Mountain and Pacific Northwest 
regions. The Company's exposure to credit risk may be impacted by the concentration of 
customers in those regions due to changing economic or other conditions. The 
Company's customers include individuals and companies in numerous industries that 
may be impacted differently by changing conditions. The Company believes that it does 
not have significant potential for credit related losses and that the carrying amount of 
receivables equals fair value. The Company generally does not require collateral from 
customers. 
Market Risk 
The Company enters into swaps and options to secure known margins for the marketing 
of natural gas. Generally, swap contracts involve exchanging a NYMEX based price or 
fixed price for a local market price. There is a high degree of correlation of such 
contracts with the related physical commodity. Recognized gains and losses on the 
hedged transactions are recorded during the same period as the related physical 
transactions. Failure by counter parties to deliver physical volumes may expose the 
Company to market risk. 
Use of Estimates 
The preparation of financial statements in conformity with generally accepted accounting 
principles requires management to make estimates and assumptions that affect the 
amounts of assets and liabilities or the results of operations. Actual amounts could differ 
from those estimates. 
Income Taxes 
Temporary' differences primarily relate to unrealized losses and certain reserves not 
currently deductible for tax purposes. 
Reclassifications 
Certain 1996 amounts have been reclassified to conform with the 1997 presentation. 
8 
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Wasatch Energy Corporation 
Notes to Consolidated Financial Statements (continued) 
2. Financial Instruments 
At June 30, 1997 and 1996, the Company held swap contracts covering approximately 
3,800.000 MMBtus and 7,000,000 MMBtus of natural gas to be delivered through 
October 1998 and December 1997, respectively. The face value of the contracts was 
approximately $5,500,000 and $9,800,000 at June 30, 1997 and 1996, respectively. The 
market value of the contracts was approximately $627,000 less and $610,000 less than 
face value at June 30, 1997 and 1996, respectively. As of August 19, 1997, the market 
value was approximately $255,000 less than face value. The calculation of the market 
value assumes the Company closed its position on that date and did not recognize 
potential gains on the physical transaction. The fair value of these contracts was based on 
market prices as listed in Inside FERC or quotations from brokers at year end. The 
Company only enters into swap contracts with large credit worthy brokers specializing in 
natural gas derivatives. 
3. Income Taxes 
Deferred income taxes reflect the net tax effects of temporary differences between the 
earning amounts of assets and liabilities for financial reporting purposes and the amounts 
used for income tax purposes. The Company's deferred tax assets are approximate!) 
$374,000 and $0 at June 30. 1997 and 1996. respectively. 
The components of deferred taxes are primarily certain reserves and unrealized losses not 
currenth deductible for tax purposes. 


























Wasatch Energy Corporation 
Notes to Consolidated Financial Statements (continued) 
3. Income Taxes (continued) 
Differences between the reported amount of income tax expense attributable to 
continuing operations for the year and the amount of income tax expense that would 
result from applying domestic federal statutory tax rates to pretax income from 
continuing operations relate primarily to permanent differences. 
4. Related Party Transactions 
At June 30, 1997. the Company holds a note receivable from a stockholder for SI2.000. 
The Company also leased office space on a month to month basis from a stockholder 
during 1997 and 1996. Total payments under the lease totaled $33,950 and $19,500 at 
June 30. 1997 and 1996, respectively. 
5. Lease Obligations 
Rental expense for 1997 and 1996 was $63,412 and $19,500. respectively. Future rental 
payments for a non-cancelable office building lease from June 30, 1997 through February 
28. 2000 total $455,000. The Company also has the option to extend the lease for 2 
years. 
6. Contingencies and Commitments 
Prepaid Gas Transaction 
During August 1996. the Company, and an outside investor, entered into a prepaid 
natural gas transaction with a supplier. Based on commitments to deliver gas from the 
supplier, the Company entered into swap contracts with brokers to secure a margin on the 
scheduled deliveries. In March 1997. the supplier ceased deliver}' of its gas to the 
Company, filed suit against the Company to void the contract, and sold its gas reserves to 
a third party. The Company countersued for breach of contract and foreclosure on the 
supplier's properties. 
At June 30, 1997, the Company had recorded as accounts receivable approximately 
$490,000 for payments made to settle the related swap contracts. The Company 
estimates that an additional $400,000 will be paid to settle swap positions through 
December 31, 1997. 
10 
000437 
Wasatch Energy Corporation 
Notes to Consolidated Financial Statements (continued) 
6. Contingencies and Commitments (continued) 
Fixed Price Derivative Transactions 
At June 30, 1997, the Company held a swap contract with a broker for which there was 
no offsetting physical transaction. The contract settles monthly and calls for the 
Company to pay a local market price for that month and in return receive $1.50 per 
MMBtu. Volumes covered by the contract are 3,700 per day with the contract beginning 
July 1, 1997 and ending on June 30, 1998. Face value of the contract is approximately 
$2,025,750. At June 30, 1997. the Company would incur a loss of approximately 
$283,000 related to this contract if it closed its position. Since inception, the maximum 
potential loss of the contract has been $305,000. 
Other 
Estimates for payments to settle swap contracts are based on current market prices of 
natural gas which can fluctuate significantly. 
The Company has a $1,800,000 revolving line of credit with a bank. As of June 30. 
1997, $250,000 of the $1,800,000 was reserved for an outstanding letter of credit. 
11 
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Wasatch Energy 
June 30,1997 
Audit Strategies Memorandum 
Changes in Client's Business and Audit Scope 
Wasatch Energy (the Company) was organized in 1993, under the name Wasatch Oil & 
Gas, as a sub-chapter S corporation. It was later changed to a C corporation in April of 
1995. The Company later reorganized changing its name to Wasatch Energy and forming 
a subsidiary named Wasatch Oil & Gas. The subsidiary is wholly owned by Wasatch 
Energy and deals with gas producers while Wasatch Energy handles the marketing 
functions. The Company is engaged in the buying and reselling of natural gas. The 
Company buys natural gas from other brokers or natural gas producers and resells the gas 
to end users or other brokers. It may also enter the market for electricity in the future. 
The majority of the Company's sales are to utilities in the Northwest. Hedges are placed 
on all transactions that expose the Company to market risk in order to guarantee the 
Company a targeted margin of 3 to 5 cents/MMBTU. The majority of the Company's 
contracts are short-term in nature. 
Through May, 1997, the Company's annualized sales were S30.8 million, a 156% increase 
over 1996. Annualized net income for 1997 was $458,500, compared to 5172,758 for 
1996. Income amounts may fluctuate due to imbalances which are recalculated every 
month. 
Accounting and Auditing Issues 
Between April and June we attended several meetings with Brian Watts, controller, to 
discuss the upcoming audit and learn more about the client's needs. From our planning 
meeting with the client and review of the Company's financial records, we identified the 
following issues. 
Hedges 
The Company has numerous hedges using basis swaps, swaps, and futures contracts. 
Testing will be conducted to determine if there are any positions which expose the 
Company to excessive risk. We will also need to disclose hedging information in 
accordance with FASB standards in the financial statements. 
Accounts Receivable 
Approximately 60 percent of the Company's balance sheet consists of accounts receivable 
and no reserve has been established for bad debts. We will confirm the receivables 
EY 000757 
File: Audit Strategies Memo 
CONFIDENTIAL SUBJECT 
TO PROTECTIVE ORDER 
according to Micro-Start and ascertain the necessity of establishing a bad debt reserve 
account. 
PP&E 
In our prior year audit, we noted the Company had capital leases that were treated as 
operating leases. We will examine leases and test for proper accounting treatment of 
leases. 
Accounts Payable 
Approximately 95 percent of the Company's current liabilities consists of accounts payable 
to suppliers. We will perform a search for unrecorded liabilities in accordance with the 
audit program to determine that all liabilities are properly included on the balance sheet. 
Imbalance Account 
The Company's balance sheet shows a significant gas imbalance that is for gas owed to 
transportation providers (offiset is to income). We will test the imbalance amount to 
determine that it is properly stated on the balance sheet. 
Suspense Accounts 
The Company's policy is to carry an accrual on the balance sheet for amounts remitted in 
excess of invoices (Invoices are based on nominations) for one year before taking the 
amount to income. We will examine contracts and determine the accounting treatment 
and policy is in accordance with the contracts. 
Shareholder Transactions 
During 1997, numerous shareholder transactions occurred with several changes in the 
number shareholders and stock owned by shareholders. We will determine the proper 
disclosure of shareholder information in the financial statements. 
Other Issues 
During 1997 a supplier to the Company entered into bankruptcy, causing the Company to 
incur losses as it had to provide "makeup" gas to customers and fulfill swap commitments 
to brokers. Although the Company had filed lien^n properties held by the supplier, the 
supplier sold the property to a third party. The Company has filed suit against the supplier 
and is seeking the revenues from the property sale. The case is currently in court. 
During 1997 the Company entered into a swap position intending to offset the position 
with another broker. The offsetting position could not be completed, leaving the 
Company exposed to market fluctuations. The swap is currently in a loss position of 
approximately $200,000. 
EY 000758 
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The Company is currently in mediation to resolve a dispute with a shareholder who is also 
the past president. There is a possibility that mediation will be unsuccessful. If the 
mediation is unsuccessful, the shareholder may pursue legal action against the Company. 
Overall Analytical Review 
See the enclosed financial statements. 
Changes in Audit Strategies and Risk Assessments 
We concluded that it would be more efficient to not test controls as this is a small client 
with some segregation of duties issues. We will use the small business approach for this 
client. For our Micro-Starts, we will assess the controls as ineffective and risk as high. 
Planning Materiality 
We have based our planning materiality on net operating income before taxes. Annualized 
pre-tax operating income at 5/31/97 was $746,283 X 7.5% equals $55,971, rounded to 
$55,000. We will use this PM for the June 30 1997 audit and set TE at 75% or $41,000. 
We will post all items greater than 10% of TE ($4,100) to the summary of audit 
differences. 
Client Expectations and Needs 
Timely delivery of financial statements. 
EY 000759 
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SUMMARY REVIEW MEMORANDUM 
WASATCH ENERGY CORPORATION 
June 30, 1997 
BACKGROUND 
Wasatch Energy Corporation (the Company) was originally incorporated in July 1993 as a 
"Subchapter S Corporation" under the laws of the state of Utah with the name Wasatch Oil & 
Gas Corporation. In April 1995, the Company changed its structure to a C Corp and its name to 
Wasatch Energy Corporation. It also formed a subsidiary (100% owned by Wasatch Energy) 
named Wasatch Oil & Gas Corporation to operate oil and gas producing properties. The 
Company's main focus is buying natural gas from small producers and reselling it to utilities and 
industrial users. It has also started to acquire some smaller oil and gas producing properties. 
SCOPE OF EXAMINATION 
We were engaged to perform an audit of the financial statements of Wasatch Energy Corporation 
as of and for the year ending June 30, 1997, and to express an opinion thereon. We previously 
audited the Company for June 30 1994, 1995 and 1996. 
IMPORTANT ACCOUNTING AND AUDITING MATTERS 
Allowance for Doubtful Accounts 
The Company's purchasers are primarily larger industrial or utility customers. Amounts are 
generally paid within 30 days. The Company recorded an allowance for doubtful accounts of 
$619,000 related to litigation with a supplier (United Utilities). No other amounts are currently 
outstanding that appear uncollectible nor has the Company experienced significant write-offs. 
Income Taxes 
The Company has a deferred tax asset of approximately $373,000 related timing differences for 
amortization of furniture and fixtures, unrealized losses, and certain loss reserves. The tax status 
was reviewed by the tax department. 
Commitments and Contingencies 
In 1994, Wasatch established a relationship with a producer, United Utilities. In early 1996, 
United developed several gas wells and became a significant supplier for Wasatch. However, 
United was experiencing cash flow difficulties and needed operating capital. Wasatch structured 
several transactions where an outside investor would provide loans (setup as a prepaid gas 
transaction) to United, which would be paid back to the investor in gas. The investor would sell 
the gas to Wasatch, and Wasatch would sell the gas to customers. The initial arrangement was 
successful as United received operating capital and a fair price for its gas, Wasatch obtained a 
significant supply of gas, and the outside investor received a good return on his investment. 
In August 1996 another transaction was arranged so that the outside investor would loan 
$1,100,000 and Wasatch would loan $400,000 (total $1.5 million) to United in exchange for gas 
to be returned in the future. Based on United's previous production, it appeared that United 
would be able to supply the gas. As security, Wasatch obtained a Deed of Trust on United's gas 
properties, which covered "any and all" obligations. United also committed to deliver additional 
volumes above what was to be delivered in the prepaid arrangement. Based on the prepaid 
EY 000661 
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SUMMARY "REVIEW MEMORANDUM 
WASATCH ENERGY CORPORATION 
June 30, 1997 
Page 2 
transaction and additional volumes committed by United, Wasatch hedged contracted volumes to 
secure a margin on the gas being sold. 
By January 1997, United's production volumes had decreased below the volumes it had 
committed to fulfill and United did not satisfy its gas delivery obligations to Wasatch. Some gas 
was received in January and February with no gas being received after February. About the same 
time, United sold its properties to a company named Rosewood (despite the Trust deed to 
Wasatch) and filed a lawsuit against Wasatch to void the contract. Wasatch counter sued to 
foreclose on United's property and for breach of contract. 
With no offsetting physical volumes, Wasatch was exposed to market risk for the hedges placed 
on United's gas. Wasatch continued to fulfill its hedging obligations with brokers (by settling in 
cash) and booked amounts paid to brokers as receivables from United. Total receivables 
recorded related to United at June 30, 1997 amounted to $1,040,000. Based on current market 
prices, the Company projects to pay an additional $465,000 to brokers through December (when 
the hedges expire). Amounts paid are being booked as receivables based on the Trust deed. The 
Company recorded an allowance of $619,000 related to the receivable currently in litigation. 
In its lawsuit, Wasatch has submitted a settlement claim for $3,800,000. This amount includes 
penalties stipulated by the contract and an amount for profit Wasatch would have received on the 
receipt and sale of gas. Wasatch believes it likely that a settlement is going to be reached with no 
negative financial impact in view of its secured position. 
United claims that only amounts relating to the prepaid transaction are secured by the Trust deed. 
Losses on any hedge positions are essentially unsecured. Based on prices "triggered" by United, 
the value of gas related to the prepaid transaction would be $1,975,000. Rosewood (the new 
owner) has offered to settle out-of-court for $1,500,000. For any settlement received, Wasatch 
would need to first repay the outside investor upto $1,100,000 (should no settlement be received, 
Wasatch is not obligated to repay the investor). 
The outside investor has been assigned the Trust deed and is essentially in 1st position. However, 
Wasatch's contract with the investor indicates that the investor must first allow Wasatch to 
attempt to recover the gas or settlement as long as it is exerting their best efforts. This stipulation, 
prevents the outside investor from circumventing Wasatch's position and negotiating directly •' 
with United or Rosewood. As the lawsuit is still in the early stages, we have not proposed a, 
writeoff of the receivable balance related to United or accrual of additional reserves. / 
Wasatch has also filed another lawsuit against a smaller producer, MM & O. During May 1997, 
NM & O defaulted on supplying its gas to Wasatch. Based on volumes committed by NM & O, 
Wasatch had entered into hedges to secure a margin for the gas delivered from NM & O. Based 
on actual and projected swap payments less payables to NM & O, Wasatch will incur losses of 
approximately $55,000 by the time the hedges expire in October (based on current market 
values). To recover the amount, Wasatch filed a lawsuit claiming NM & O breached its contract 
with Wasatch. Wasatch did not obtain a security interest in NM & O's property and has
 p Y n n 0 f i o 9 
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The company had a $1,800,000 line of credit at the end of 1997. No balance was outstanding on 
the line at June 30, 1997. 
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WASATCH ENERGY CORPORATION 
June 30, 1997 
Page 3 
Hedging 
The Company enters into hedging arrangements with natural gas brokers to limit its exposure to 
price risk on purchases of natural gas. We noted one hedge arrangement at June 30, 1997 which 
was not properly tied to physical volumes and has an unrecognized loss of $283,000. All other 
hedging arrangements (with exception of United and NM & O discussed above) appeared to be 
properly matched to physical transactions and as such qualify for deferred treatment of gains and 
losses. The Company has recorded the unrealized loss of $283,000. 
Related Party Transactions 
Our testing revealed the following related party transaction: 
1) The Company loaned $12,000 to Todd Cusick, a shareholder. 
Going Concern 
We discussed the following observations regarding the Company's ability to continue as a going 
concern: 
1. The Company generated pre-tax income of approximately $86,000 in 1997 and has positive 
equity. 
2. The Company has no long-term debt. 
3. The Company has access to a $1,800,000 line of credit. There are currently no amounts 
outstanding. 
Based on the above considerations, we do not believe that the Company's ability to continue as a 
going concern is in question. 
SUMMARY ANALYTICAL REVIEW 
See attached copies of financial statements. 
EY 000663 
CONFIDENTIAL SUBJECT 
TO PROTECTIVE ORDER 
SUMMARY REVIEW MEMORANDUM 
WASATCH ENERGY CORPORATION 
June 30, 1997 
Page 4 
SUMMARY OF AUDIT DIFFERENCES 
There were no audit differences. 
The following factors were considered in evaluating whether or not the financial statements are 
materially misstated: 
There were no audit differences in the current or prior year. 
The possible effect of undetected errors has been considered. 
OPINION 
It is our opinion that the scope of our audit was adequate and that the financial statements of 
Wasatch Energy Corporation as of June 30, 1997 are presented fairly in conformity with 











In assessing the receivable due from United Utilities, we considered the accounting 
treatment required by FAS 5 and the circumstances surrounding the receivable from 
United. 
The natural gas purchase agreements with United included a default provision that 
specified a payment to Wasatch equal to the difference between the NYMEX based price 
and the related Inside FERC price in the event that United did not produce the gas under 
contract. This difference is substantially equal to the amount that Wasatch is obligated to 
pay and has paid on its hedges of the purchase volumes. 
As the underlying transaction and contract provisions essentially created an obligation 
from United at the point of default, we believe that accounting rules for loss 
contingencies as opposed to gain contingencies should apply to the recorded receivable. 
The underlying premise is that an obligation by United is created at the time of default 
and the receivable was recorded based orHhc gas purchase agreement. 
The receivable balance was approximately $1.1 million at June 30, 1997 but is likely to 
increase to approximately $1.4 million at December 31, 1997 when the hedge agreements 
expire depending on the price of gas. 
Although Wasatch has a deed of trust on the gas and is actively pursuing the receivable 
through litigation, there is a question regarding collectibility. Because of the uncertainty 
regarding the outcome of the litigation, Wasatch has recorded a specific reserve of 
\ $600,000 for this receivable. Wasatch continues to beftei^that it has a valid receivable 
that will be fully collected. It has received an offer onl.5/nillion from the purchaser of 
the United properties to settle the matter but has chosenTo pursue litigation. 
This receivable has been prominently discussed in the notes to the financial statements 
with adequate uncertainty discussion. 
To tfOMrfUt-i-V 
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TO PROTECTIVE ORDER 
Perrin R. Love (5505) 
CLYDE SNOW SESSIONS & SWENSON 
One Utah Center, Thirteenth Floor 
201 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801)322-2516 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY STATE OF UTAH 




WASATCH ENERGY CORPORATION, 
a Utah Corporation, 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF PERRIN R. LOVE 
IN SUPPORT OF AWARD 
OF COSTS, EXPENSES, AND 
ATTORNEY'S FEES 
Civil No. 97-0906444CV 
Judge David S. Young 
: ss. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Perrin R. Love, being first duly sworn, on his oath deposes and verily states: 
a. I have been a shareholder of Clyde, Snow, Sessions & Swenson since September 
1998 ("'Clyde, Snow"). Before that, I was a shareholder at Campbell. Maack & Sessions ("CMS"). 
I have served as counsel for Roger Eggett ("Mr. Eggett") in the above-captioned litigation. 
b. I submit this Affidavit in Support of Award of Costs, Expenses, and Attorney's Fees 
of Reasonable Attorney Fees pursuant to the finding of the Court that Mr. Eggett is the prevailing 
party. All statements are based upon my personal knowledge and my review of the billing records 
of Clyde, Snow and CMS. 
3. At trial, the jury awarded to Mr. Eggett SI 1,888.35 in additional compensation due 
Mr. Eggett as damages for breach of his Employment Agreement ("Employment Agreement") dated 
April 21, 1995, and the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The jury awarded to Mr. Eggett 
S135,671.60, the book value of Mr. Eggett's shares in defendant Wasatch Energy Corp. ("Wasatch"), 
as damages for breach of the Shareholder's Agreement ("Shareholder's Agreement") dated April 13, 
1995 and the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. In so awarding, the jury rejected Wasatch's 
defenses and counterclaims that Mr. Eggett was properly terminated for cause or that Eggett had 
taken excessive compensation and abused his expense account. 
4. Mr. Eggett's claim for costs, expenses, and attorney's fees is based upon paragraph 
19(c) of the Shareholder's Agreement, which states in full: 
In the event any legal action is required by a party to this 
Agreement to enforce the provisions of same, the prevailing party 
shall be entitled to recover its costs of suit, including reasonable 
attorneys' fees. 
The Employment Agreement has no comparable provision, and does not authorize either prevailing 
party to recover expenses or attorney's fees. 
5. In making this Affidavit, I follow the four factors identified in Dixie State Bank v. 
Bracken, 764 P.2d 985 (Utah 1988), to determine the reasonableness of attorney's fees: (1) what 
legal work actually was performed; (2) was the legal work reasonably necessary to adequately 
prosecute or defend the matter; (3) were the hourly rates reasonable compared to others in the 
locality; and (4) what additional circumstances, including the circumstances listed in Rule 1.5 of the 
Rules of Professional Conduct, affect the reasonableness of the fees. Accord, Cabrera v. Cottrell 
694 P.2d 622 (Utah 1992). 
w 
6 For the reasons explained below, Eggett is entitled to an award of cost, expenses, and 
attorney's fees m the amount of $56,900 27 In calculating this amount, I have excluded costs, 
expenses, and attorney's fees incurred before May 16, 1997, because those fees relate solely to Mr 
Eggett's claims for additional compensation pursuant to the Employment Agreement, which does 
not authorize an award of costs, expenses, or attorney's fees 
7 I was retained by Mr Eggett on or about April 25, 1997, about 10 days after he 
submitted his letter of resignation to Wasatch (to be effective July 14, 1997) Mr Eggett agreed to 
pay for my representation at an hourly rate of SI 50 00 per hour. 
8 Initially, I was retained to assist Mr Eggett m obtaining compensation to which he 
was entitled pursuant to his Employment Agreement for the period January 1,1997 through July 14, 
1997 The scope of my representation changed when I received notice on May 16, 1997, that 
Wasatch had terminated Eggett for cause pursuant to paragraph 2(e) of the Employment Agreement 
Shortly thereafter, Wasatch informed me that, because Eggett had been terminated for cause, 
Wasatch was entitled to redeem Eggett's shares for par value rather than book value, pursuant to 
paragraphs 3 and 18(e) of Shareholder Agreement 
9 Accordingly, the scope of my representation expanded on or about May 16,1997, to 
include claims for breach of the Shareholder Agreement, and to obtain for Mr Eggett book value 
for his shares These claims required Mr Eggett to prove that his termination for cause was 
wrongful, that he had not taken excessive compensation or abused his expense account, and that his 
termination was a pretext to deny him book value for his shares 
10 Because Mr Eggett's claims under the Shareholder Agreement are inextricably 
mtertw med with his claims under the Employment Agreement, and with Wasatch's counterclaims, 
Mr Eggett is entitled to recover all of his costs, expenses, and fees incurred from the time that Mr 
Eggett w as terminated for cause, and that Wasatch asserted that it was entitled to pay Mr Eggett par 
value rather than book value. This Court has discretion to award all fees where a prevailing party 
is entitled to an award of attorney's fees on some, but not all, claims. 
11. In Henslev v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983), the Supreme Court held that a 
prevailing party may recover fees only on the claims on which it prevailed or is otherwise entitled 
to an award, unless all claims involve a common core of fact or legal theory. Where the parties' 
claims involve a common core of facts or related legal theories, much 
of counsel's time will be devoted generally to the litigation as a whole, making it 
difficult to divide the hours expended on a claim-by-claim basis. Such a lawsuit 
cannot be viewed as a series of discrete claims. 
461 U.S. at 435. In those situations, where 
a plaintiff has obtained excellent results, his attorney should recover a fully 
compensatory fee. Normally this will encompass all hours reasonably expended on 
the litigation, and indeed in some cases of exceptional success an enhanced award 
may be justified. In these circumstances the fee should not be reduced simply 
because the plaintiff failed to prevail on every contention raised in the lawsuit. 
Litigants in good faith may raise alternative legal grounds for a desired outcome, and 
the court's rejection of or failure to reach certain grounds in not a sufficient reason 
for reducing a fee. The result is what matters. 
12. The Utah Court of Appeals adopted the same approach in Sprouse v. Jager, 806 P.2d 
219 (Utah App. 1991). In Sprouse, the attorney for the prevailing party apportioned one-third of his 
time in litigation to a contract claim, and two-thirds of his time to other claims (the contract had an 
attorney's fee provision). The trial court awarded the prevailing party all of its fees, and the Court 
of Appeals upheld the award because all claims and issues were so intertwined: 
The trial court has discretion in determining reasonable attorney fees, and, absent an 
abuse of discretion, we will not overturn such an award. Although the minute entry 
is somewhat sketchy, it appears that Sprouse's objection is not to the number of hours 
or to the hourly rate, but rather it is to the fact that the court failed to separate out 
two-thirds of the attorney time that Sprouse considered to be irrelevant because it did 
not pertain to the [contract claim]. However, the court was satisfied that, because 
appellees prevailed on the counterclaim, the foreclosure, and the collection, they 
were entitled to the full amount. Because these complex issues were so intertwined, 
we find the court acted within its discretion in its award of attorney fees. 
S06 P.2d at 226 (emphasis added). 
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13 After May 16, 1997, my time was devoted to the litigation as a whole, and not to 
discreet claims under either the Shareholder Agreement or the Employment Agreement The parties 
prepared for and participated in a mediation in August 1997 that addressed all of the parties' claims 
and counterclaims Preparation of Mr Eggett's pleadings obviously related to all claims, as did 
document discovery from Wasatch, Magna Energy International, and Ernst & Young The 
depositions of Roger Eggett, Keith Painter, David Lillywhite, Curtis Chisholm, and Tod Cusick 
related to all claims, as did trial preparation and tnal 
14 Appended to this Affidavit are the billing statements provided to Mr Eggett from 
April 25, 1997, through the date of this Affidavit, by Clyde, Snow and CMS The time entnes 
reflected on the billing statements were recorded on a regular if not daily basis throughout this 
litigation, and were maintained on the CMS and Clyde, Snow computenzed billing systems 
15 From Apnl 25,1997, through December 31,1997, Mr Eggett was billed at a rate of 
SI 50 00 per hour Mr Eggett, however, could not afford to pay this hourly rate As of October 31, 
1997,1 agreed with Mr Eggett to defer half of the hourly fee until Mr Eggett obtained a favorable 
settlement or judgment, and agreed to be paid from the proceeds of that settlement or judgment 
This was not a modification of the retainer agreement from an hourly to a contingency fee, Mr 
Eggett agreed that if he did not obtain a favorable settlement or judgment, he would pay the deferred 
fee from other sources Accordingly, the billing statements from November 1,1997 forward reflect 
an hourly rate of $75 00 per hour In making this Affidavit, I adjust those billing statements to 
reflect the fees to be awarded at a rate of S150 00 per hour I believe that a rate of $150 00 is 
reasonable, because my hourly rate since January 1, 1998, has been SI75 00 
16 To summarize the fees and expenses in the billing statements 
a Exhibit A is a Statement of Services Rendered from Apnl 25, 1997 through 
May 31, 1997 Again, Mr Eggett seeks an award of fees and costs from May 16, 1997 forward 
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Those fees total $1,320.00 (8.8 hours); the costs total SI68.30 (including SI50.00 for the Mediation 
filing fee required by the American Arbitration Association). 
b. Exhibit B is a Statement of Services Rendered for June 1997. The total fees 
are S255.00. The total costs are SI.00. 
c. Exhibit C is a Statement of Services Rendered for July 1997. The total fees 
are $2,250. Total costs are S.60. 
d. Exhibit D is a Statement of Services Rendered from August 1,1997 through 
October 31, 1997. The total fees incurred are $2,407.50, which relate to the mediation conducted 
pursuant to the rules of the American Arbitration Association, and the preparation of the initial 
pleadings. Total costs are $372.10, which relate primarily to the mediator's fee. This amount 
excludes $ 175.00 in costs reflected on the billing statement for filing the initial Complaint in Second 
District Court. After filing in Second District Court, I refiled the Complaint in Third District Court. 
Wasatch should not have to pay both filing fees. 
e. Exhibit E is a Statement of Services Rendered from November 1, 1997 
through December 31, 1997. The total fees are $795.00 (at $150.00 per hour), and relate to 
answering Wasatch's counterclaim, settlement negotiations, and preparing discovery requests. Total 
costs are S324.27, which include the Third District Court filing fee. 
f. Exhibit F is a Statement of Sendees Rendered from January 1,1998 through 
February 28, 1998. The total fees are S375.00 (at $150.00 per hour). Total costs are S2.83. 
g. Exhibit G is a Statement of Sendees Rendered for April, 1998. Total costs 
areSlO.01. 
h. Exhibit H is a Statement of Sendees Rendered for May 1998. The total fees 
are S3,060 (at SI 50.00 per hour). These fees relate principally to the depositions of Mr. Eggett and 
Keith Painter, and the document production from Ernst & Young. Total costs are $46.57. 
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i. Exhibit I is a Statement of Services Rendered for June 1998. The total fees 
are S270 (at $150.00 per hour). Total costs are S5.20. 
j . Exhibit J is a Statement of Services Rendered for August 1998. The total fees 
are 51,200.00 (at $150 per hour), and relate primarily to the depositions of Curtis Chisholm and 
David Lillywhite. 
k Exhibit K is a Statement of Services Rendered from October 1998 through 
March 1999. The total fees are S360.00 (at SI50.00 per hour). Total costs are S397.66. 
1. Exhibit L is a Statement of Services Rendered from April 1999 through 
September 1999. The total fees are S2,925.00 (at $150.00 per hour). These fees relate primarily to 
the deposition of Tod Cusick, to preparing responses to discovery, and to preparing a motion to 
compel responses to discovery. Total costs are $522.60, which include the court reporter fees for 
the Cusick deposition. 
m. Exhibit M is a Statement of Services Rendered for October 1999. The total 
fees are S16,513.00. These fees include my fees of S13,275.00 (at S150.00 per hour), T. Mickell 
Jimenez's fees of $2,622.00 (at SI 15.00 per hour), and Amy Pelton's fees of S616.00 (at $70.00 per 
hour). Ms. Jimenez is an associate who performed legal research relating to jury instructions and 
other issues, including the definition of "good cause" and "bad faith" in wrongful termination cases, 
liability of a board of directors for wrongful termination, and admissibility of after-acquired evidence 
as a basis for wrongful termination. Amy Pelton is a paralegal who prepared trial exhibits, and 
operated the projector at trial. Total costs are S590.80, which include copying costs for all copies 
of the trial exhibits. 
n. Exhibit N is a Statement of Services Rendered for November 1999 and 
December 1-3. The total fees are $19,762.00. These fees include my fees of $14,175.00 (at S150.00 
per hour), T Mickell Jimenez's fees of S828.00 (at SI 15.00 per hour), Amy Pelton's fees of 
S-U56.00 (at $70.00 per hour), and Susan Bailey and Donald Maughan's fees of S203.00 (at $70 
7 
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per hour). My fees relate to trial preparation (including preparation of the jury verdict form, jury 
instructions, and voir dire questions, as well as preparations of witness exams and opening 
argument), attendance at trial, and post-trial matters (including preparation of this Affidavit). Ms. 
Jimenez continued to perform legal research, primarily for jury instructions, Ms. Pelton attended trial 
as a paralegal to operate the projector and coordinate exhibits, and Mr. Maughan and Ms. Bailey 
performed services as paralegals during trial. Total costs are S812.31, including a charge for on-line 
Lexis research in the amount of $588.13. A detailed accounting of the Lexis research performed is 
provided. 
o. Exhibit 0 is an invoice from Litigation Technology, Inc., for rental of the 
projector and computer at trial, in the amount of 51,435.73. I believe that use of the projector was 
essential to enable the jury to follow and understand the documents establishing that Mr. Eggett's 
termination was wrongful, that Mr. Eggett was entitled to book value for his shares, and to 
establishing book value itself. 
p. Exhibit Pare invoices for court reporter fees paid directly by Mr. Eggett. One 
invoice is for 5498.80. The other is for $229.00. 
17. I believe these fees were reasonably incurred. On behalf of Mr. Eggett, I took only 
two depositions-Keith Painter and Tod Cusick. Wasatch took all other depositions. To save 
expense, I did not depose Dennis Fox, Brian Watts, Greg Probst, or Ward Coombs, all of whom were 
identified as trial witnesses, and all of whom testified at trial. I also delayed performing any legal 
research until it was absolutely clear that the matter would go to trial. I also was required to file two 
motions to compel because Wasatch initially refused to produce documents that I considered 
relevant, which increased the fees incurred. 
18. Utah Rule of Professional Conduct 1.5(4) and Henslev hold that the trial court should 
consider the result obtained in determining the reasonableness of the fee, and that an enhanced fee 
may be appropriate. Given the jury verdict for Eggett and against Wasatch on all claims, I believe 
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that an enhanced fee would be appropriate. Mr. Eggett does not seek an enhancement of fees. 
Instead, I cite this factor simply to underscore the reasonableness of the fees that Mr. Eggett has 
incurred and is entitled to recover. 
19. Some of the costs identified in the Affidavit are taxable costs that may be awarded 
pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 54(d). Mr. Eggett does not seek a double recovery of these costs; if the 
Court awards to Mr. Eggett all of his costs, Mr. Eggett will file a Memorandum of Costs pursuant 
to Rule 54(d) to preserve an independent basis for the award of these costs in the event there is an 
appeal. 
Dated this ^ of December, 1999. 
On the c^: day of December, 1999, Perrin R. Love, being first duly sworn under oath, stated 
that he has read the foregoing Affidavit and knows the contents thereof and the same are true to the 
best of his knowledge, except as to those matters stated to be alleged on information and belief, and 
to those matters he believes them to be true. 
mit*w PUBLIC 
K. NICOLE HOLT 
201 South Main #1300 
Sart Lak° City, UT 84111 
My Co^Tvssion Expires 
June 21, 2003 
STATE OF UTAH 
Notary Public 
yvs 
T I I r n 
Pemn R. Love (5505) 
CLYDE SNOW SESSIONS & SWENSON 
One Utah Center, Thirteenth Floor 
201 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801)322-2516 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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WASATCH ENERGY CORPORATION, 
a Utah Corporation, 
Defendants. 
REPLY AFFIDAVIT 
OF PERRIN R. LOVE 
IN SUPPORT OF AWARD 
OF COSTS AND 
ATTORNEY'S FEES 
Civil No. 97-0906444CV 
Judge David S. Young 
ss. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Perrin R. Love, being first duly sworn, on his oath deposes and verily states: 
1. I have been a shareholder of Clyde, Snow, Sessions & Swenson since September 
1998 ("Clyde, Snow"). Before that, I was a shareholder at Campbell, Maack & Sessions ("CMS"). 
I ha\ e served as counsel for Roger Eggett ("Mr. Eggett") in the above-captioned litigation. 
2. I submit this Reply Affidavit in Support of Award of Costs and Attorney's Fees to 
respond to the Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Award of Attorneys Fees 
("Mem. Opp.") submitted by defendant Wasatch Energy Corp. ("Wasatch"). All statements are based 
upon my personal knowledge and my review of the billing records of Clyde, Snow and CMS. 
ATTORNEY'S FEES 
3. Contrary to Wasatch's assertion, Mem. Opp. at 2-3, my initial Affidavit properly 
segregates fees incurred on Eggett's claims brought pursuant to the Shareholder Agreement (which 
has an attorney's fee provision) from his claims brought pursuant to the Employment Agreement 
(which has no attorney's fees provision). Eggett seeks no fees or costs incurred before May 16, 
1997, when Wasatch purported to terminate him for cause and to deny him book value for his shares. 
4. From that point forward, there is no principled way to distinguish time or expenses 
incurred on Eggett's claims under the Shareholder Agreement from his claims under the 
Employment Agreement, or from Wasatch's counterclaims. Every fact relating to Wasatch's 
counterclaims for excessive compensation and abuse of Eggett's expense account would have been 
litigated whether or not Wasatch filed a counterclaim, because Wasatch asserted those facts as a 
defense to Eggett's claims for book value for his shares. (Wasatch asserted that Eggett was not 
entitled to book value because he took excessive compensation and abused his expense account, 
justifying his termination for cause.) All of the fees and costs were "necessarily incurred" to 
prosecute Eggett's claims under the Shareholder Agreement, and Eggett is entitled to recover them. 
5. The same is true of Eggett's claim under the Employment Agreement for additional 
compensation between January and May 1997. Because Wasatch claimed that Eggett took excessive 
compensation during this period (and purported to terminate him for it), all of the facts surrounding 
Eggett's 1997 compensation would have been litigated whether or not Eggett pursued a claim under 
the Employment Agreement for additional compensation. 
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6. My initial Affidavit complies with the requirements of Foote v. Clark, 962 F.2d 52 (Utah 
1998), and Valcarce v. Fitzeerald, 961 P.2d 305 (Utah 1998), relied upon by Wasatch, because the 
Affidavit segregates those fees and expenses incurred in pursuing claims under the Employment 
Agreement. Neither Foote nor Valcarce stand for the proposition that a prevailing party cannot 
recover fees and expenses necessarily incurred on claims that entitle the party to fees and costs, 
simply because those fees and costs also relate to other claims. 
7. Neither Foote nor Valcarce is factually similar to the situation here. In Valcarce, the 
litigation involved several phases and several parties. The defendant claimed that the prevailing 
party failed to allocate those fees that were incurred against other parties, or to distinguish those fees 
that were incurred before the defendant was joined in the lawsuit. See 961 P.2d at 317. In Foote v. 
Clark, 962 F.2d 52 (Utah 1998), a disappointed home buyer sued the seller for breach of the real 
estate purchase contract (which had an attorney's fee provision), and sued the seller's broker for 
tortuous interference of contract. In requesting attorney's fees, the buyer did not distinguish time 
and expense pursing the breach of contract claims against the seller, and time and expense pursing 
tort claims against the broker. See 962 P.2d at 56-7. 
COSTS 
8. Wasatch objects to many of the costs incurred by Eggett, because they are not taxable 
costs within the scope of Utah R. Civ. P. 54(d). See Mem. Opp. at 6-7. The objection is unfounded, 
because Eggett's right to recover these costs is contractual, not statutory. Paragraph 19(c) of the 
Shareholder Agreement states that "the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover its costs of suit, 
including reasonable attorneys' fees." By its plain language, paragraph 19(c) defines costs to include 
all costs, not just taxable costs, because it defines costs to include attorneys' fees. Those costs that 
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are not properly recoverable as taxable costs pursuant to Rule 54(d) are recoverable pursuant to the 
Shareholder Agreement.l 
9. To respond to Wasatch's objections to specific costs: 
a. Runner Fees. Runner fees were incurred in the ordinary course of business, 
as appropriate, generally to provide hand delivery of pleadings, important documents, or sizable 
documents to court and to opposing counsel. When mailing or faxing was appropriate, those 
methods were preferred, particularly of correspondence between counsel. 
b. Photocopies. Photocopies were made, in the ordinary course of business, of 
correspondence, pleadings, documents, and exhibits, to provide to the client or opposing counsel, 
to maintain records for our files, and for use in discovery and at trial. The vast majority of 
photocopies are for trial exhibits in October and November 1999. The price is S.18 per page, and 
is recorded and allocated to Roger Eggett at the time the copy is made. 
c. Mediation Expenses. Although the Mediation was required by paragraph 9(i) 
of the Employment Agreement, the parties agreed to mediate all claims and to attempt to resolve all 
claims, including Eggett's claims pursuant to the Shareholder Agreement. Indeed, I prepared and 
submitted to the mediator a Statement of Position that primarily addressed Eggett's right to book 
value for his shares, and the facts and circumstances establishing that Wasatch terminated Eggett in 
bad faith to deny him book value for his shares. The mediation primarily focused on these issues, 
as well as Wasatch's defense that Eggett was properly terminated for cause because Eggett took 
excessive compensation and abused his expense account. Again, these issues are inextricably 
intertwined because one is a defense to the other. 
^nder Rule 54(d), costs are recoverable "only in the amounts and in the manner provided 
by statute, and generally is restricted to those costs which are "required to be paid to the court and 
to witnesses " Frampton v. Wilson, 605 P.2d 771, 773-74 (Utah 1980). No such restriction 
applies to a contractual provision. Pursuant to Rule 54(d), Eggett is submitting a separate Verified 
Memorandum of Costs to establish an independent basis for an award of those costs. 
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d. Long distance telephone calls. All long distance telephone calls were to 
Roger Eggett at the Bear River Lodge, where he was employed, or to his home in Evanston, 
Wyoming, where he moved to run the Bear River Lodge. They were necessary to prosecute Mr. 
Eggett's claims. 
e. Deposition Costs. Wasatch complains that my Affidavit fails to specify 
deposition costs, other than the costs associated with the Keith Painter, Curtis Chisholm, and David 
Lillywhite depositions. To the contrary, paragraph 16.1. of the Affidavit and Exhibit L each specify 
S438 as the court reporter fees for the Tod Cusick deposition. Wasatch cannot deny that the Cusick 
deposition was used at trial. Wasatch argues that Eggett is not entitled to reimbursement for 
transcripts of the Chisholm and Lillywhite depositions, because Wasatch took those depositions. 
Wasatch cites no authority for the assertion and it makes no sense. No Utah authority excludes 
deposition transcripts as a taxable cost, and Form 23 to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure specifially 
includes as a taxable cost "deposition transcript." Regardless whether a deposition transcript is a 
taxable cost, it is a recoverable costs pursuant to paragraph 19(c) of the Shareholder Agreement. 
Chisholm and Lillywhite were non-party witnesses; their testimony was necessary to develop Eggett's 
case. Eggett would have deposed them if Wasatch had not; and I questioned each witness on behalf 
of Eggett. 
f. Witness Fees. The witness fees are as follows: 
May 29, 1998 Service of Subpoena Duces Tecum $ 5.00 
To Ernst & Young 
October 14, 1998 Service of Subpoena Duces Tecum $ 38.00 
on Magna Energy 
October 28, 1999 Trial subpoenas for Keith Painter S 37.00 
and Curtis Chisholm 
November 5, 1999 Service of Trial Subpoenas on Keith S 85.00 
Painter and Curtis Chisholm 
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g. Lexis Legal Research. This research was conducted by Mickell Jiminez, and 
is identified in the billing statements for October and November 1999, Exhibits M and N to my initial 
Affidavit. All of this research related to Eggett's claims under the Shareholder Agreement. To 
summarize those entries, Ms. Jiminez researched wrongful termination issues, both to prepare jury 
instructions and to anticipate issues and evidence that might be raised at trial. These included the 
admissibility of after-acquired evidence as a justification for termination for cause; the right of an 
employer to terminate an employee for cause after the employee has resigned; the right of members 
of a board of directors to rely on reports from employees or other board members; the elements and 
requirements of "bad faith" by members of the board of directors in performing their duties, including 
terminating an officer or employee for cause, and the burden of proof on these issues. Ms. Jiminez 
was required to use Lexis to research case law outside the states encompassed by the Pacific Reporter. 
Moreover, in my opinion, use of electronic research is more efficient and less expensive than 
requiring a lawyer to review regional treatises and other sources of case law. 
h. Use of Projector at Trial. As explained in my initial Affidavit, the projector 
was necessary to present the documentary exhibits to the jury in an efficient and comprehensible 
manner 
10. To eliminate ongoing dispute about these matters, however, I have reviewed the billing 
records in light of Wasatch's objections, and make the following redactions to the fees and costs 
identified in the initial Affidavit: 
a. August 28, 1997, "Meet with Roger Eggett to discuss revised fee agreement; 
prepare revised fee agreement," 1.5 hours, $225.00; 
b. October 28, 1997, "Draft Reply to Counterclaim," 1.0 hour, SI50.00; 
c. November 25,1997, telephone conference with Eric Olson regarding request 
for cooperation in United litigation; telephone conference with Roger Eggett regarding same," 0.5 
hours, S75.00; 
6 
d. September 4,1997, runner services to file Complaint in Second District Court 
and to serve on Wasatch, $52.00 (again, because the Complaint was later filed in Third Diistrict 
Court, Wasatch should not bear this expense). 
e. October 9, 1998, Magna Energy Witness Fee S 17.00, duplicate billing. 
11. I have made no similar redaction for discussion with Mr. Eggett regarding his non-
competition agreement, see Mem. Opp. at 5, because that discussion arose in the context of 
negotiations to settle all claims. I have made no redaction regarding my review of correspondence 
from David Lillywhite, Mem. Opp. at 5, because I reviewed that correspondence in the course of 
determining whether Wasatch's purported termination of Eggett for cause was a pretext to deny him 
book value for his shares. Finally, I have made no redaction for research relating to jury instruction, 
or for responding to discovery requests, Mem. Opp. at 5, because those activies squarely related to 
Eggett's claims for book value for his shares. 
12. The redactions identified in paragraph 10 total S519.00. This reduces Eggett's 
requested costs and fees to 556,381.27. 
Dated this .of December, 1999. 
Perriii R. Live/, Esq.v 
On the ^ p d a y of December, 1999, Perrin R. Love, being first duly sworn under oath, stated 
that he has read the foregoing Affidavit and knows the contents thereof and the same are true to the 
best of his knowledge, except as to those matters stated to be alleged on information and belief, and 
to those matters he believes them to be true. 
V PUBLIC 
'•: '--'-OLE HOLT 
,?n* ;:r.-;,T.h Main #1300 
SH.1 L.^.o Crty, UT B4111 
Vy O.'r.Tvssion Expires 
J'iHO 2 ! , 2003 
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oarty's attorney fees incurred in a motion to 
compel discovery. Affleck v. Third Judicial Dist. 
Court, 655 P.2d 665 OJtah 1982;. 
Cited in Hatch v. Renzo, 21 Utah 2d 144, 442 
R2d 467 (1968); Poulsen v. Poulsen, 672 P.2d 97 
'Lv.ah 19H:JJ/: Synergetics v*x rei. Lancer Indus., 
Inc. v. Marathon Ranching Co., 701 R2d 1106 
'Utah 1985;; Pennington v. Allstate Ins. Co., 
973 R2d 932 'Utah 1998;. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Attorney's Fees in 
Utah, 1984 Utah L. Rev. 553. 
Recent Developments in Utah Law — Legis-
lative Enactments — Attorney's Fees, 1989 
Utah L. Rev. 342. 
Brigham Young Law Review. — The Use 
of a Rule 37(b)(2XA.) Sanction to Establish In 
Personam Jurisdiction, 1982 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 
103. 
A New Antidote for an Opponent's Pretrial 
Discovery Misconduct: Treating the Misconduct 
at Trial as an Admission by Conduct of the 
Weakness of the Opponent's Case, 1993 B.Y.U. 
L. Rev. 793. 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 23 Am. Jur. 2d Depositions 
and Discovery §§ 361 to 372. 
C.J.S. — 27 C.J.S. Discovery §§ 53, 68, 86. 
A.L.R. — Failure of party or his attorney to 
appear at pretrial conference, 55 A.L.R.3d 303. 
Dismissal of state court action for failure or 
refusal of plaintiff to answer written interrog-
atories, 56 A.L.R.3d 1109. 
Construction and application of state statute 
or rule subjecting party making untrue allega-
tions or denials to payment of costs or attor-
neys' fees, 68 A.L.R.3d 209. 
Attorney's conduct in delaying or obstructing 
discovery as basis for contempt proceeding, 8 
A.L.R.4th 1181. 
Judgment in favor of plaintiff in state court 
action for defendant's failure to obey request or 
order for production of documents or other 
objects, 26 A.L.R.4th 849. 
Dismissal of state court action for failure or 
refusal of plaintiff to obey request or order for 
production of documents or other objects, 27 
A.L.R.4th 61. 
Judgment in favor of plaintiff in state court 
action for defendant's failure to obey request or 
order to answer interrogatories or other discov-
er:/ questions, 30 A.L.R~4th 9. 
Dismissal of state court action for failure or 
refusal of plaintiff to appear or answer ques-
tions at deposition or oral examination, 32 
A.L.R.4th 212. 
Sanctions for failure to make discovery under 
Federal Civil Procedure Rule 37 as affected by 
defaulting party's good faith attempts to com-
ply, 2 A.L.R. Fed. 811. 
PART VI. TRIALS 
Rule 38. J u r y trial of right. 
(a) Right preserved. The right of trial by jury as declared by the constitution 
or as given by statute shall be preserved to the parties. 
(b) Demand. Any party may demand a trial by jury of any issue triable of 
right by a jury by paying the statutory jury fee and serving upon the other 
parties a demand therefor in writing at any time after the commencement of 
the action and not later than 10 days after the service of the last pleading 
directed to such issue. Such demand may be endorsed upon a pleading of the 
party. 
(c) Same: specification of issues. In his demand a party may specify the 
issues which he wishes so tried; otherwise he shall be deemed to have 
demanded trial by jury for all the issues so triable. If he has demanded trial by 
jury for only some of the issues, any other part}*, within 10 days after service 
of the demand or such lesser time as the court may order, may serve a demand 
for trial by jury of any other or all of the issues of fact in the action. 
(d) Waiver. The failure of a party to pay the statutory fee, to serve a demand 
as required by this rule and to file it as required by Rule 5(d) constitutes a 
waiver by him of trial by jury. A demand for trial by jury made as herein 
provided may not be withdrawn without the consent of the parties. 
(Amended effective Jan. 1, 1987.) 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to demand, U.R.C.P. 39<b\ 
Rule 38, F.R.C.P. 
Cross-References. — Constitutional guar-
antee, Utah Const., Art. I, Sec. 10. 
Discretion to order jury trial in absence oi" 
Fees of jurors, § 21-5-1 et seq. 
Jury provisions generally, § 78-46-1 et seq. 
Statutory risrht to jury trial, $ 7S-21-1. 
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Rule 48. Exceptions unnecessary. 
Formal exceptions to rulings or orders of the court are unnecessary. It is 
sufficient that a party, at the time the ruling or order of the court is made or 
sought, makes known to the court the action which he desires the court to take 
or his objection to the action of the court and his grounds therefor; and, if a 
party has no opportunity to object to a ruling or order at the time it is made, 
the absence of an objection does not thereafter prejudice him. 
Compiler's Notes. — This: rile is substan- Cross-References. — Objections to instruc-
tially similar to Rule 46, F.R.C.P. tions to jury, U.R.C.P. 51. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Form of verdict Doe v. Hafen, 772 P.2d 456 (Utah Ct. App. 
—Duty to examine and object. 1989), cert, denied, SCO P.2d 1105 (Utah 1990). 
In general. 
Instructions. Instructions. 
— Right to object. 
Harmless error. —Right to object. 
Cited. The parties have a right to make objections to Form of verdict. the instructions to preserve ch ll nges o their
accuracy; if counsel was prevented from mak-
— Duty to examine and object. ing objections to instructions, he should, under 
Counsel has the obligation not only to object this rule, be deemed to have done so. Hanks v. 
to the form of the verdict, but to affirmatively Christensen, 11 Utah 2d 8, 354 P.2d 564 (1960). 
seek to examine it; by failing to request court 
permission to examine the verdict and make Harmless error. 
objection to it, party waived any objection to the If the instructions are correct, any error 
verdict form. Martineau v. Anderson, 636 P.2d which prevents counsel from making objections 
1039 (Utah 1981). thereto is harmless error. Hanks v. 
Christensen, 11 Utah 2d 8, 354 P.2d 564 (1960). 
In general. 
To preserve a question for appeal, an objec- Cited in Watters v. Querry, 626 P.2d 455 
tion must be clear and concise and made in a 'Utah 1931); 3roberg v. Hess, 782 P.2d 198 
fashion calculated to obtain a ruling thereon. (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 5 Am. Jur. 2d Appellate A.L.R. — Sufficiency in federal court of mo-
Review § 614. tion in limine to preserve for appeal objection to 
C.J.S. — 4 C.J.S. Appeal and Error § 202 et evidence absent contemporary objection at 
seq. trial, 76 A.L.R. Fed. 619. 
Rule 47. Jurors. 
(a) Examination of jurors. The court may permit the parties or their 
attorneys to conduct the examination of prospective jurors or may itself 
conduct the examination. In the latter event, the court shall permit the parties 
or their attorneys to supplement the examination by such further inquiry as is 
material and proper cr shall itself submit to the prospective jurors such 
additional questions of the parties or their attorneys as is material and proper. 
(b) Alternate jurors. The court may direct that one or two jurors in addition 
to the regular panel be called and impaneled to sit as alternate jurors. 
Alternate jurors in the order in which they are called shall replace jurors who, 
prior to the time the jury retires to consider its verdict, become unable or 
disqualified to perform their duties. Alternate jurors shall be drawn in the 
same manner, shall have the same qualifications,, shall be subject to the same 
examination and challenges, shall take the same oath, and shall have the same 
functions, powers, facilities, and privileges as the principal jurors. An alternate 
juror who does not replace a principal juror shall be discharged after the jury 
retires to consider its verdict. If one or two alternate jurors are called each 
party is entitled to one peremptory challenge in addition to those otherwise 
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allowed. The additional peremptory challenge may be used only against an 
alternate juror, and the other peremptory challenges allowed by law shall not 
be used against the alternates. 
(c) Challenge defined; by whom made. A challenge is an objection made to 
the trial jurors and may be directed (1) to the panel or (2) to an individual juror. 
Either party may challenge the jurors, but where there are several parties on 
either side, they must join in a challenge before it can be made. 
(d) Challenge to panel; time and manner of taking; proceedings. A challenge 
to the panel can be founded only on a material departure from the forms 
prescribed in respect to the drawing and return of the jury, or on the 
intentional omission of the proper officer to summon one or more of the jurors 
drawn. It must be taken before a juror is sworn. It must be in writing or be 
stated on the record, and must specifically set forth the facts constituting the 
ground of challenge. If the challenge is allowed, the court must discharge the 
jury so far as the trial in question is concerned. 
(e) Challenges to individual jurors; number of peremptory challenges. The 
challenges to individual jurors are either peremptory or for cause. Each party 
shall be entitled to three peremptory challenges, except as provided under 
Subdivisions (b) and (c) of this rule. 
(f) Challenges for cause; how tried. Challenges for cause may be taken on 
one or more of the following grounds: 
(1) A want of any of the qualifications prescribed by law to render a person 
competent as a juror. 
(2) Consanguinity or affinity within the fourth degree to either party, or to 
an officer of a corporation that is a party. 
(3) Standing in the relation of debtor and creditor, guardian and ward, 
master and servant, employer and employee or principal and agent, to either 
party, or united in business with either party, or being on any bond or 
obligation for either party; provided, that the relationship of debtor and 
creditor shall be deemed not to exist between a municipality and a resident 
thereof indebted to such municipality by reason of a tax, license fee, or service 
charge for water, power, light or other services rendered to such resident. 
(4) Having served as a juror, or having been a witness, on a previous trial 
between the same parties for the same cause of action, or being then a witness 
therein. 
(5) Pecuniary interest on the part of the juror in the result of the action, or 
in the main question involved in the action, except his interest as a member or 
citizen of a municipal corporation. 
(6) That a state of mind exists on the part of the juror with reference to the 
cause, or to either party, which will prevent him from acting impartially and 
without prejudice to the substantial rights of the party challenging; but no 
person shall be disqualified as a juror by reason of having formed or expressed 
an opinion upon the matter or cause to be submitted to such jury, founded upon 
public rumor, statements in public journals or common notoriety, if it satisfac-
torily appears to the court that the juror can and will, notwithstanding such 
opinion, act impartially and fairly upon the matter to be submitted to him. 
Any challenge for cause shall be tried by the court. The juror challenged, and 
any other person, may be examined as a witness on the trial of such challenge. 
(g) Selection of jury. The clerk shall draw by lot and call the number of jurors 
that are to try the cause plus such an additional number as will allow for all 
peremptory challenges permitted. After each challenge for cause sustained, 
another juror shall be called to fill the vacancy before further challenges are 
made, and any such new juror may be challenged for cause. When the 
challenges for cause are completed, the clerk shall make a list of the jurors 
remaining, in the order called, and each side, beginning with the plaintiff, shall 
indicate thereon its peremptory challenge to one juror at a time in regular turn 
until all peremptory challenges are exhausted or waived. The clerk shall then 
call the remaining jurors, or so many of them as shall be necessary to 
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constitute the jury m the order in which they appear on the list, and the 
persons whose names are so called shall constitute the jury. 
(h) Oath of jury. As soon as the jury is completed an oath must be 
administered to the jurors, in substance, that they and each of them will well 
and truly try the matter in issue between the parties, and a true verdict 
rendered according to the evidence and the instructions of the court. 
(i) Proceedings when juror discharged. If, after the jury is impaneled and 
before verdict, a juror becomes unable or disqualified to perform his duty and 
there is no alternate juror, the parties may agree to proceed with the other 
jurors, or to swear a new juror and commence the trial anew. If the parties do 
not so agree the court shall discharge the jury and the case shall be tried with 
a new jury. 
(j) View by jury. When in the opinion of the court it is proper for the jury to 
have a view of the property which is the subject of litigation, or of the place in 
which any material fact occurred, it may order them to be conducted in a body 
under the charge of an officer to the place, which shall be shown to them by 
some person appointed by the court for that purpose. While the jury are thus 
absent no person other than the person so appointed shall speak to them on 
any subject connected with the trial. 
(k) Separation of jury. If the jurors are permitted to separate, either during 
the trial or after the case is submitted to them, they shall be admonished by the 
court that it is their duty not to converse with, or suffer themselves to be 
addressed by, any other person on any subject of the trial, and that it is their 
duty not to form or express an opinion thereon until the case is finally 
submitted to them. 
(1) Deliberation of jury. When the case is finally submitted to the jury they 
may decide in court or retire for deliberation. If they retire they must be kept 
together in some convenient place under charge of an officer until they agree 
upon a verdict or are discharged, unless otherwise ordered by the court. Unless 
by order of the court, the officer having them under his charge must not suffer 
any communication to be made to them, or make any himself, except to ask 
them if they have agreed upon their verdict, and he must not, before the 
verdict is rendered, communicate to any person the state of their deliberations 
or the verdict agreed upon. 
(m) Papers taken by jury. Upon retiring for deliberation the jury may take 
with them the instructions of the court and all exhibits and all papers which 
have been received as evidence in the cause, except depositions or copies of 
such papers as ought not, in the opinion of the court, to be taken from the 
person having them in possession; and they may also take with them notes of 
the testimony or other proceedings on the trial taken by themselves or any of 
them, but none taken by any other person. 
(n) Additional instructions of jury. After the jury have retired for delibera-
tion, if there is a disagreement among them as to any part of the testimony, or 
if they desire to be informed on any point of law arising in the cause, they may 
require the officer to conduct them into court. Upon their being brought into 
court the information required must be given in the presence of, or after notice 
to, the parties or counsel. Such information must be given in writing or stated 
on the record. 
(o) New trial when no verdict given. If a jury is discharged or prevented from 
giving a verdict for any reason, the action shall be tried anew. 
(p) Court deemed in session pending verdict; verdict may be sealed. While 
the jury is absent the court may be adjourned from time to time in respect to 
other business, but it shall be open for every purpose connected with the cause 
submitted to the jury, until a verdict is rendered or the jury discharged. The 
court may direct the jury to bring in a sealed verdict at the opening of the court, 
in case of an agreement during a recess or adjournment for the day. 
(q) Declaration of verdict. When the jury or three-fourths of them, or such 
other number as may have been agreed upon by the parties pursuant to Rule 
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48, have agreed upon a verdict they must be conducted into court, their names 
called by the clerk, and the verdict rendered by their foreman; the verdict must 
be in writing, signed by the foreman, and must be read by the clerk to the jury, 
and the inquiry made whether it is their verdict. Either party mayTequire the 
jury to be polled, which shall be done by the court or clerk asking each juror if 
it is his verdict. If, upon such inquiry or polling there is an insufficient number 
of jurors agreeing therewith, the jury must be sent out again; otherwise the 
verdict is complete and the jury shall be discharged from the cause. 
(r) Correction of verdict If the verdict rendered is informal or insufficient, it 
may be corrected by the jury under the advice of the court, or the jury may be 
sent out again. 
(Amended effective January 1, 1998.) 
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amend-
ment, effective January 1, 1998, substituted 
"stated on the record" for "noted by the report-
er" in the second sentence of Subdivision (d) 
and for "taken down by the reporter" at the end 
of Subdivision (n) and made stylistic changes. 
Compiler's Notes. — Subdivision (a) of this 
rule is similar to Rule 47(a), F.R.C.P. 
Cross-References. — Jurors generally, 
§ 78-46-1 et seq. 
Three-fourths of jurors may find verdict in 
civil case, Utah Const., Art. I, Sec. 10. 
Witness, juror as, § 78-24-3; U.R.E. 606. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Additional instructions. 
—Absence of counsel. 
Prejudice. 
—Entry of judge into jury room. 
—Written response to inquiry. 
Challenges for cause. 
—Acquaintance with party. 
— Bias or prejudice. 
Malpractice. 
Religious affiliation. 
Waiver of right to challenge. 
Wrongful death. 
—Failure to remove juror when cause estab-
lished. 
Prejudicial error. 
Correction of verdict. 
—Award of damages. 
Excess of maximum. 
Travel expenses. 
—Waiver of objection. 
Insufficient on face. 
Declaration of verdict. 
— Impeachment. 
— Intent of rule. 
—Three-fourths concurrence. 
Dissent. 
Removal of municipal officer. 
Deliberations. 
— Impeachment of verdict. 
—Knowledge of everyday affairs. 
Examination. 
—Judge's discretion. 
— Preliminary questions. 
Juror's misconduct. 
No verdict. 
— Directed verdict. 
Papers taken by jurors. 
—Depositions. 
— Pleadings. 






View of property or place. 




—Absence of counsel. 
Prejudice. 
Where, upon request of the jury, the trial 
court brought the jury back into the courtroom, 
explained apparently conflicting instructions, 
told the jury to reread all instructions, and 
offered future assistance if needed, unless ap-
pellant could show substantial or prejudicial 
error, it was not error to have proceeded with-
out appellant's counsel who had left the court 
building. Tjas v. Proctor, 591 P.2d 438 (Utah 
1979). 
— Entry of judge into jury room. 
Where bailiff had informed trial judge that 
jurors wanted advice on a certain point, it was 
improper for judge to go into jury room to 
advise them in absence of and without consent 
of counsel. Johnson v. Maynard, 9 Utah 2d 268, 
342 P.2d 884 (1959). 
—Written response to inquiry. 
Court's written response to an inquiry of the 
jury which was simply a correct statement of 
the law regarding the responsibilities of a jury 
was not reversible error. Board of Comm'rs of 
State Bar v. Petersen, 937 P.2d 1263 (Utah 
1997). 
Challenges for cause. 
—Acquaintance with party. 
In action by truck owner whose vehicle was 
damaged when it struck defendant's cow on 
highway, plaintiff's challenge of jurors for cause 
on grounds they were acquainted with defen-
dant and were engaged in raising livestock did 
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Compiler's Notes.— This rule corresponds Three-fourths of jurors may find verdict in 
to Rule 48, F.K.C.P. rivilcase, Utah Const.,.Art. 1, Sec. 10. 
Cross-References. — Number of jurors, 
§ 78-46-5. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Effect of Rule 47(q). instruction as to the number of concurring 
Removal of municipal officer. jurors required to reach a verdict. Madsen y. 
Brown, 701 R2d 1086 (Utah 1985). 
Effect of Rule 47(q) Removal of municipal officer. 
Intent of U.R.C.P. 47(q) is to allow the parties
 R e m Q v a l o f m u n i c i
 F
a l o f f i c e r d o e s n o t i r e 
the opportunity to ensure that the requisite
 u n a n i m o u s v e r d i c t b y a j u r y ; a three-fourths 
number of jurors concurred in the verdict; it is
 m a j o r i t y i s a c c eptable. Madsen v. Brown, 701 
not a vehicle to bring into issue the courts p 2 d IQQQ (Utah 1985). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 47 Am. Jur. 2d Jury § 211 et tion or waiver in state civil case, to accept 
seq. verdict by number or proportion of jurors less 
C.J.S. — 50 C.J.S. Juries § 123; 89 C.J.S. than that constitutionally permitted, 15 
Trial § 494. A.L.R.4th 213. 
A.L.R. — Validity of agreement, by stipula-
Rule 49. Special verdicts and interrogatories, 
(a) Special verdicts. The court may require a jury to return only a special 
verdict in the form of a special written finding upon each issue of fact. In that 
event the court may submit to the jury written interrogatories susceptible of 
categorical or other brief answer or may submit written forms of the several 
special findings which might properly be made under the pleadings and 
evidence; or it may use such other method of submitting the issues and 
requiring the written findings thereon as it deems most appropriate. The court 
shall give to the jury such explanation and instruction concerning the matter 
thus submitted as may be necessary to enable the jury to make its findings 
upon each issue. If in so doing the court omits any issue of fact raised by the 
pleadings or by the evidence, each party waives his right to a trial by jury of the 
issue so omitted unless before the jury retires he demands its submission to the 
jury. As to an issue omitted without such demand the court may make a 
finding; or, if it fails to do so, it shall be deemed to have made a finding in 
accord with the judgment on the special verdict. 
(b) General verdict accompanied by answer to interrogatories. The court may 
submit to the jury, together with appropriate forms for a general verdict, 
written interrogatories upon one or more issues of fact the decision of which is 
necessary to a verdict. The court shall give such explanation or instruction as 
may be necessary to enable the jury both to make answers to the interrogato-
ries and to render a general verdict, and the court shall direct the jury both to 
make written answers and to render a general verdict. When the general 
verdict and the answers are harmonious, the appropriate judgment upon the 
verdict and answers shall be entered pursuant to Rule 5SA. When the answers 
are consistent with each other but one or more is inconsistent with the general 
verdict, judgment may be entered pursuant to Rule 58Ain accordance with the 
answers, notwithstanding the general verdict, or the court may return the jury 
for further consideration of its answers and verdict or may order a new trial. 
When the answers are inconsistent with each other and one or more is likewise 
inconsistent with the general verdict, judgment shall not be entered, but the 
court shall return the jury for further consideration of its answers and verdict 
or shall order a new trial. 
Compiler 's Notes. — This rule is similar to 
Rule 49, F.R.C.P. 
191 UTAH &L".L£S OK CIVIL PRcx "LDUIV.IL iUiiii iyj 
(d) £/fec£ o/* satisfaction,. When a judgment shall have been satisfied, in 
whole or m part, or as to any judgment debtor, and such satisfaction entered 
upon the docket by the clerk, such judgment shall, to the extent of such 
satisfaction, be discharged and cease to be a lien. In case of partial satisfaction, 
if any execution shall thereafter be issued on the judgment, such execution 
shall be endorsed with a memorandum of such partial satisfaction and shall 
direct the officer to collect only the residue thereof, or to collect only from the 
judgment debtors remaining liable thereon. 
(e) Filing transcript of satisfaction in other counties. When any satisfaction 
0f a judgment shall have been entered on the judgment docket of the county 
where such judgment was first docketed, a certified transcript of satisfaction, 
or a certificate by the clerk showing such satisfaction, may be filed with the 
clerk of the district court in any other county, where the judgment may have 
been docketed. Thereupon a similar entry in the judgment docket shall be 
made by the clerk of such court; and such entry shall have the same effect as 
in the county where the same was originally entered. 
Compiler's Notes. — There is no federal 
rule covering this subject matter. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Acceptance of full payment. tial satisfaction of judgment to extent of money 
—Effect. collected through attachment proceeding. 
Attachment. Blake v. Farrell, 31 Utah 110, 86 P. 805 (1906). 
Vacation of satisfaction. 
. . . . . Vacation of satisfaction. 
Acceptance of full payment.
 T h e r e c o r d e d s a t ; 3 f a c t i o n o f j u d g m e n t s i g n e d 
Effect. by judgment creditor cannot be vacated without 
When plaintiff voluntarily accepted full pay- action and hearing in equity, and the lien of an 
ment of a judgment in his favor, the satisfaction attorney against the proceeds of the judgment 
and discharge operated to satisfy and discharge does not include his personal right to execute 
everything merged in and adjudicated by the against the judgment debtor. Utah C.V. Fed. 
judgment. Sierra Nev. Mill Co. v. Keith O'Brien Credit Union v. Jenkins. 528 P.2d 1187 (Utah 
Co., 48 Utah 12, 156 P. 943 (1916). 1974). 
Attachment. 
Court had duty to make order directing par-
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 47 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments A.L.R. — Voluntary payment into court of 
§ 1004 et seq. judgment against one joint tort-feasor as re-
C.J.S. — 49 C.J.S. Judgments §§ 574 to 584. lease of others, 40 A.L.R.Sd 11S1. 
Rule 59. New trials; amendments of judgment . 
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new trial may be granted 
to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues, for any of the 
following causes; provided., however, that on a motion for a new trial in an 
action tried without a jury, the court may open the judgment if one has been 
entered, take additional testimony, amend findings of fact and conclusions of 
law or make new findings and conclusions, and direct the entry of a new 
judgment: 
(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse party or any 
order of the court, or abuse of discretion by which either party was prevented 
from having a fair trial. 
(2) Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any one or more of the jurors have 
been induced to assent to any general or special verdict, or to a finding on any 
question submitted to them by the court, by resort to a determination by 
chance or as a result of bribery, such misconduct may be proved by the affidavit 
of any one of the jurors. 
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(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have guarded 
against. 
(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for the party making the applica-
tion, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered and 
produced at the trial. 
(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been given under 
the influence of passion or prejudice. 
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision, or 
that it is against law. 
(7) Error in law. 
(b) Time for motion. A motion for a new trial shall be served not later than 
10 days after the entry of the judgment. 
(c) Affidavits; time for filing. When the application for a new trial is made 
under Subdivision (a)(1), (2), (3), or (4), it shall be supported by affidavit. 
Whenever a motion for a new trial is based upon affidavits they shall be served 
with the motion. The opposing party has 10 days after such service within 
which to serve opposing affidavits. The time within which the affidavits or 
opposing affidavits shall be served may be extended for an additional period 
not exceeding 20 days either by the court for good cause shown or by the parties 
by written stipulation. The court may permit reply affidavits. 
(d) On initiative of court. Not later than 10 days after entry of judgment the 
court of its own initiative may order a new trial for any reason for which it 
might have granted a new trial on motion of a party, and in the order shall 
specify the grounds therefor. 
(e) Motion to alter or amend a judgment. A motion to alter or amend the 
judgment shall be served not later than 10 days after entry of the judgment. 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to 
Rule 59, F.R.C.P. 
Cross-References. — Harmless error not 
ground for new trial, Rule 61. 
Abandonment of motion. 
Accident or surprise. 
Arbitration awards. 
Burden of proof. 
Caption on motion for new trial. 
Correction of insufficient or informal verdict. 
Correction of record. 
Costs. 
Decision against law. 
Discretion of trial court. 
Effect of order granting new trial. 




Excessive or inadequate damages. 
—Punitive damages. 
Failure to object to findings of fact. 
Failure to order discovery. 
Filing of affidavits. 
Grounds for new trial. 
—Particularization in motion. 
Improper statement by counsel. 
Incompetence or negligence of counsel. 
Misconduct of jury. 
Motion to alter or amend judgment. 
Motion to be presented to trial court. 
Newly discovered evidence. 
New trial on initiative of court. 
Procedure for questioning grant of new trial. 
Juror's competency as witness as to validity 
of verdict or indictment, Rules of Evidence, 
l Rule 606. 
Reconsideration of motion for new trial.. 
Sanctions. 
Settlement bars appeal. 
Summary judgment. 
Time for motion. 
Tolling time for appeal. 
Waiver. 
Cited. 
Abandonment of motion. 
Abandonment of motion for new trial must be 
intentional, and the facts must indicate this 
intention. Bailey v. Sound Lab, Inc., 694 P.2d 
1043 (Utah 1984). 
Accident or surprise. 
This section requires that the moving party 
show that ordinary prudence was exercised to 
guard against the accident or surprise. Powers 
v. Gene's Bldg. Materials, Inc., 567 P.2d 174 
(Utah 1977). 
Plaintiff was not entitled to a new trial on the 
basis of surprise concerning testimony of the 
defendant's expert witness where the plaintiff 
failed to object to the testimony either before, or 
immediately after, it was given. Jensen v. Tho-
mas, 570 P.2d 695 (Utah 1977). 
A "surprise" at trial which could have been 
easily guarded against by utilization of avail-
able discovery procedures may not serve as a 
ground for a new trial under Subdivison (a)(3). 
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(1) the acts of its volunteers are not as described in Subsection 78-19-
2(1) unless the nonprofit organization had, or reasonably should have had, 
reasonable notice of the volunteer's unfitness to provide services to the 
nonprofit organization under circumstances that make the .nonprofit 
organization's use of the volunteer reckless or wanton in light of that 
notice; or 
(2) a business employer would not be liable under the laws of this state 
if the act or omission were the act or omission of one of its employees. 
History: C. 1953, 78-19-3, enacted by L. 






ISSUES AND TRIAL 
Section 
78-21-1. Right to jury trial. 
78-21-2. Jury- to decide questions of fact. 
78-21-3. Court to decide questions of law. 
78-21-1. Right to ju ry trial . 
In actions for the recovery of specific real or personal property, with or 
without damages, or for money claimed as due upon contract or as damages for 
breach of contract, or for injuries, an issue of fact may be tried by a jury, unless 
a jury trial is waived or a reference is ordered. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943, Righttojury trial, Utah Const. Art. I, Sec. 10; 
Supp., 104-21-1. Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 38(a). 
Cross-References. — Demand for jury trial, Waiver of jury trial, Utah Const. Art. I, Sec. 
Utah Const. Art. I, Sec. 10; Rules of Civil 10; Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 38(d). 
Procedure, Rule 38(b). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS Specific performance action. 
Consolidation of causes of action. ~ . . , ,. - . 
Discretion of trial court. Consolidation of causes of action. 
Powers and functions of jury. ^ o r d e r f° r consolidation, for trial of the 
Quiet title actions. issue of liability, of eleven actions involving 
Rescission of instruments. nineteen plaintiffs claiming damages against 
Right to jury trial. the defendants did not violate this section. 
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ISSUES AND TRIAL 78-21-2 
78-21-2. Jury to decide questions of fact. 
All questions of fact, where the trial is by jury, other than those mentioned 
in Section 78-21-3, are to be decided by the jury, and all evidence thereon is to 
be addressed to them, except when otherwise provided. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943, 
Supp., 104-21-2; L. 1995, ch. 20, § 158. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1995 amend-
ment, effective May 1, 1995, substituted "Sec-
tion 78-21-3" for "the next section." 
Cross-References. — Contents of writings, 
recordings and photographs, determinations 
for jury, U.R.E. Rule 1008. 
Court submission of special findings to jury, 
U.R.C.R Rule 49(a). 
Court to charge that the jury are the exclu-
sive judges of all questions of fact, U.R.C.R 
Rule 51. 
Trial by jury or court, U.R.C.R Rules 39(a) to 
(0. 
Verdict may be general or special, U.R.C.R 
Rules 49(a), (b), 58A(a). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Consolidation of causes of action. 







Right to jury tr ial 
Cited. 
Consolidation of causes of action. 
The term *the jury" does not mean that one 
and the same jury must try all the issues in a 
case, but means that all questions of fact are to 
be decided by the jury impaneled to try such 
issues. Raggenbuck v. Suhrmann, 7 Utah 2d 
327, 325 P.2d 258 (1958). 
Drawing of inferences. 
While juries are given great latitude in de-
ducing inferences from established facts, they, 
nevertheless, are not permitted to base an 
inference upon an inference, nor may they, 
without reason, overturn legal presumptions or 
arbitrarily disregard positive statements of 
witnesses. Karren v. Bair, 63 Utah 344, 225 P. 
1094 (1924). 
Express warranty. 
The question of express warranty is properly 
submitted to the jury where the evidence is 
substantial and supports the essential ele-
ments which the plaintiff is required to prove. 
Park v. Moorman Mfg. Co., 121 Utah 339, 241 
P-2d 914, 40 A.L.R.2d 273 (1952). 
Negative testimony. 
The weight of negative testimony of wit-
nesses as to the giving of warning signals by 
railroad employees ordinarily is for the jury to 
determine; but when physical conditions and 
the attending circumstances are such as to 
render it highly improbable that they could 
make the observation, the rule is otherwise. 
Seybold v. Union Pac. R.R., 121 Utah 61, 239 
P.2d 174 (1951). 
Negligence. 
Generally the degree of care which a person 
must exercise for his own safety is a matter for 
the jury. Eisner v. Salt Lake City, 120 Utah 675, 
238 P.2d 416 (1950). 
Ordinarily, questions of negligence present 
questions of fact to be determined by the jury. 
Poulsen v. Manness, 121 Utah 269, 241 P.2d 
152 (1952). 
Matters of negligence generally are jury 
questions, unless the evidentiary facts are of 
such conclusive character as to require all rea-
sonable minds to conclude that the ultimate 
fact of negligence does or does not exist. Gibbs 
v. Blue Cab, Inc., 122 Utah 312, 249 P.2d 213 
(1952), aff'd, 123 Utah 281, 259 P.2d 294 (1953). 
Proximate cause. 
The question of proximate cause is a jury 
question. Park v. Moorman Mfg. Co., 121 Utah 
339, 241 P.2d 914, 40 A.L.R.2d 273 (1952). 
Matters of proximate cause generally are 
jury questions, unless the evidentiary facts are 
of such conclusive character as to require all 
reasonable minds to conclude that the ultimate 
fact of proximate cause does or does not exist. 
Gibbs v. Blue Cab, Inc., 122 Utah 312, 249 P.2d 




Trial court, in a quiet title action, properly 
submitted to the jury the question of the actual 
location of a disputed boundary corner. Hansen 
v. Stewart, 761 P.2d 14 (Utah 1988). 
363 
'78.21-3 JUDICIAL CODE 
Right to jury trial. 
Bight to have the jury pass upon issues of fact 
does not include the right to have a cause 
submitted to the jury in hope of a verdict where 
the facts undisputably show that the plaintiff is 
not entitled to relief. Raymond v. Union Pac. 
R.R., 113 Utah 26, 191 P.2d 137 (1948). 
Where there is substantial contradictory evi-
dence on both sides, the case must be given to 
the jury. Finlayson v. Brady, 121 Utah 204, 240 
P.2d 491 (1952). 
Cited in Home Sav. & Loan v. Aetna Cas. & 
Sur. Co., 817 P.2d 341 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. - 75AAm. Jur. 2d Trial § 719. 
C.J.S. - 88 C.J.S. Trial § 203 et seq. 
AX.R. — Failure to comply with statute 
regulating travel by pedestrian along highway 
as affecting right to recovery for injuries or 
death resulting from collision with automobile, 
45 A.L.R.3d 658. 
Key Numbers. — Trial «=» 134 et seq. 
78-21-3. Court to decide questions of law. 
All questions of law, including the admissibility of evidence, the facts 
preliminary to such admission, the construction of statutes and other writings, 
and the application of the rules of evidence are to be decided by the court and 
all discussions of law addressed to it. Whenever the knowledge of the court is 
by law made evidence of a fact, the court is to declare such knowledge to the 
jury, who are bound to accept it. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943, 
Supp., 104-21-3. 
Cross-References. — Contents of writings, 
recordings and photographs, determinations by 
court, Rules of Evidence, Rule 1008. 
Judicial notice, Rules of Evidence, Rule 201. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Existence of agency. 
Interpretation of statute. 
Legal effect of written instrument. 
Cited. 
Existence of agency. 
Where evidence in support of a particular 
agency is undisputed, the question of existence 
of agency is one of law for the court, but, where 
such agency is disputed, the question of the 
agency's existence is a mixed question of law 
and fact to be determined by the jury. 
McCornick v. Queen of Sheba Gold Mining & 
Milling Co., 23 Utah 71, 63 P. 820 (1900). 
Interpretation of statute. 
Meaning of the phrase "domestic or family 
remedies" in a statute delineating acts consti-
tuting the practice of medicine was a matter for 
determination by the court, not the jury. State 
v. Yee Foo Lun, 45 Utah 531,147 P. 488 (1915). 
Legal effect of written instrument. 
The legal effect of a written instrument is for 
the determination of the court as a matter of 
law. Verdi v. Helper State Bank, 57 Utah 502, 
196 P. 225, 15 A.L.R. 641 (1921). 
Cited in Hansen v. Stewart, 761 R2d 14 
(Utah 1988). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. 
§§ 717, 718. 
75A Am. Jur. 2d Trial C.J.S. - 88 C.J.S. Trial § 300. 
Key Numbers. - Trial e=» 213. 
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